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Arbitration.  In re Town of Little Compton, 37 A.3d 85 (R.I. 2012).  The 
Town of Little Compton contended that a local firefighter union, through its 
non-lawyer representative, had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law 
during an arbitration hearing against the Town. The Supreme Court declined 
to limit the practice of non-lawyers in labor arbitrations, but left the door 
open to further address the issue in the future. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In June of 2008, the Town of Little Compton (“Town”) and the 
Little Compton Firefighters Local 3957 (“Union”) entered into a 
collective bargaining agreement that governed the employment of 
the local firefighters.1 The agreement contained a provision 
stating that grievances were to be resolved through arbitration.2  
In February 2009, the union filed a claim against the Town for 
violating the agreement, and appointed a non-lawyer to represent 
the union in the arbitration proceedings. 
The Union’s claims were ultimately denied during the 
hearings, and the Town filed a petition with the Superior Court to 
enter a final judgment on behalf of the Town.3  After the 
arbitration hearing, but prior to the arbitration panel’s ruling in 
favor of the Town, the Town had also filed a formal complaint with 
the Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee (“UPLC”),4 stating 
that the Union had violated state law when represented by a non-
lawyer during the arbitration proceedings.5 
The UPLC formally notified the Union about the complaint 
and scheduled an investigative hearing, during which the Union 
was represented by an attorney authorized to practice law in 
 
 1.  In re Town of Little Compton, 37 A.3d 85, 86 (R.I. 2012). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. at 87. 
 4.  The Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee is a committee 
appointed by the Supreme Court, and charged with enforcing provisions 
regulating the permitted practice of law in the State. R.I. GEN. LAWS §11-27-
19 (1956). 
 5.   Town of Little Compton, 37 A.3d at 87. 
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Rhode Island.6  After the investigative hearing, a majority of the 
members of the UPLC found that the Union had technically 
violated the provisions prohibiting the unauthorized practice of 
law in the state.7  Nonetheless, because representation of labor 
unions by non-lawyers is common practice in Rhode Island, the 
committee deferred the matter to the Supreme Court.8 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Prior to addressing the issue, the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court delved into a historical background of labor arbitration, 
describing how opinions about arbitration evolved from its 
generally unfavorable view by courts at the turn of the twentieth-
century, to a common activity in modern disputes involving 
collective bargaining.9  The change came largely with the need to 
avoid disrupting production during wartime, and later became a 
“distinctive feature of our collective-bargaining system,” after a 
series of decisions on labor arbitration by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in the 1960’s.10 
As part of its analysis, the Court also examined how other 
jurisdictions had approached the issue. In Ohio, the Board of the 
Unauthorized Practice of Law of the Supreme Court determined, 
in an advisory opinion, that non-lawyer representation did not 
constitute the unauthorized practice of law despite the adversary 
nature of arbitration because parties do not “rely on the strict use 
of formal rules of civil procedure or evidence.”11  Similarly, the 
states of Connecticut, Utah, Washington and California, either by 
Court rule or statute, allowed for non-lawyer representation in 
arbitration proceedings arising under collective bargaining 
 
 6.   Id. at 87. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. at 87-88. 
 9.  Id. at 89. 
 10.  Id. at 89-90, citing generally to United Steelworkers of America v. 
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers of 
America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); and United 
Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) 
(all enforcing arbitration provisions included in collective-bargaining 
agreements). 
 11.  Id. at 90 (quoting Lawyer and Nonlawyer Representation of Labor 
Organizations in Collective Bargaining and Labor Grievance Arbitration, Op. 
No. UPL 2008–01, 3 (February 7, 2008)). 
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agreements.12 
The Court acknowledged that the minute number of states 
allowing for non-lawyer practice in labor arbitration did not 
indicate a trend, but it also asserted that, to the Court’s 
knowledge, no state had outlawed the practice as it pertained to 
labor arbitrations.13 
 
Rhode Island Analysis 
The Court began its Rhode Island analysis by reaffirming the 
sole authority of the Court to decide what the practice of law 
entails. The Court referred to the legislature’s attempt to codify 
what constituted the authorized practice of law, but ultimately 
reaffirmed that those statutory definitions14 served only to guide 
the Court in the regulation of the practice of law, not to grant the 
right to practice law irrespective of the Court’s authority.15  
Further, the Court also noted its limited role in the arbitration 
process, reviewing arbitration awards only under an 
“exceptionally deferential standard,” which helps legitimize the 
practice.16 
The Court later examined the extent of non-lawyer 
representation in labor arbitration in Rhode Island, finding it to 
be common practice.  In fact, prior labor arbitrations to which the 
Town was a party had also included other parties represented by 
non-lawyers.17  Common practice, noted the Court, should not 
alone validate non-lawyer representation in arbitration cases.18  
The Court then cited two instances where non-lawyer 
representation had been allowed in the state: employee-assistants 
aiding employees in informal hearings before the Department of 
Workers Compensation,19 and non-lawyers representing “unions 
 
 12.  Id. at 90-91. 
 13.  Id. at 91. 
 14.  The statute, in pertinent part, defines the practice of law as “the 
doing of any act for another person usually done by attorneys at law in the 
course of their profession,” including  acting as the “representative of another 
person before any … commission, board, or body authorized or constituted by 
law to determine any question of law or fact.” R.I. GEN. LAWS §11-27-2 (1956). 
 15.  Town of Little Compton, 37 A.3d at 91-92. 
 16.  Id. at 92. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. at 93 (citing Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. State, Dept. 
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and employers in unfair labor practice proceedings.”20 
In support of its decision, the Court also weighed the 
advantages of arbitration, which provides parties with an 
inexpensive and informal means of solving grievances, as well as 
the advantages that a non-lawyer working with the union would 
have, due to familiarity with the specific collective bargaining 
agreement and the operating practices at the organization.21  
Forcing the union to obtain a lawyer would formalize the process, 
encumber the proceedings and raise its costs, all of which would 
be detrimental to the nature of arbitration itself.22 
On the other hand, the Court analyzed the findings of the 
UPLC, which showed that the non-lawyer had engaged in 
presenting arguments and examining witnesses during the 
arbitration hearing, behaviors generally attributed to the practice 
of law.  Further, the Court remarked that the Practice of Law 
statute23 did not permit the practice by listing non-lawyer 
representation in labor arbitrations as an exception.24 
In the end, since the arbitration award was in favor of the 
Town and an adverse decision would greatly impact the way labor 
arbitrations were conducted in Rhode Island, the Court decided 
not to “disturb the status quo,”25 but left open the possibility that, 
under the supervisory powers of the Court, and with the 
participation of a full panel of justices, the Court could address the 
issue of non-lawyer representation in labor arbitrations in the 
future.26 
 
 
 
of Workers’ Comp., 543 A.2d 662, 666 (R.I. 1988)(“Acknowledging that, [while] 
the actions of the nonlawyer employee assistants generally [fell] within the 
definition of the practice of law,” the conduct was authorized by the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court because of public need)). 
 20.  Id. at 94. The Court references the Rhode Island State Labor 
Relation Board’s General Rules and Regulations which allows “[b]usiness 
managers, field agents, union stewards, or any other member(s) of a labor 
organization” to represent a union.  Id. (citing 16-020-001 R.I. Code R. § 
5.01.2(b)).  
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  R.I. GEN. LAWS §11-27-11 (1956). 
 24.  Town of Little Compton, 37 A.3d at 94. 
 25.  Id. at 95. 
 26.  Id. 
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COMMENTARY 
In its opinion, the Court did not want to constrain the practice 
of arbitration, seeing it as a beneficial tool to the legal system.  
However, it seemed to waiver on the decision to allow non-lawyer 
representation in arbitration hearings, for reasons which are not 
fully expounded in the 
For those expecting a definitive answer, this decision might 
point to a distasteful excess opinion, but apparent in its 
suggestion that it might re-examine the issue.of carefulness on the 
part of the Court.  However, the Court here is certainly prudent in 
delaying the issue for further consideration with the benefit of a 
full panel,27 perhaps even giving an opening to the legislature, 
which has the time and resources to fully analyze the 
consequences that such a ruling would have in labor dispute 
resolutions. 
 
CONCLUSION 
For now, at least, non-lawyers are allowed to represent 
parties in labor arbitrations proceedings which stem from a 
collective bargaining agreement.  However, it would not be a 
surprise if the rule changed in the near future. 
Antonio Massa Viana 
 
 
 27.  See id. 
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Civil Procedure.  Watson v. Fox, 44 A.3d 130 (R.I. 2012).  The Rhode 
Island Supreme Court held that plaintiffs lacked standing because plaintiffs 
urged that the process used by the General Assembly to allocate state funds 
to legislative grants for local and community nonprofit organizations 
violated the Rhode Island Constitution, yet the plaintiff’s complaint alleged 
no particularized or concrete injury not suffered by the public at large.  The 
Court reasoned that to grant an exception based on “taxpayer standing” in 
this case would work to undermine the standing requirement of an injury-in-
fact, specific and distinguishable from one suffered by the public at large, in 
order to meet the standing requirement for justiciability. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
The plaintiff, Robert Watson (“Watson”), along with nine 
colleagues of the Rhode Island House of Representatives, filed a 
complaint as taxpayers challenging the constitutionality of the 
General Assembly’s “legislative grant program.”1  Administered 
under the General Assembly’s Joint Committee on Legislative 
Services (“JCLS”), which adopted the application process for state 
grants, the legislative grant program provides for state funds to be 
awarded to nonprofit entities and community organizations.2  
Specifically, to begin the process, the legislative sponsor of the 
nonprofit or organization submits an application to the fiscal office 
of either the Rhode Island House or Senate.3  Thereafter, the final 
decision to award the grant rests with the Speaker of the House 
and the President of the Senate.4  As a condition of receiving state 
funds, an organization that is awarded a grant is responsible for 
preparing and submitting a “legislative grant expenditure report,” 
which details the planned expenditures to be made flowing from 
the award received.5 
 
 1.  Watson v. Fox, 44 A.3d 130, 132 (R.I. 2012). 
 2.  Id. at 132-33. 
 3.  Id. at 133. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
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In 2006, the JCLS proposed an appropriation of $2.3 million 
for “other grants” as a line item of the Fiscal Year 2008 budget.6  
The appropriation divided the grant expenses among the 
executive, legislative, and judicial branches, but did not include 
line items for each individual award or amount to be distributed to 
local and community recipients of state funds.7  The budget, and 
the appropriations therein, were passed by the General Assembly 
and vetoed shortly thereafter by the Governor.8  The General 
Assembly successfully overrode the Governor’s veto in June of 
2007, as the budget act received more than the constitutionally-
required two-thirds majority vote in the Rhode Island House and 
Senate.9 
The plaintiffs’ central argument in challenging the process of 
allocating $2.3 million in “other grants” is that the process failed 
to include grants of state funds as specific line items in the 
budget, a failure which “deprived legislators of information. . .that 
they were voting to allot $2.3 million of public funds for local 
and/or private purposes.”10  The plaintiffs requested declaratory 
relief in their complaint, specifically for a court to rule that the 
legislative grant allocation process is unconstitutional.  In 
response, defendants filed a motion to dismiss that raised a two-
fold argument: first, that the plaintiffs’ complaint should be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, as the plaintiffs failed to allege an “injury-in-fact 
distinguishable from that suffered by” the general public; and 
second, that a court could not honor plaintiffs’ request for 
declaratory relief, as granting a declaration would force a court to 
rule on a political question contra to justiciability principles.11 
At a hearing before the Superior Court in 2008, the motion 
justice credited defendants’ arguments and granted their motion 
to dismiss, ruling that the plaintiffs’ complaint failed to meet the 
injury-in-fact requirement of standing and moreover that the 
 
 6.  Id.  
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. at 133-34.  
 10.  Id. at 134. Plaintiffs also contended that the administration of the 
legislative grant program solely by the speaker of the House and president of 
the Senate “usurped” the role of the executive, but this argument was not 
reached by the Court in its final decision. Id. 
 11.  Id.  
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plaintiffs’ claim requested “a political solution to an in-house 
legislative branch quarrel” and therefore constituted a 
nonjusticiable political question.12  Only one plaintiff, Watson, 
completed a timely appeal, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
granted review.13 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Court reviewed the Superior Court decision to determine 
whether the plaintiff was “entitled to relief under any conceivable 
set of facts,”14 and more specifically, to determine whether the 
plaintiff had standing to challenge the budget appropriation of 
legislative grants.15  The plaintiff argued that even if the Court 
determined that his claim did not allege an “injury-in-fact” 
sufficient to meet the requirement of standing, the Court should 
find: (1) that the plaintiff’s claim should be viewed in light of Flast 
v. Cohen,16 a U.S. Supreme Court case holding that plaintiff 
taxpayers had a “sufficiently strong interest” in ensuring 
appropriate spending of public funds;17 and (2) that the 
“substantial public interest” exception, used on rare occasion by 
the Court, permitted the Court to determine the merits of the case 
at bar.18 
Initially, the Court reviewed whether the plaintiff had 
standing as a taxpayer to challenge the constitutionality of the 
legislative grant appropriations.19  The Court examined 
specifically the injury requirement of standing, explaining: “[t]o 
satisfy the standing requirement, a plaintiff must allege ‘that the 
challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or 
otherwise.’”20  Further, the injury must be “particularized” and 
must derive from the plaintiff’s “stake in the outcome that 
distinguishes his claims from the claims of the public at large.”21  
 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. at 132. 
 14.  Id. at 135. 
 15.  Id.  
 16.  392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
 17.  Id. at 137. 
 18.  Id. at 138. 
 19.  Id. at 135-38. 
 20.  Id. at 135 (citing Rhode Island Opthalmological Society v. Cannon, 
317 A.2d 124, 128 (R.I. 1974)). 
 21.  Id. at 136 (quoting Bowen v. Mollis, 945 A.2d 314, 317 (R.I. 2008)).  
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“Mere interest” in a problem is insufficient itself to bring about 
the harm required to sustain a claim of injury in fact,22 as are 
“generalized claims alleging purely public harm.”23  While the 
plaintiff here urged the Court to adhere to Flast precedent,24 the 
Court declined the chance to grant such “taxpayer standing” and 
to make such a “radical departure” from the Court’s long-
established standing principles.25 
Finally, the Court addressed plaintiff’s argument that the 
“substantial public interest exception” should apply.26  However, 
since the plaintiff failed to take actions to include all potentially 
interested parties in the litigation, the Court was not persuaded 
that this case was an appropriate one in which the “substantial 
public interest” exception should apply.27  Moreover, the Court 
was unwilling to allow the plaintiff to seek relief more akin to an 
advisory opinion under the guise of a request for a declaratory 
judgment.28 
The Court affirmed the decision of the Superior Court and 
granted defendants’ motion to dismiss.29  Placing a strong 
emphasis on Rhode Island standing doctrine and jurisprudence, 
the Court concluded: “if we were to dispense with the requirement 
of standing here, in the words of Chief Justice Warren, it would 
tend to ‘distort the role of the Judiciary in its relationship to the 
Executive and the Legislature’ and would verge on ‘government by 
injunction.’”30 
 
 
 22.  Id. at 136 (quoting Blackstone Valley Chamber of Commerce v. 
Public Utilities Commission, 452 A.2d 931, 933 (R.I. 1982)). 
 23.  Id. at 136 (citing In re Review of Proposed Town of New Shoreham 
Project, 193 A.3d 1226, 1227-29 (R.I. 2011)). 
 24.  Flast, 392 U.S. at 88 (holding that certain taxpayer plaintiffs had a 
“sufficiently strong interest” in the government expenditures of public funds, 
such that they met the standing requirement).  
 25.  Id. at 137-38. In addition, the Court reasoned that plaintiff’s 
supporting cases were either inaccurate or ill-fit for analogy to the case at 
hand, and that the relief plaintiff seeks (declaratory relief) is inconsistent 
with the relief typically sought under the “taxpayer standing” exception. Id. 
 26.  Id. at 138. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. at 138. 
 29.  Id. at 139. 
 30.  Id. at 139 (citing Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the 
War, 418 U.S. 208, 222 (R.I. 1964)).  
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COMMENTARY 
In this case, the Rhode Island Supreme Court took the 
opportunity, first and foremost, to emphasize the well-respected 
and long-standing approach in Rhode Island to matters of 
justiciability.  This case illustrated the Court’s unwillingness to 
override or overlook the standing requirement to any agree, 
stressing that doing so would be “imprudent” and would weaken 
the “concrete adverseness” that a court must identify before 
“address[ing] thorny constitutional questions.”31  Constitutional 
considerations, such as separation of powers and safeguarding the 
system of checks and balances, were surely in mind as the Court 
resolved the issues here, particularly concerns of ensuring that 
the judiciary is refrained from improperly exercising its authority 
and is limited to resolving justiciable disputes. 
The Court alludes to these concerns in its discussion of 
advisory opinions, making it clear that the Court will not grant a 
request for declaratory relief if such relief would amount virtually 
to an advisory opinion from the Court.32  While such advisory 
opinions are permissible under Rhode Island law (in contrast to 
federal courts), they must be properly sought through written 
request of the Governor or either House of the General Assembly 
“only when the questions propounded concern the 
constitutionality of pending legislation. . .[or] existing statutes.”33  
Specifically in reference to Watson’s claim as a taxpayer, the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court cautiously rejected the chance to 
alter existing standing and justiciability jurisprudence to allow a 
“taxpayer exception” in such a way that would loosen and relax 
the standing requirement.34 
However, the Court does little to clarify in its analysis what 
exactly the “substantial public interest exception” entails.35  
Merely indicating that the exception might apply “[o]n rare 
 
 31.  Id. at 138-39 (citing Flast, 392 U.S. at 99; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 
186, 204 (1962)). 
 32.  Id. at 137-38. 
 33.  Id. at 136 (citing In re Advisory Opinion (Chief Justice), 507 A.2d 
1316, 1319 (R.I. 1986)). 
 34.  Id. at 138. 
 35.  Id.  
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occasions” at the Court’s discretion,36 the Court fails to describe 
what elements plaintiffs may need to allege, or factors the Court 
might consider, in assessing whether the exception applies.  The 
fact that plaintiffs failed to take any steps to join all interested 
parties in the litigation clearly influenced the Court’s analysis and 
ultimate decision, but the extent to which it did is unclear.37  The 
decision leaves unresolved some substantial questions about the 
public interest exception, as to both its substance and application; 
further, it begs questions peculiar to the case at hand: would the 
issues be decided differently if Watson had just attempted to “join 
all the interested parties”38 potentially affected by the 
appropriations process, and if not, what else might Watson have 
needed to allege here that would have met the exception’s 
standard?  Watson reinforces the Rhode Island constitutional 
injury-in-fact requirement of standing, but discusses a critical 
applicable exception in passing only, leaving litigants in the dark 
as to the exception’s elements, reasoning, or application. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the Superior 
Court’s decision that the plaintiffs in the present case failed to 
allege an injury sufficient to meet the standing requirement, 
therefore their claim was nonjusticiable.  In order for a plaintiff to 
have standing, he must be able to allege in the complaint the 
experience of some concrete and particularized injury other than 
one suffered by the public at large.  The Court also refused to 
apply the public interest exception and declined to adopt the 
“taxpayer standing” theory, reemphasizing the importance of the 
injury-in-fact requirement of standing in Rhode Island 
jurisprudence. 
 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. The Court explains: “if a court were to reach the merits of this 
case, and if plaintiff prevailed, the rights of these absent parties 
unquestionably would be affected.” Id. It is clear that the Court is concerned 
about issuing a binding judgment where all parties or interests are not 
represented or voiced, but again, the Court still fails to elaborate on or 
explain this factor (and others) that are critical to the analysis centering 
around the substantial public interest exception. See id. 
 38.  Id. 
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Contract Law.  Mut. Dev. Corp. v. Ward Fisher & Co., LLP, 47 A.3d 319 
(R.I. 2012).  The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a finder’s fee in a 
real estate contract needs to be in a signed writing in order to be enforceable.  
The applicability of the Statute of Frauds to a contract is determined by the 
nature of the transaction, not who the parties are.  In addition, the word 
“commission” in subsection 6 of the Statute of Frauds is broad enough to 
encompass any type of payments, including a finder’s fee. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In September 2001, the defendants, Ward Fisher & Co., LLP 
(“Ward Fisher”) and WF Realty & Investment, LLC (“WF Realty”) 
were searching the market to purchase a commercial building for 
their new accounting offices.1  The defendants met with Stephen 
Soscia, the president of Mutual Development Corporation, who 
first introduced two properties to the defendants for lease.2  The 
defendants were not interested in the first two properties.3  
Ultimately, the defendants were interested in purchasing 
properties rather than leasing them.4 
In September 2002, Mr. Soscia found a property located at 
250 Centerville Road, Warwick, RI which met the defendants’ 
requirements.5  The defendants admit that they had no knowledge 
of the property prior to its introduction by Mr. Soscia.6  The 
defendant, Ward Fisher, decided to make an offer on the 
Centerville property and during the discussion Mr. Soscia alleges 
the topic of a finding fee came up.7  Later, Ward Fisher submitted 
an offer for the property and later counter-offered with a higher 
 
 1.  Mut. Dev. Corp. v. Ward Fisher & Co., LLP, 47 A.2d 319, 321 (R.I. 
2012).   
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id.  
 5.  Id.  
 6.  Id.  
 7.  Id. at 321-22. 
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bid to purchase the property.8  Mr. Soscia helped defendants 
create an initial bid, but the seller rejected it for another offer.9  
Later, the defendants, without the aid of Mr. Soscia, pursued the 
property until an agreement was struck with the seller.10 
On February 20, 2007, the plaintiff sued the defendants in the 
Superior Court for Kent County for breach of contract, fraud, and 
unjust enrichment.11  The defendants answered asserting the 
affirmative defense of the Statute of Frauds and argued the 
plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted.12  After discovery the defendants moved for summary 
judgment on all counts upon which plaintiffs objected.13 
At the November 10, 2008 summary judgment hearing, 
plaintiff argued that the finder’s fee is not subject to the Statute of 
Frauds.14  The defendants alleged that the plaintiff sought to 
recover a fee based upon defendants’ purchase of the property 
which requires section 6 of the Statute of Frauds to apply.15 
At the hearing the justice held that the Statute of Frauds was 
so broad that it prohibited even a finder’s fee.16  In order for a 
broker or finder to receive the commission they need to have a 
written agreement; therefore, any oral agreement is 
unenforceable.17  The justice granted summary judgment in favor 
of the defendants.18 
After the defendants moved for an entry of final judgment, the 
plaintiff filed an objection, alleging the justice failed to make a 
decision in regard to plaintiff’s fraud claim.19  The hearing 
justice’s later ruling granted summary judgment for defendants on 
 
 8.  Id. at 322. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id.    
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id.  
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. at 322; See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-1-4 (1956) (“no action shall be 
brought whereby to charge any person upon any agreement or promise to pay 
any commission for or upon the sale of any interest in real estate”). 
 16.  Mut. Dev. Corp., 47 A.3d at 322.  
 17.  Id. The Court went on to discuss that a sophisticated party such as 
Mutual Development should have known the importance of obtaining a 
written document.  Id. at 322. 
 18.  Id.  
 19.  Id.  
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all claims and a final judgment was issued.20  The plaintiffs later 
appealed.21 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island heard the case on appeal 
under a de novo review and sought to reconcile plaintiff’s alleged 
distinction between finders and brokers for purposes of 
applicability to the Statute of Fraud and how the word 
“commission” in the Statute of Frauds should be interpreted.22 
Plaintiff argued that subsection  6 of the Statute of Frauds is 
applicable only to brokers and agents and not to finders because 
there is a “well-recognized distinction” between brokers and 
finders.23  In response defendants argue that the distinction 
between a broker and a finder is inapplicable under the Statute of 
Frauds and the ultimate determination of applicability is not who 
the parties are but what the nature of the underlying deal is.24 In 
its review the Court agreed with the defendant’s interpretation of 
the Statute of Frauds determining that the Statute of Frauds 
draws no distinction between a broker and finder, and any 
individual or entity seeking a finder’s fee must have evidence of a 
written agreement signed by the party to be charged.25 
In support of their opinion, the Court examined previous 
decisions which declined to focus on a distinction between a finder 
and broker because the determination of applicability to the 
 
 20.  Id. at 322-23. 
 21.  Id. at 323. 
 22.  See id. at 323-24.   
 23.  Id. at 324 (citing Brochu v. Santis, 939 A.2d 449 (R.I. 2008)(holding 
“we need not dwell on the distinction between a finder’s fee and a commission 
since at most, the transaction at issue reflected an agreement to pay a 
commission and therefore the oral agreement was unenforceable due to its 
failure to comply with the Statute of Frauds); Bottomley v. Coffin, 399 A.2d 
485 (R.I. 1979)(holding “the Statute of Frauds did not bar the suit since the 
nature of the transaction was the sale of business and not about the 
distinction between a finder and broker).; Fishbein v. Zexter, 270 A.2d 510, 
512 (R.I. 1970)(holding “the applicability of subsection 6 of the Statute of 
Frauds, it is the nature of the underlying transaction that is determinative 
and not whether the person attempting to enforce the agreement is a finder 
or a broker”). 
 24.  Id. at 324.   
 25.  Id. at 324-28;  see R.I. GEN LAW § 9-1-4. 
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Statute of Frauds rested upon the nature of the transaction.26  In 
addition, the Court determined that the Statute of Frauds was 
inherently broad enough to require a finder’s agreement to be in 
writing.27  From a public policy perspective, the Court feared  
individuals would be able to undermine the intent and 
effectiveness of the Statute of Frauds simply by labeling 
themselves as finders and not brokers to avoid the writing 
requirement.28 
Next, the plaintiff argues that the presence of the word 
“commission” under subsection 6 is stated in terms of its well-
established common meaning of percentage-based compensation 
and not in terms of other forms of compensation, such as a finder’s 
fee.29  The defendants disagreed with plaintiff’s definition of 
“commission,” contending that the term commission refers to both 
percentage-based and flat-fee compensation.30 
The Court disagreed with the plaintiff’s characterization of 
the term “commission.”31  The Court determined that when a word 
is not defined by the statute, it is the Court’s practice to employ 
the common meaning of the word provided by recognized 
dictionaries.32  None of the dictionaries examined by the Court 
described “commission” only relating to percentage-based 
compensation.33  The Court concluded that that word 
“commission” under the Statute of Frauds encompasses any type 
of payment, including a finder’s fees.34 
Finally, the Court wanted to uphold the “public-protection”  
purpose of the Statute of Frauds.35  The purpose of the Statute of 
 
 26.  Mut. Dev. Corp., 47 A.3d at 325-27 (citing Brochu v. Santis, 939 A.2d 
449, 453 (R.I. 2008); Bottomley v. Coffin, 399 A.2d 485 (R.I. 1979); Fishbein v. 
Zexter, 270 A.2d 510 (1970)).    
 27.  Id. at 327 (quoting 12 Am. Jur. 2d Brokers § 70 (2012)). 
 28.  Id. at 327(citing Buckingham v. Stille, 379 N.W.2d 30, 33 (Iowa Ct. 
App. 1985)).    
 29.  Id. at 324 
 30.  Id.  
 31.  Id. at 329. 
 32.  Id. at 328-29. 
 33.  Id. (citing Black’s Laws Dictionary 306 (9th ed. 2009); The American 
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 371 (4th ed. 2009); The Random 
House Dictionary of the English Language 412 (2d. ed. 1987)).   
 34.  Id. at 329.  The court also wanted to make sure to keep in accord 
with the intent of the General Assembly.  Id. at 328. 
 35.  Id. at 330.   
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Frauds was to protect the public against “unfounded claims” and 
foster certainty in contract formation and not based upon “loose 
statements.”36  The court was concerned that to allow plaintiff’s to 
separate themselves from the Statute of Frauds would defeat its 
purpose to protect the public from “unfounded claims” and 
potentially open up the “floodgates of litigation” which have been 
“closed” by the Statute’s clarity and unambiguity.37 
 
COMMENTARY 
Before the Rhode Island Supreme Court even began their 
analysis on the issues the Court had already made it quite clear 
they intended to remain constantly aware of the underlying 
principles of the Statute of Frauds.38  The Court was mindful that 
in order to fulfill the public policy behind the Statute of Frauds it 
required strict enforcement.39  “To do so otherwise would defeat 
the basic purpose of the statute.”40  Before the analysis was even 
conducted one could get the general sense the court was leaning to 
the defendant’s side.  It appears the Court wanted to remain in 
strict compliance with the Statute of Frauds and was not prepared 
to grant any exceptions to the long-standing statute and its 
principles. 
In addition, the Court emphasized the Statute’s clear and 
unambiguous language.41  When a statute’s language is not 
subject to multiple interpretations and the words are 
unambiguous, the Court must give the words their plain and 
ordinary meanings as a means to honor and give effect to the 
General Assembly’s general intent.42  It is reinforced by the Court 
that if the legislative body wanted to create exceptions to the 
Statute they would have specifically made it clear and evident. 
Another matter that the Court correctly reinforces is the need 
 
 36.  Id. at 329 (quoting Brochu, 939 A.2d at 453-54). 
 37.  Id. at 330 (quoting Heyman v. Adeack Realty Co., 228 A.2d 578, 582 
(R.I. 1967). 
 38.  Id. at 324. 
 39.  Id. (quoting Heyman, 228 A.2d at 582).  
 40.  Id. (quoting Heyman, 228 A.2d at 582).   
 41.  Id. at 328.   
 42.  Id. (quoting DeMarco v. Travelers Insurance Co., 26 A.3d 585, 616 
(R.I. 2011); Planned Env’ts Mgmt. Corp. v. Robert 966 A.2d 117, 121(R.I. 
2008)).    
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to have everything down in a written, signed agreement, 
especially for major business transactions.  As the hearing court 
noted, a sophisticated business party like Mutual Development 
should have recognized the importance of placing the finder’s fee 
in the written document.43  From a practical perspective this 
concept cannot be underestimated.  So many costs, expenses, and 
legal suits could have been squarely avoided if the parties had just 
taken the time to write the fees and clauses within the agreement.  
This is a simple case that delivers an important lesson. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that when it comes to 
the Statute of Frauds it does not open the door for a distinction 
between a finder and a broker.  The Court supports this decision 
on the long-standing principle that the applicability of the Statute 
of Frauds is ultimately determined by the nature of the 
transaction, not who the parties are.  In addition, to allow the 
plaintiff to find its way around the Statute of Frauds based upon 
their characterization would go against the overall purposes of 
protecting the public from unfounded claims and placing a stopper 
on frivolous lawsuits. 
Adam Forsblom 
 
 
 
 43.  Id. at 322. 
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Contract Law.  Sophie F. Bronowiski Mulligan Irrevocable Trust v. Todd 
Arthur Bridges, 44 A.3d 116 (R.I. 2012).  In a breach of contract action, the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the clear and unambiguous language 
set forth in a residential lease agreement was controlling and the proper 
measure of damages for repairing the damaged wallpaper in the historic 
home was the cost of repair rather than diminution of value. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
A Brown University graduate student (“Tenant”) was accused 
of breaching his lease agreement when he painted over expensive 
wallpaper in the historic home of the plaintiff, the Sophie F. 
Bronowiski Mulligan Irrevocable Trust (“Landlord”), and failed to 
make his last month’s rent payment.1  The Tenant, Todd Arthur 
Bridges, signed a lease agreement with the Landlord on 
September 3, 2004.2  The agreement gave him access to the 
second, third, and fourth floors of the 1862 home located at 151 
Benefit Street in Providence, Rhode Island.3  The Landlord 
alleged in its complaint that its damages included “$1,600 in 
unpaid rent, $25,000 for repairs to the property, punitive 
damages, costs and attorneys’ fees.”4 
The lease agreement described the property and its historic 
nature, the Tenant’s responsibility for any property damage, and 
the Tenant’s liability if any legal action was necessary to enforce 
the lease.5  After the Tenant moved out of the home on September 
 
 1.  Sophie F. Bronowiski Mulligan Irrevocable Trust v. Bridges, 44 A.3d 
116, 117 (R.I. 2012).  
 2.  Id. at 118. 
 3.  Id.  
 4.  Id. at 117. 
 5.  Id. at 118.  Paragraphs 21 and 15 of the lease agreement provide: 
 
21. Historic property. Tenant acknowledges that the rented 
premises is a unique historically significant house which has been 
carefully and meticulously restored with the advice of historical 
experts on Victorian and 18th century design. Should any part of the 
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5, 2006, the Landlord filed a complaint alleging that the Tenant 
breached the express terms of the lease by painting several parts 
of the house without the Landlord’s permission.6  In his answer, 
the Tenant did not deny painting parts of the home.7  Instead, he 
alleged that the home had been damaged by smoke and that 
painting was necessary to fix the damage.8 
On July 21, 2010, a bench trial was held at the Providence 
County Superior Court in which only the Landlord was 
represented by counsel.9  Ronald Dwight was called as the first 
 
decorated surfaces of the house, including the woodwork or plaster 
work, be chipped or any wallpaper be torn or marked for any reason 
other than aging or settling or a casualty of which the Tenant has 
not been a proximate cause, Tenant agrees to restore the same to the 
same condition as when the premises were received. Tenant 
acknowledges that all colors are custom mixed and must be exactly 
matched to the present color scheme. If exact matching is not 
possible, this may involve repainting or wallpapering large areas to 
obtain visual integrity. Removal of all finger marks and restoration 
of the woodwork and wallpaper to the condition at the beginning of 
the lease term will be the Tenant's financial responsibility at the end 
of the lease term. If Landlord must restore the premises after 
Tenant's surrender of possession, Tenant will be liable for the 
expense and acknowledges that special restorers and experts in 
painting may be required at more than normal expense to perform 
such work. … If Tenant wishes to paint any room, tenant will obtain 
first obtain [sic ] permission and then Landlord as to color and finish 
[sic ] and Landlord will supply all materials. Painting must be down 
[sic ] to landlord's specifications. 
 
15. Legal action to enforce lease. Should any legal action be 
required by the Landlord to enforce any of the obligations of this 
lease or to obtain compensation for any damage to the property 
under an action separate from the lease, Tenant agrees to pay 
reasonable attorney's [sic ] fees and costs should any court of 
competent jurisdiction render a judgment in Landlord's favor to 
collect for unpaid rent, damages to the property of any kind, to 
obtain possession of the premises, or to obtain an injunction against 
improper use of the property or behavior thereon, or an order to 
obtain compliance with any provision of the lease. 
 
Id.   
 6.  Id. at 119. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id.  The Tenant also suggested in his answer that, “he and plaintiff 
agreed to apply his security deposit toward the last month’s rent.”  Id.  
 9.  Id.  However, the Landlord’s attorney, Ronald A. Dwight, was forced 
to withdraw his representation because he was scheduled to testify as a 
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witness to testify on the Landlord’s behalf.10  He testified that the 
Tenant painted five areas of the home in violation of the lease’s 
terms and drops of paint had damaged the recently refinished 
wood floors.11  Tiffany Adams was the Landlord’s second 
witness.12  She testified very specifically as to the process and 
costs of replacing the very expensive wallpaper.13  She also stated 
that, in her opinion, if the entire space was not re-wallpapered, 
“the overall appearance of the hallway and stairwell ‘absolutely’ 
would be affected.”14  However, when Ms. Adams was cross-
examined, she conceded that the stairwell walls that the Tenant 
painted were separated from the hallway by a wooden border and 
estimated that merely twelve to fourteen rolls of paper would be 
needed to wallpaper the hallway.15  Finally, the Landlord called 
the Tenant as an adverse witness in which the Tenant “conceded 
that he painted a portion of the third-floor bathroom, the stair 
tread, and the hallway adjacent to the stairwell without 
permission from the plaintiff.”16  After the Landlord rested its 
case, the Tenant then testified on his own behalf.17  He apologized 
for breaching the lease by painting certain areas of the home and 
failing to pay his last month’s rent, but that he should not be held 
responsible for paying to re-wallpaper the entire stairwell.18 
The trial justice delivered the bench decision holding that the 
Tenant had to pay the Landlord the last month’s rent of $1,600 
plus interest.19  She found that although the defendant admitted 
to breaching the lease by painting the wallpaper without 
permission, “[the] plaintiff failed to meet its burden of proving by 
a preponderance of the evidence that ‘the painting of the affected 
areas has so materially affected the aesthetics and overall 
 
witness.  See id. at 119  n.4.  The Landlord argued that the trial justice erred 
in forcing the attorney to withdraw but since it did not pursue this argument 
further, the Court found the issue moot.  Id. at 120 n.5.   
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. at 120. 
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presentation of the property’ that defendant should be saddled 
with the cost of re-wallpapering the entire stairwell in addition to 
the hallway.”20  The trial justice refused to award more than the 
unpaid rent in damages because “the evidence is such that [she] 
would only be speculating if [she] were to arbitrarily pick a 
different dollar amount of compensation.”21  The Landlord filed a 
timely appeal alleging that the damages amount was wrongly 
determined and that the trial justice failed to award the attorney’s 
fees as agreed in the lease.22 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Upon review of the Superior Court’s order, the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court first addressed whether the amount of damages 
awarded to the Landlord were correct.23  The Court focused on Ms. 
Adams’ expert testimony, which she “testified with great 
specificity about the cost of re-wallpapering the grand foyer, 
stairwell, and hallway of 151 Benefit Street.”24  She also testified 
that if the entire stairwell was not re-wallpapered, the “‘visual 
integrity’ would be compromised.”25  The Court thus found that 
based on fundamental principles of contract and state law, when a 
contract is “clear and unambiguous,” that language is 
controlling.26  Furthermore, where there is temporary rather than 
permanent damage, the proper measure is the cost of repair and 
not the diminution in value.27  The Court pointed to specific 
language in the lease providing that “‘Tenant agrees to restore the 
same to the same condition as when the premises were 
received. . .If exact matching is not possible, this may involve 
repainting or wallpapering large areas to obtain visual 
 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. at 117.   
 23.  Id. at 120.  “‘[T]he standard of review of a trial justice findings on 
damages is quite differential.’”  Id. (quoting Riley v. St. Germain, 723 A.2d 
1120, 1122 (R.I. 1999) (citation omitted)).     
 24.  Id.   
 25.  Id. at 121. 
 26.  Id. (quoting Elias v. Youngken, 493 A.2d 158, 163 (R.I. 1985)).  
 27.  Id. (citing Tortolano v. DiFilippo, 349 A.2d 48, 52 (R.I. 1975).  
Diminution in value is a more appropriate measure when the damage is 
permanent.  Id.   
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integrity.’”28  Therefore, the Court held that based on the clear 
language of the lease agreement and Ms. Adams testimony, “the 
trial justice erred when she determined damages because she 
appear[ed] to have applied the ‘diminution of value’ standard 
rather than the ‘cost of repair’ standard.”29 
The Court then reviewed the Landlord’s argument that the 
trial justice erred by not awarding attorney’s fees.30  The trial 
justice’s ruling on the attorney’s fees is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion.31  Although the Court follows the “American Rule”32 
when awarding attorney’s fees, the Court again pointed to the 
clear language of the contract, providing that “the defendant 
agreed ‘to pay reasonable attorney’s [sic] fees and costs’ if the legal 
action was required to ‘obtain compensation for any damage to the 
property.’”33  Therefore, the Court held that the trial justice 
abused her discretion in failing to award plaintiff the attorney’s 
fees.34  The Court affirmed the unpaid rent award of $1,600, plus 
interest, but remanded the case to the Superior Court for a 
hearing on the issue of damages for the repair of the historic 
property and to award attorneys’ fees.35 
 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court clearly followed established 
principles of contract law.36  The Court’s focus was on the “clear 
and unambiguous” language of the lease agreement.37  The 
Landlord sought to protect his historic property by carefully 
 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id.  However, the Court also held that  “the trial justice did not err 
by not awarding damages for” the other claims of damage to property such as 
“the improperly painted stair tread, the two third-floor bedrooms, or the 
woodwork that defendant allegedly spattered with paint” because the 
plaintiff failed  to present any evidence as to what the cost of repair would be.  
Id. at 121-22.     
 30.  Id. at 122. 
 31.  Id.  
 32.  “[L]itigants are generally responsible for their own attorney’s fees 
and costs.”  Id. (quoting Napier v. Epoch Corp., 971 A.2d 594, 598 n.4 (R.I. 
2009)). 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id.  
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. at 121-22. 
 37.  Id.  
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drafting the lease agreement.  The Tenant agreed to the lease’s 
terms when he signed the document and began living in the home.  
As stated by the Court, the lease clearly stated the intent of the 
parties and their obligations.  Thus, it would be unfair to allow the 
Tenant to pay only the last month’s unpaid rent when the lease 
clearly stated that he was responsible for any damage done to the 
property and any attorney’s fees.38 
 
CONCLUSION 
In Sophie F. Bronowiski Mulligan Irrevocable Trust v. Todd 
Arthur Bridges, the Rhode Island Supreme court held that when a 
lease agreement’s language is clear and unambiguous, the parties 
are bound to that agreement.  Furthermore, when damages can be 
ascertained with specificity, the cost of repair standard should be 
applied rather than the diminution in value. 
Joceline Rocha 
 
 
 38.  See id. at 122. 
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Criminal Law.  State v. Carpio, 43 A.3d 1 (R.I. 2012).  The Rhode Island 
Supreme Court concluded that murdering a police officer in the line of duty 
was an aggravating factor sufficient to uphold the defendant’s sentence of 
life imprisonment without parole; that jury instructions which adequately 
cover the relevant law may include statements clarifying the jury’s role in 
the proceedings; and that a defendant’s failure to raise an issue at trial 
waives the defendant’s right to appeal on that issue. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In the span of a single day, Esteban Carpio (“Mr. Carpio”), the 
defendant, escaped from two of his victims and law enforcement 
authorities three times, leaving a critically injured elderly woman 
and a fatally wounded police detective in his wake.1 
The twenty-four hour crime spree began midday, when Mr. 
Carpio tried to rob Madeline Gatta (“Mrs. Gatta”) in front of her 
home.2  With his face hidden by a scarf and hat, Mr. Carpio 
stabbed Mrs. Gatta in the back near the strap of her purse, then 
fled the scene in a red van.3  Though he later changed cars, telling 
his girlfriend he wanted to get another car, one of Mrs. Gatta’s 
neighbors took down the red van’s registration, and police used 
that information to track down Mr. Carpio.4  Later in the day, 
officers apprehended Mr. Carpio at his home, and the defendant 
offered no resistance.5 
At the police station, detectives brought Mr. Carpio to a 
conference room for questioning and removed his handcuffs.6  
Several detectives made “small talk” with Mr. Carpio, but the 
questions became more probing with the arrival of Detective Allen 
 
 1.   State v. Carpio, 43 A.3d 1, 3-5 (R.I. 2012). 
 2.   Id. at 3. 
 3.   Id.  Mrs. Gatta’s injuries were severe:  the stab wound could not be 
closed for two days and required hospitalization.  Id. at 3. 
 4.   Id. at 3, 4. 
 5.   Id. at 4. 
 6.   Id. 
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(“Det. Allen”), who conducted much of the interview with Mr. 
Carpio.7  Though initially reticent, Mr. Carpio became “agitated” 
during the course of the interview, as Det. Allen made clear the 
seriousness of Mr. Carpio’s situation.8  At one point, only three 
people were in the room: Mr. Carpio, Det. Allen, and a third 
detective, Detective Timothy McGann (“Det. McGann”).9  Mr. 
Carpio asked for a glass of water, which Det. McGann left the 
room to retrieve.10 
Det. McGann returned and heard shouts and “sounds of a 
violent struggle” from inside the conference room.11  He tried to 
open the door, but found it locked from the inside.12  Gunshots 
rang out, and silence fell.13  Det. McGann called out to Det. Allen 
but heard nothing.14  As other officers arrived, Det. McGann 
“heard several more gunshots,” but nothing from Det. Allen.15  
When officers finally broke down the door, they discovered Det. 
Allen fatally injured on the floor.16  Det. Allen passed away a few 
hours later at Rhode Island Hospital.17 
The officers discovered Mr. Carpio’s escape during their 
search of the conference room and the adjoining office.18  It 
appeared Mr. Carpio shot out one of the windows in the adjoining 
office, leapt to the ground below, and left the murder weapon, Det. 
Allen’s service pistol, on the metal grate below the window.19 
Mr. Carpio took refuge at a friend’s apartment and requested 
a taxicab to New York City.20  His friend placed a phone call to a 
taxicab company offering $500 cash for the fare, and the 
 
 7.   Id. 
 8.   Id. 
 9.   Id. 
 10.   Id. at 5. 
 11.   Id. 
 12.   Id. 
 13.   Id. 
 14.   Id. 
 15.   Id. 
 16.   Id. 
 17.   Id. 
 18.   Id. 
 19.   Id. at 5.  This version of events was corroborated by an eyewitness 
passing by the Providence Public Safety Complex at the time of Mr. Carpio’s 
escape, who “heard the sound of shattering glass,” saw a man leap from one 
of the windows several stories up, and, apparently unhurt, stand and walk 
quickly away from the scene.  Id. at 5. 
 20.   Id. at 5. 
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dispatcher relayed the request to a driver.21  The dispatcher also 
told the driver about the recent shooting of a police officer, and 
cautioned the driver in picking up the fare.22  In a moment of 
startling prescience, the driver stopped to talk to a police officer 
and advise the officer that the next passenger could be the wanted 
shooter.23  Officers agreed to follow the driver to the pick-up.24  
When the taxicab arrived, Mr. Carpio went towards it, took a few 
seconds to look at the driver, and then dashed off into the night.25  
This third escape attempt would be the last for Mr. Carpio, as a 
number of officers apprehended the defendant.26 Mr. Carpio did 
not submit to arrest easily, “kick[ing] and flail[ing]” until he was 
physically subdued.27 
Mr. Carpio, charged with first-degree murder of a police 
officer, discharging a firearm while committing a crime of 
violence, and felony assault with a dangerous weapon, mounted 
an insanity defense.28  The expert for the defense, Dr. Steve 
Heisel, testified that Mr. Carpio “suffered from schizophrenia-
form psychosis” such that he was incapable of obeying the law.29  
The two experts for the prosecution, Drs. David Faust and Martin 
Kelly, each testified that in their expert opinions, Mr. Carpio was 
capable of obeying the law, and that mental illness did not 
“impair[]” Mr. Carpio from doing so.30 
The trial judge gave jury instructions on the insanity defense, 
noting that “the question of whether defendant is criminally 
 
 21.   Id. at 5, 6. 
 22.   Id. at 6. 
 23.   Id.  
 24.   Id. 
 25.   Id. 
 26.   Id. These officers included Rhode Island State Police Officers, 
Providence Police Officers, and F.B.I. officers.  Id. 
 27.   Id.  The Court fleshes out the details of this “violent struggle” in a 
footnote with the testimony of Rhode Island State Police Officer Christopher 
Zarrella, who described the officers tackling the defendant, and punching him 
in the face and head.  Id. 
 28.   Id. at 3, 6.  After his final apprehension, Mr. Carpio again submitted 
to a series of interviews during which he claimed not to remember any of 
incidents leading up to his second arrest, claimed that “a friend of his made 
him crazy,” claimed that “he heard voices,” and finally, claimed that “the 
devil” was to blame.  Id. at 6. 
 29.   Id. at 6. 
 30.   Id. at 6, 7.  Dr. Faust went so far as to say he believed “Carpio’s 
answers exhibited ‘gross malingering.’”  Id. at 7. 
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responsible is a question for the fact finder – the jury – to 
determine in light of community standards of blameworthiness.”31  
The jury found the defendant guilty on all charges, and the trial 
judge, taking account of all the circumstances of the defendant’s 
crimes and his background, imposed the maximum sentence 
under the law, essentially life imprisonment without parole, with 
two additional consecutive sentences on top of the life term.32  
Defense counsel did not move for a new trial nor a judgment of 
acquittal.33 
On appeal, the defendant raised three contentions: first, that 
the evidence was insufficient to “establish his criminal 
responsibility;”34 second, that the trial judge erred in instructing 
the jury by adding “community standards of blameworthiness” to 
the instruction;35 and third, that his sentence of life imprisonment 
without parole was “excessive and unwarranted.”36 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Insufficiency of the Evidence 
The Court did not entertain Mr. Carpio’s claim that the 
evidence was insufficient in light of his counsel’s failure to raise 
the issue at the trial court level.37  Discussing the Court’s “well-
settled raise-or-waive rule,” Justice Goldberg cited the dual 
rationale of judicial economy and fairness to opposing counsel, and 
laid out the proper procedural posture for such a challenge: “the 
trial justice’s denial of the defendant’s motions for judgment of 
acquittal and new trial.”38 
Mr. Carpio conceded, and the Court agreed, that the issue of 
 
 31.   Id. at 7. 
 32.   Id.  The sentence was as follows:  “life imprisonment without parole 
for the first-degree murder of a police officer; a consecutive term of life 
imprisonment for the discharge of a firearm while committing a crime of 
violence; and a consecutive term of twenty years to serve on the felony 
assault of Mrs. Gatta with a dangerous weapon.”  Id. 
 33.   Id.  
 34.   Id. at 8. 
 35.   Id. at 8, 10. 
 36.   Id. at 8, 13. 
 37.   Id. at 8.  
 38.   Id. (quoting State v. Lynch, 854 A.2d 1022, 1045-46 (R.I. 2004); 
State v. Pacheco, 763 A.2d 971, 976 (R.I. 2001); State v. Burke, 522 A.2d 725, 
731 (R.I. 1987)). 
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sufficiency of the evidence was not properly preserved for 
appellate review in the procedure described above.39  Thus 
defendant asserted instead that his right to appeal stemmed from 
a statutory right or, in the alternative, the plain error doctrine.40  
The Court dismissed Mr. Carpio’s other attempts to fashion a 
right to appellate review, noting first that the defendant brought 
forth no support for his claimed “statutory right,” and second, that 
Rhode Island “does not recognize the plain error doctrine.”41  The 
Court thus summarily dismissed Mr. Carpio’s claim of 
insufficiency of the evidence.42 
 
Jury Instructions 
The Court laid out the standard of review for jury 
instructions, stating that “[a] charge need only adequately cover 
the law,”43 and that the Court would “review the challenged 
portions in the context in which they were rendered.”44  The 
defendant drew the Court’s eye to the trial judge’s instruction 
regarding “community standards of blameworthiness,” viewing it 
as another hurdle for the defendant to clear in order to reach 
acquittal through the insanity defense.45 
The Court disagreed, discussing at length the role of the jury, 
particularly in the context of determining whether a defendant 
claiming insanity ought to be held criminally responsible for his 
acts.46  The discussion was a reminder of the jury’s role in fact-
finding, and that trials on the issue of insanity were not intended 
to be “usurped” by expert witnesses.47  Instead, experts provide 
 
 39.   Id. 
 40.   Id. at 9. 
 41.   Id.  The Court went on to note that there may exist “extraordinary 
circumstances” in which a defendant “suffers an abridgement of his basic 
constitutional rights” where the Court would be willing consider adoption of 
the plain error doctrine.  Id.  However, Justice Goldberg pointed out the 
difficulty here in finding that defense counsel’s deliberate choice not to 
pursue a motion for judgment of acquittal or motion for a new trial would 
allow an appeal based on the plain error doctrine.  Id. 
 42.   Id. 
 43.   Id. at 10 (internal quotations omitted) (citing State v. Cardona, 969 
A.2d 667, 674 (R.I. 2009)). 
 44.   Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citing Cardona, 969 A.2d at 674). 
 45.   Id. at 9, 10. 
 46.   Id. at 11. 
 47.   Id. (quoting State v. Johnson, 399 A.2d 469, 476 (R.I. 1979)). 
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the “raw data”48 for juries to determine the extent to which a 
defendant was impaired by his or her insanity, the latter being a 
legal question to which the application of a “community sense of 
justice” was appropriate.49  Thus the Court, in emphasizing the 
instructions explained the jury’s role rather than add to the 
defendant’s burden of proof, also dismissed the defendant’s claim 
that the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury.50 
 
Life Imprisonment Without Parole 
The Court began by acknowledging the severity of the 
sentence, calling it “the most severe sentence authorized by Rhode 
Island law,”51 and stating that therefore the burden rests upon the 
Court to “ratify . . . or . . . reduce” the sentence, “in its . . . 
discretion.”52  The Court first outlined the legal standards 
regarding the sentence, citing a United States Supreme Court 
decision describing the murder of a police officer as an 
“aggravating circumstance” to consider in sentencing, in light of 
the strong public policy towards protecting those “who regularly 
must risk their lives in order to guard the safety of other persons 
and property.”53  The Court also cited the Rhode Island General 
Assembly’s own determination that the “murder of a police officer 
in the performance of his or her duties warrants a sentence of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.”54 
Next, the Court looked to the factual circumstances 
surrounding the crime and the defendant’s own history.55  In 
neither place did the Court find reason for reducing the sentence.  
The crime itself was described by the Court as “heinous,” a “brutal 
murder” of a police detective.56  In addition, the defendant had a 
criminal history of violence and substance abuse.57  Both of these 
 
 48.   Id. (quoting United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 619-20 (2d Cir. 
1966)). 
 49.   Id. (quoting Johnson, 399 A.2d at 477). 
 50.   Id. at 12. 
 51.   Id. at 13 (quoting State v. Tassone, 749 A.2d 1112, 1121 (R.I. 2000)). 
 52.   Id. at 13 (quoting Tassone, 749 A.2d at 1119); see also R.I. GEN. 
LAWS 1956 §11-23-2. . 
 53.   Id. at 14 (quoting Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 636 (1977)).  
 54.   Id.; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS 1956 §11-23-2. 
 55.   Id. 
 56.   Id. 
 57.   Id. 
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“aggravating factors,” in the Court’s eyes, overshadowed the 
minute mitigating effect of the defendant’s alleged insanity and 
expressions of remorse.58  The Court spent time debunking the 
defendant’s insanity defense, recounting Mr. Carpio’s carefully 
orchestrated series of escapes: his concealment of his identity with 
a scarf and hat when robbing Mrs. Gatta, his decision to switch 
cars after fleeing his failed robbery in one vehicle, his lies to the 
police about his name and background, his manipulation of Det. 
McGann to get Det. Allen alone, his escape from the police station, 
and his getaway to a safer landing zone on grass from the window 
of an adjoining office to the conference room.59 
The Court also concluded the trial judge performed the same 
careful review of the “defendant’s criminal record, personal 
history, and character,” including listening to the words of Mrs. 
Gatta, the surviving victim; the deceased victim’s family and 
coworkers; and Mr. Carpio’s family members at the sentencing 
hearing.60  In its independent review of the record, the Court 
found the sentence appropriate.61  The Court concluded that risk 
of danger to the community by Mr. Carpio’s was far greater than 
any hope of his rehabilitation. 
 
COMMENTARY 
Under the Court’s careful and thorough analysis of the record 
and circumstances surrounding the case at bar is thinly veiled 
disgust with the defendant and his actions.  Justice Goldberg 
employs strong language to condemn Mr. Carpio and his actions, 
and rightly so – the murder of Det. Allen and assault of Mrs. 
Gatta were both shocking and violent.  Yet despite the obvious 
emotional basis for upholding the trial court’s decision, the Court 
thoughtfully delineated the very good reasons for finding no error 
in any of the grounds raised by Mr. Carpio. 
The most interesting of the three arguments raised by the 
defendant was his second contention, that the jury instructions by 
the trial judge inserted a “second tier to his burden of proof.”62  
 
 58.   Id. at 14, 15. 
 59.   Id. 
 60.   Id. at 15. 
 61.   Id. 
 62.   Id. at 9. 
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The defendant’s concern appeared to be that the instructions 
essentially told the jury, “You may only acquit based on the 
insanity defense if you find that there is any reasonable doubt 
that Mr. Carpio is guilty based on his purported insanity, and that 
the community would not likely find Mr. Carpio blameworthy in 
light of the evidence presented regarding his sanity.”63 The Court 
dismissed the idea that by stating the jury may make 
determinations using “community standards of 
blameworthiness”64 the trial judge inserted an impermissible 
“value judgment” into their determinations.65  The instructions 
were a fairly standard description of the legal question that a jury 
must answer in cases of an insanity defense, whether or not a 
person was legally insane.66  That value judgment, in the Court’s 
eyes, was an integral part of the legal question posed to the jury.  
However, in the factual context at bar, where a twenty-seven year 
veteran of law enforcement was murdered with his own gun in the 
confines of police headquarters,67 Mr. Carpio was right to fear 
that no matter what his expert witness said about his mental 
capacity, the “community” would find him blameworthy indeed.  
Perhaps there was something to his argument regarding a “second 
tier of proof,” but it is not clear the presence or absence of the trial 
judge’s words ameliorated or aggravated the effect such a crime 
would have on the minds of the jury. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that (1) in the absence 
of an abridgment to a Constitutional right, the defendant’s failure 
to raise an issue at trial waived any right to appeal on those 
grounds; (2) jury instructions clarifying the jury’s role by 
incorporating “community standards of blameworthiness” were 
appropriate so long as they adequately covered the relevant law; 
and (3) life imprisonment without parole for first-degree murder 
was an appropriate sentence in light of the aggravating 
circumstance of murder of a police officer in his line of duty. 
 
 63.   See id. 
 64.   Id. at 10 & n.8.   
 65.   Id. at 9. 
 66.   Id. at 10 & n.8. 
 67.   Id. at 5. 
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Criminal Law.   State v. Robat, 49 A.3d 58 (R.I. 2012).  The Supreme 
Court of Rhode Island affirmed defendant’s conviction for second degree 
murder at trial, holding that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to 
meet the State’s burden in proving that the defendant, Julie Robat, acted 
with malice aforethought when her child died shortly after she delivered in a 
bathroom in her home, during a difficult delivery.  The Court found 
important that Ms. Robat did not seek medical care before, during, or 
immediately after the delivery, the body of the baby was found wrapped in 
plastic bags and hidden in the basement of the Robat home, and that Ms. 
Robat was thirty years of age at the time of the events. More specifically, the 
Court held that the defendant’s motions for a new trial and for acquittal were 
properly denied, that the State carried its burden of proof particularly with 
respect to proving malice aforethought. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
Sometime between the evening of October 29, 2006 and the 
early morning of October 30, 2006, thirty-year-old Julie Robat 
gave birth in the house she lived in with her parents and two 
adult sisters.1  The baby, despite apparently being near full-term, 
did not survive. In the aftermath of the delivery Ms. Robat was 
rushed to the hospital, having lost copious amounts of blood, 
where her treating physicians, possibly over her objections, 
examined her and determined that she had recently given birth.2  
Based on this determination and the elephant in the room that 
was the missing infant, the doctors notified the police who, upon 
searching the Robat home, discovered the body of a baby wrapped 
in two plastic bags.3  Ms. Robat was subsequently indicted for 
murder.4 
At trial copious evidence was introduced, with the state 
presenting fourteen witnesses, the defense presenting five 
 
 1.  State v. Robat, 49 A.3d 58, 60-61, 78 (R.I. 2012). 
 2.  Id. at 64, 86. 
 3.  Id. at 64-65. 
 4.  Id. at 61. 
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witnesses of its own, and the defendant taking the stand on her 
own behalf.5  Numerous issues were contested at trial, with 
conflicting testimony presented as to what the cause(s) of the 
baby’s death was/were, how long the baby lived, if it was born 
alive at all, how many breaths the baby took, what actions Ms. 
Robat did or did not take in the aftermath of her delivery, whether 
an abruption of the placenta had taken place during the delivery, 
and what physical and mental condition Julie Robat was in during 
and immediately after the delivery and during her arrival and 
initial treatment at the hospital.6  It was uncontested that Ms. 
Robat never sought medical attention before she went into labor 
or during the delivery, that the delivery was a difficult one and 
that Ms. Robat lost copious and life-threating amounts of blood, 
and that the body of the baby was found hidden in the laundry 
room wrapped in plastic bags.7  Ms. Robat’s sisters testified that it 
was Julie Robat who secreted the body, while Ms. Robat testified 
that she remembered very little of the events of the night after 
going into labor but that she did remember her sisters putting her 
in the bath tub and slapping and screaming at her, as well as 
being dressed and waiting on the steps of the house for an 
ambulance.8 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
On appeal Ms. Robat contended that the trial justice erred in 
failing to grant defense motions for an acquittal or in the 
alternative for a new trial, and that the state had failed to present 
sufficient evidence of malice aforethought to prove her guilty of 
second degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt.9  Additionally 
she argued that the chain of inferences relied upon by the State 
rested upon an ambiguous fact and thus could not support a 
conviction.10  A majority of the Court rejected these contentions 
and held, despite a spirited dissent by Justice Flaherty, that the 
prosecution had presented sufficient evidence for a jury to find 
 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. at 62-70.  
 7.  Id. at 69-70, 76-77, 86. 
 8.  Id. at 62-63, 69-70. 
 9.  Id. at 60. 
 10.  Id. at 72-74. 
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that Ms. Robat had acted with the requisite malice aforethought 
necessary for the death of her child to constitute second degree 
murder. 
The Court noted that because a defendant at trial has a 
heavier burden in prevailing on an acquittal motion than on a 
motion for a new trial, a failure to prevail on a motion for new 
trial precludes success on a motion for acquittal at trial.11  The 
Court, extrapolating from this view of the applicable burdens, first 
determined whether the trial justice erred in failing to grant Ms. 
Robat’s motion for a new trial, and upon holding that the trial 
justice did not, declared that it was not required to make any 
further analysis of her claims as to her motion for acquittal.12 
When ruling on a motion for a new trial a “trial justice acts as 
a thirteenth juror and exercises independent judgment on the 
credibility of witnesses and on the weight of the evidence.”13  If 
the trial justice in so doing “does not agree with the jury verdict or 
does not agree that reasonable minds could differ as to the proper 
disposition of the case” and further determines that “the verdict is 
against the fair preponderance of the evidence and fails to do 
substantial justice” a new trial must be granted.14  On appeal a 
trial justice’s ruling on a motion for a new trial is given great 
deference, so long as “he or she has articulated sufficient 
reasoning in support of the ruling” and “will not be overturned on 
appeal ‘unless [the Rhode Island Supreme Court] determine[s] 
that the trial justice committed clear error or that he or she 
overlooked or misconceived material and relevant evidence 
[relating] to a critical issue in the case.’”15 
In the instant case, the Court focused on whether the trial 
justice had committed clear error in ruling on the motion for a 
new trial with respect to whether the State had proven the 
requisite malice aforethought to be convicted of second degree 
murder.16  Second degree murder is defined in Rhode Island as 
“any killing of a human being committed with malice aforethought 
 
 11.  Id. at 72 (citing State v. Pineda, 13 A.3d 624, 640 (R.I. 2011); State v. 
Navarro, 33 A.3d 147, 156 (R.I. 2011)). 
 12.  Id. at 82. 
 13.  Id. at 70 (quoting State v. Guerra, 12 A.3d 759, 765 (R.I. 2011)). 
 14.  Id. at 71 (quoting State v. DeOliveira, 972 A.2d 653, 665 (R.I. 2009)). 
 15.  Id. (quoting Navarro, 33 A.3d at 156; State v. Texieira, 944 A.2d 132, 
141 (R.I. 2008)). 
 16.  Id. at 72-73. 
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that is not defined by the statute as first degree murder,” with 
malice aforethought being defined as “an unjustified disregard for 
the possibility of death or great bodily harm and an extreme 
indifference to the sanctity of human life.”17 Of the three types of 
second degree murder recognized by the Court, the one in question 
in the instant case “involves ‘those killings in which the defendant 
killed with wanton recklessness or conscious disregard for the 
possibility of death or of great bodily harm.’”18  While malice is not 
mere negligence or carelessness, “malice may be inferred ‘from the 
circumstances surrounding a defendant’s conduct and the events 
leading up to the death of the victim” and “from heedless 
indifference to the consequences of an act or recklessness.’”19 
In reviewing the evidence, the Court found that the trial 
justice was correct in determining that the state had proven 
sufficiently; (1) “that defendant never sought medical attention for 
her baby; (2) that she expressly turned her sisters away while she 
 
 17.  Id. at 73 (quoting Texieira, 944 A.2d at 142 n. 12; State v. Parkhurst, 
706 A.2d 412, 421 (R.I. 1998)); See R.I.GEN. LAWS § 11-23-1.  This statute 
states: 
The unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought is 
murder. Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any 
other kind of willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing, 
or committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any 
arson or any violation of §§ 11-4-2, 11-4-3, or 11-4-4, rape, any degree 
of sexual assault or child molestation, burglary or breaking and 
entering, robbery, kidnapping, or committed during the course of the 
perpetration, or attempted perpetration, of felony manufacture, sale, 
delivery, or other distribution of a controlled substance otherwise 
prohibited by the provisions of chapter 28 of title 21, or committed 
against any law enforcement officer in the performance of his or her 
duty or committed against an assistant attorney general or special 
assistant attorney general in the performance of his or her duty, or 
perpetrated from a premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously 
to effect the death of any human being other than him or her who is 
killed, is murder in the first degree. Any other murder is murder in 
the second degree. 
R.I.GEN. LAWS § 11-23-1. 
 18.  Id. (quoting State v. Delestre, 35 A.3d 886, 900 & n. 17 (R.I. 2012)).  
The three types of second-degree murder recognized by the Court are killings 
in which the defendant formed a momentary intent to kill contemporaneous 
with the homicide; felony murder for inherently dangerous felonies that are 
not expressly listed within the statutory definition of first-degree murder; 
and those killings in which the defendant killed with wanton recklessness or 
conscious disregard for the possibility of death or of great bodily harm. 
 19.  Id. at 74 (quoting State v. Wilding, 638 A.2d 519, 522 (R.I. 1994)). 
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was in the bathroom where she gave birth; (3) that she hid the 
body of her infant; (4) that she protested when her family sought 
medical attention for her; and (5) that she vehemently and 
mendaciously rebuffed the suspicions of her treating physicians to 
the effect that she had given birth or had seen a baby.”20  The 
Court further found meaningful that the “defendant never once 
attempted to seek medical advice or treatment after she became 
aware that she was pregnant,” and that Ms. Robat was thirty 
years old, rather than more youthful, at the time of the incident in 
question.21  Further, the Court found evidence of malice in the fact 
that Ms. Robat “by not seeking medical attention for her child . . . 
to whom she owed a legal duty to protect,” and “took affirmative 
steps to prevent the discovery of the birth of her child” as her 
sisters had testified Ms. Robat was “seen carrying a laundry 
basket downstairs to the laundry room—the room in which the 
body was eventually found “secreted in a trash bag.”22  These 
facts, the Court held, could support the inferences necessary to 
establish malice, namely that the defendant was able to act and 
did so voluntarily and willfully.  The Court further found that the 
defendant failed to identify “any ambiguity in the factual 
foundation upon which that ultimate inference rests” that would 
make the pyramid of inferences insufficient to support a 
conviction.23  The Court suggests that since there is clear evidence 
and defendant even seems to admit that “the child was born alive 
and that it died while in her care” there can be no ambiguous fact 
between the facts that there was a live birth followed by a death 
and the inference that Ms. Robat acted with malice.24 
Finally, the Court noted “that, by testifying, defendant ran 
the risk that, if her testimony were disbelieved, the finder of fact 
could conclude that the opposite of her testimony was actually the 
truth—provided that there existed some other evidence to support 
a finding of guilt” and that sufficient other evidence existed, in the 
form of the evidence above, to support a conviction.25 
 
 20.  Id. at 78. 
 21.  Id. at 77-78. 
 22.  Id. at 77, 80. 
 23.  Id. at 75. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. at 81 (citing State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098, 1109 (R.I. 1992)). 
That other evidence beyond uncredited or disbelieved defendant testimony is 
necessary to support a conviction flows logically and inexorably from the fact 
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Having determined to its satisfaction that the trial justice was 
justified in rejecting Ms. Robat’s motion for a new trial the Court 
further held that Ms. Robat’s arguments as to the trial justice’s 
refusal to grant a motion of acquittal were consequently 
invalid.26Having rejected all of Ms. Robat’s arguments the Court 
affirmed her conviction for second degree murder. 
Justice Flaherty, in writing a dissenting opinion, took issue 
with the factual determinations the majority held to be justified, 
and would have overturned Ms. Robat’s conviction.  Justice 
Flaherty found error not only with the trial justice’s refusal of her 
motion for a new trial, but her motion for acquittal as well, and 
would have remanded the case to Superior Court for an entry of 
conviction for involuntary manslaughter.27 
The dissent first takes issue with what it calls “a flawed 
contortion of this Court’s precedent” in “the majority’s 
interpretation and application of our law on the probative value of 
‘pyramiding inferences.’”28  In contrast to the majority’s holding, 
the dissent had no trouble finding an ambiguous fact upon which 
the pyramid of influences relied upon by the state rested, noting 
that upon “the established fact that defendant’s child was born 
alive and died while in her care” a number of ambiguous facts had 
to be inferred for the state to meet its burden in proving malice 
aforethought.29  Those facts, the dissent contends, are that “(1) 
defendant knew that the baby was born alive; (2) defendant knew 
that the baby needed care; (3) defendant chose not to provide care, 
or acted in a hostile manner; and (4) she did so knowingly, or with 
wanton or conscious disregard for the fact that her failure to 
provide care likely would cause the baby’s death.”30  Such a chain 
of inferences, according to the dissent, resting as is does on the 
ambiguous fact that the defendant knew the baby was born alive 
(or further down the chain, that the defendant knew the baby 
needed care), lacks probative value, is impermissively speculative 
 
that if the prosecution has failed to present sufficient evidence of guilt at the 
close of its case-in-chief a motion for acquittal must be granted.  
 26.  Id. at 82. The Court further ruled that her argument contending that 
the prosecutor used improper language during closing arguments was not 
properly preserved. Id. at 83. 
 27.  Id. at 84 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
 28.  Id. (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
 29.  Id. at 85 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
 30.  Id. (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
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under Rhode Island law, and as such cannot be the basis for a 
finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.31  Further, the dissent 
argues that the majority’s failure to find an ambiguous fact was 
without basis because “[t]he test for determining whether a fact is 
‘ambiguous’ is whether it is susceptible to more than one 
reasonable inference inconsistent with guilt.”32  “This is so,” the 
dissent points out; 
because the same fact-finder reasonably could infer from 
the evidence that defendant was incapacitated to the 
extent that she (1) did not appreciate the condition of the 
baby at the time of delivery; (2) that she did not know 
that the baby needed to be cared for and warmed 
immediately; or (3) that she knew the baby needed care 
but was unable to render any aid. Because these 
reasonable-alternative inferences exist, any inference 
drawn in favor of the state beyond the primary inference 
that “the defendant knew the baby was born alive” lacks 
“a foundation that logically has the probative force of 
established fact” and necessarily is reduced to mere 
“conjecture and surmise.”33 
The dissent also takes issue with the “other evidence” of 
malice on which the state’s case relied in addition to the finding 
that the testimony of Ms. Robat was not credible.34  First, Justice 
Flaherty argues that the majority’s reliance on consciousness of 
guilt evidence improperly imputes malice from “an inference that 
defendant knew she had done something that was illegal or 
shamefully immoral[.]”35 While the dissent notes that Rhode 
Island has not ruled on whether malice may be inferred from 
conscious of guilt evidence, it also notes that outside the state it is 
a well settled issue, and that “authorities . . . unanimously 
conclude that inferences of malice, premeditation, or deliberation 
cannot be gleaned from evidence of subsequent concealment of 
 
 31.  Id. (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
 32.  Id. at 86 (Flaherty, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Vargas, 21 A.3d 
347, 353 (R.I. 2011)). 
 33.  Id. (Flaherty, J., dissenting) (quoting Carnevale v. Smith, 404 A.2d 
836, 841 (R.I. 1979)). 
 34.  Id. at 87 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
 35.  Id. (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
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evidence, lying, or other guilty conduct.”36  Second, the dissent 
argues that the majority misapplied Mattatall because, while 
Mattatall “stands for the proposition that if a defendant chooses to 
testify, then ‘he runs the very real risk that if disbelieved, the trier 
of fact may conclude that the opposite of his testimony is the 
truth,’” it further requires “some other evidence of the defendant’s 
guilt . . . to sustain a finding of guilt.”37  The dissent goes on to 
note inarguably that if neither consciousness of guilt evidence nor 
the State’s pyramid of inferences are proper evidence of guilt, then 
the defendant’s testimony cannot be sufficient proof of guilt on its 
own.38 
Finally, the dissent points out that the majority’s decision 
“puts this Court in the precarious position of judging the 
sufficiency of every expectant mother’s decisions about prenatal 
care” by imputing malice to a mother’s decisions about prenatal 
care.39  Such a relationship between prenatal care choices and 
malice is not something Justice Flaherty found persuasive, and he 
further notes that if such a relationship was held to exist, there is 
little if anything to distinguish the use of prenatal choices as 
evidence of malice from its use as evidence of premeditation, a use 
that the trial justice found impermissible as a matter of law.40 
 
COMMENTARY 
In the instant case the majority and dissent were hotly 
divided over whether sufficient evidence of malice was present.  
Underlying this disagreement were a number of specific issues on 
which the dissent and majority did not see eye to eye, including 
both how the law applied to the facts in this situation, and how 
certain rules of laws should be understood.  The primary points of 
divergence between the majority and dissent are the application of 
the law of inferences and ambiguous facts to Ms. Robat’s case,41 
the relationship of consciousness of guilt evidence to the element 
 
 36.  Id. (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
 37.  Id. at 89-90 (Flaherty, J., dissenting) (quoting Mattatall, 603 A.2d at 
1109). 
 38.  Id. (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
 39.  Id. at 88 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
 40.  Id. at 88 & n. 34 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
 41.  See id. at 75; but see id. at 85 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
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of malice,42 the proper understanding of the Mattatall doctrine 
and how a defendant’s testimony can negatively impact her case,43 
and finally to what extent a pregnant women’s choices about 
prenatal care saddle her with potential criminal liability.44 
The position shared by both the majority and the dissent; that 
“unless a defendant can show that the presented evidence failed to 
support his or her conviction upon the motion-for-a-new-trial 
standard, a defendant necessarily will be unable to establish 
[that] he or she was entitled to a judgment of acquittal[;]”45 is 
procedurally incorrect and logically unsound.46  While it is at least 
arguable that such a position is sound at the trial level, where the 
burden of a motion for acquittal47 is weighed solely against the 
burden of a motion for a new trial,48 on appeal, where appellate 
review standards are also applied, this conclusion does not and 
cannot logically follow. 
On appeal, a defendant challenging the trial justice’s denial of 
a motion for a new trial must contend with the fact that the Court 
“accords ‘great weight to a trial justice’s ruling . . . [so long as] he 
or she has articulated sufficient reasoning in support of that 
 
 42.  See id. at 80; but see id. at 87 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
 43.  See id. at 81; but see id. at 89-90 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
 44.  See id. at 78; but see id. at 88-89 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
 45.  Id. at 72 (quoting Pineda, 13 A.3d 623, 641 (R.I. 2011)).  
 46.  Id. The Court first articulated this standard in State v. Otero, 788 
A.2d 469 (R.I. 2002).  Prior to this case the practice was to analyze each 
motion separately.  In fact, the case Otero drew on in articulating this new 
appellate standard, State v. Salvatore, 763 A.2d 985 (R.I. 2001), had, despite 
claims about the heavier evidentiary burden of a motion for acquittal at trial, 
made two separate analyses of the motions. See Otero, 788 A.2d at 475. 
 47.  “[V]iew the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, 
giving full credibility to its witnesses, and drawing all reasonable inferences 
consistent with guilt.” Id. at 72 (quoting State v. Pitts, 990 A.2d 185, 189 (R.I. 
2010)). 
 48.  “It is the trial justice's responsibility to (1) consider the evidence in 
light of the jury charge, (2) independently assess the credibility of the 
witnesses and the weight of the evidence, and then (3) determine whether he 
or she would have reached a result different from that reached by the jury.” 
Id. at 71 (quoting State v. Staffier, 21 A.3d 287, 290 (R.I. 2011) (internal 
quotations omitted)).  “If the trial justice does not agree with the jury verdict 
or does not agree that reasonable minds could differ as to the proper 
disposition of the case, the trial justice is required to determine whether the 
verdict is against the fair preponderance of the evidence and fails to do 
substantial justice.” Id. at 71 (quoting State v. DeOliveira, 972 A.2d 653, 665 
(R.I. 2009) (internal quotations omitted). 
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ruling”49 and that the standard that a “trial justice’s ruling on a 
motion for a new trial will not be overturned on appeal “unless . . . 
the trial justice committed clear error or that he or she overlooked 
or misconceived material and relevant evidence [relating] to a 
critical issue in the case.”50  When reviewing a ruling on a motion 
for acquittal however, the Court “employ[s] the same standards as 
the trial court” and reviews the matter de novo.51  In light of these 
radically different standards or review, the Court’s post-Otero 
analytical framework is not sound. While the results of appeals of 
motions for new trial and acquittal may often follow one another, 
they do not march in quite the lockstep that the Court’s position 
would have it. As such the Court ought to return to its pre-Otero 
practice of addressing each analysis separately. 
The question of the proper application of the Mattatal 
proposition52 over which the majority and dissent divided raises 
similar procedural problems. While it is uncontested that “some 
other evidence of the defendant’s guilt”53 is required beyond mere 
disbelief in the defendant’s testimony to support a conviction, just 
what other evidence—and how much of it—is an issue of 
contention.54 While the primary disagreement over how to apply 
Mattatal stems from a disagreement over the proper use of other 
kinds of evidence to show malice,55 the relationship of a 
defendant’s testimony, and the defense’s case in chief, to a motion 
for acquittal is worthy of some attention as well. When the defense 
makes a motion for acquittal at the close of the prosecution’s case 
it should be granted if the prosecution has not proven, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, one or more elements of their case, and thus 
failed to carry their burden.56  A logical extension of this is that 
the prosecution cannot make up its deficiencies through the 
defendant’s presentation of evidence. Such a result is foreclosed 
 
 49.  Id. at 71 (quoting Navarro, 33 A.3d at 156 (R.I. 2011)). 
 50.  Id. (quoting Texieira, 944 A.2d 132, 141 (R.I. 2008)). 
 51.  Id. at 72 (quoting DeOliveira, 927 A.2d at 663). 
 52.  “[T]hat if a defendant chooses to testify, then he runs the very real 
risk that if disbelieved, the trier of fact may conclude that the opposite of his 
testimony is the truth.” Id. at 89-90 (quoting Mattatall, 603 A.2d at 1109) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 53.  Id. at 76 (quoting Mattatal, 603 A.3d at 1109). 
 54.  See id. at 76-77; but see id. at 89-90 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
 55.  See id. at 89-90 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).  
 56.  See id. at 72. 
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upon, because the motion for acquittal should have been granted 
at the close of the prosecution’s case, and the defense should have 
had no need or opportunity to present any evidence of its own. The 
only impact evidence presented by the defense can properly have 
on a motion for acquittal is the potential to undermine elements of 
the prosecution’s case, and allow for a renewed motion for 
acquittal to be granted where the initial one was denied. As such, 
the “other evidence” required by Mattatal, if it is to respect both 
the Rhode Island Rules of Criminal Procedure and the defendant’s 
constitutional right to remain silent, must not be merely “some 
other evidence of guilt.”  Rather the evidence of guilt must be 
sufficient to carry the State’s burden of proof. 
When viewed in such a light the question becomes, as it 
effectively was in the instant case, whether the State carried its 
burden of proof in establishing the malice necessary to support a 
conviction for second degree murder. The majority and dissent 
divided sharply over whether the consciousness of guilt evidence, 
failure to seek prenatal care, and resulting pyramid of inferences 
relied upon by the prosecution was sufficient.57  The use of 
consciousness of guilt evidence58 to establish malice is, as the 
dissent rightly notes, a radical departure from broader American 
jurisprudence despite the fact that Rhode Island itself lacks 
precedent on the matter.59 As Justice Flaherty rightly noted, 
citing the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, “evidence of 
the defendant’s consciousness of guilt ‘while relevant to the issue 
[of] whether a criminal homicide was committed, is not evidence of 
malice aforethought.’”60 It is hardly surprising that there is such 
unanimity outside Rhode Island on the issue; the majority’s use of 
consciousness of guilt evidence to prove malice not only strains 
credulity, it is at odds with time’s arrow.61 Evidence of 
 
 57.  See id. at 72; but see id. at 84-85 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
 58.  For example Ms. Robat’s refusal to let her sisters into the bathroom 
and her supposed secreting of the body. Id. at 77. 
 59.  Id. at 87 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
 60.  Id. (Flaherty, J., dissenting) (quoting Commonwealth v. Lowe, 461 
N.E.2d 192, 199 n. 6 (Mass. 1984)). 
 61.  Time’s arrow is a term that describes the “one-way direction” or 
“asymmetry” of time. It is widely believed to have been coined in or around 
1927 by the astronomer Arthur Eddington, and is often used as shorthand for 
the future-follows-past flow of time explained by the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics and Entropy.  
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consciousness of guilt is and can only be probative of the state of 
mind following the event that lead to that sense of guilt.  By 
definition, guilt must follow the event that causes it; one cannot be 
guilty about something that has not happened.  Were behavior 
indicative of a consciousness of guilt to precede the event it would 
not be guilt at all, but fear, anxiety, or worry about an event that 
had yet to come to pass. Malice aforethought, on the other hand, 
must, by definition, precede or be concurrent with the event in 
question.  Cause must precede effect, or it can hardly be called 
cause.  One can hardly kill someone with “an unjustified disregard 
for the possibility of death or great bodily harm and an extreme 
indifference to the sanctity of human life”62 after they have 
already died. The unjustified disregard and extreme indifference 
are modifiers of the killing; they must be demonstrated as 
accompanying it, not events after it, when the possibility of death 
or great bodily harm has come gone with the tragic result being 
realized. The majority’s rule extends malice aforethought into 
new, illogical, and troubling territory, where the actions born of 
panic and shock following a tragic event can support criminal 
liability for a crime that has traditionally been reserved for the 
most shocking and disquieting of killings, murder. 
The majority’s ruling on the law of inferences is similarly 
troubling. The dissent, as outlined above, does an admirable and 
persuasive job of illuminating the ambiguous facts and towering 
pyramid of inferences upon which the prosecution sought to carry 
its burden.63  It is however worth reiterating, drawing from the 
single established fact that Ms. Robat delivered a baby that drew 
at least one breath and that the baby later died, the inferences 
that Ms. Robat, during and immediately after a harrowing 
delivery and the loss of massive amounts of blood, was aware of 
much of anything, was thinking clearly enough to act with malice, 
was physically capable of doing much of anything, and that the 
actions she was both physically and mentally able to take would 
have prevented the death, are more than a bit of a stretch. 
The net result of the majority’s handling of consciousness of 
guilt evidence, of the evidence of inferences, of the impact of the 
 
 62.  Robat, 49 A.3d at 73 (quoting Texieira, 944 A.2d at 142; Parkhurst, 
706 A.2d at 421). 
 63.  See id. at 84-86 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
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defendant’s own testimony and the Court’s general laxity about 
what evidence is sufficient to meet the prosecution’s burden is to 
do serious violence to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.  
Whatever deference is due to the determinations of the trial 
justice and the jury, the story presented by Ms. Robat’s sisters—
that Julie Robat somehow managed to descend and ascend two 
flights of stairs while carrying a full laundry basket, and do a load 
of laundry, immediately after delivery and while in the process of 
losing at least half, if not terrifyingly close to all, of the blood in 
her body—64 is more than a little implausible.  The limitations of 
the human body as it enters the more serious stages of 
hypovolemia65 alone militate strongly against such a story being 
afforded much, if any, credibility.  One of the purposes of motions 
for acquittal and new trial is to prevent just such patently 
unreasonable testimony from being credited.  When the trial 
justice failed to do so, it was up to the Supreme Court to rectify 
that failing.  That the Court instead chose to credit such an 
implausible story, and to credit it to such an extent that it could 
not find reasonable doubt is distressing. If the Court cannot find 
reasonable doubt as to malice when a woman loses a child and 
three liters of blood66 during a traumatic delivery67 one can only 
 
 64.  “Blood represents about 7% of the body mass or about 4.5 kg (volume 
~ 4.4 liters) in a 64 kg (141 lb) person.” JOHN R. CAMERON ET AL., PHYSICS OF 
THE BODY 182 (2nd ed. 1999). 
 65.  The amount of blood loss suffered by Ms. Robat was beyond serious.  
A loss of 30-40% of blood volume is generally considered a class III 
hemorrhage.  In a class III hemorrhage “mental confusion and anxiety are 
normal, respiratory rate is high, peripheral perfusion is very poor, and the 
patient appears pale and diaphoretic. The pulse rate is invariably well over 
100 beats/min and the production of urine is negligible. Under these 
circumstances, widespread failure of tissue oxygenation is occurring, with 
diversion of what blood flow there is to essential organs such as brain, kidney 
and heart.” M. A. GARRIOCH, The Body’s Response to Blood Loss 75, Vox 
Sanguinis 87 (Suppl. 1) (2004).  Ms. Robat however lost not merely 30-40%, a 
class III hemorrhage marked by the above symptoms, she lost more than 
that, blood loss of a massive enough amount to be the more serious class of 
hemorrhage, class IV.  In a class IV hemorrhage the “situation is immediately 
life-threatening and within 15 min a mortality of 50% is to be expected. Blood 
pressure has dropped to be, in some cases, unrecordable, and the pulse is 
barely palpable. Vital organ perfusion is failing.” Id. 
 66.  Blood loss of less than 500 milliliters, or a sixth of what Ms. Robat 
lost, is considered within the bounds of normal delivery.  Anything over 500 
milliliters is considered to be a hemorrhage and requires medical attention. 
See e.g. KARRIE E. FRANCOIS & MICHAEL R. FOLEY, Antepartum and 
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wonder where they might ever manage to find it, or if the phrase 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt has become little more than a 
pious fraud in the State of Rhode Island. 
This distressing undermining of many of the standards that 
protect defendants from unjustified criminal liability is not even 
the most troubling result of the majority’s reasoning.  That title 
must belong to the majority’s seeming extension of a parent’s legal 
duty to protect and assist their children to a woman’s choices 
about delivery and perhaps even prenatal care.68  If Ms. Robat’s 
choices about prenatal care expose her not only to criminal 
liability but to liability for murder no less, the Court has placed 
itself in, as the dissent noted, “the precarious position of judging 
the sufficiency of every expectant mother’s decisions about 
prenatal care.”69  Not only that, but the Court seems to suggest 
that opting for a home birth, an increasingly popular option,70 
may, if the Court does not find the precautions and methods 
sufficient, open the expectant mother to criminal liability if 
something were to go wrong. Essentially the Court’s reasoning 
leads to the conclusion that Ms. Robat was guilty of murder 
because she made prenatal and delivery choices that the Court felt 
were inadequate, and then failed to successfully deliver a healthy 
child. The only other possible conclusion is that there must have 
been something Ms. Robat should have done differently during 
delivery itself.  The Court, “however, did not explain how a 
hypothetical reasonable woman in the throes of childbirth should 
have acted in the circumstances to avoid criminal liability” 
especially one in the midst of a difficult and life threatening 
delivery.71 
 
Postpartum Hemorrhage, in OBSTETRICS: NORMAL AND PROBLEM PREGNANCIES 
456-85 (Steven G. Gabbe M.D., Ph.D., Jennifer R. Niebyl M.D. & Joe Leigh 
Simpson M.D., eds., 5th ed. 2007).  The pool of blood that Ms. Robat’s sister 
Marie testified to cleaning off the bathroom floor accounts, on its own, for 
something like half the blood lost at the upper bounds of a normal delivery.  
See Robat, 49 A.3d at 62; NELSON AWORI, PRIMARY SURGERY: TRAUMA §52.3 
Hypovolemic Shock (Maurice King ed., 1987). 
 67.  See Robat, 49 A.3d at 86 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
 68.  See id. at 80-81. 
 69.  Id. at 88 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
 70.  See MARIAN MACDORMAN, PH.D., T.J. MATHEWS & EUGENE DECLERCQ, 
PH.D., Home births in the United States, 1990–2009, NCHS data brief, no. 84. 
Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics 2012. 
 71.  969 N.E.2d 672, 686 (Mass. 2012). 
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Such a standard seems fraught with peril and more than a bit 
at odds with the bedrock right of people, including pregnant 
women, to be free of unwanted medical care.72  Rhode Island has 
long recognized such a right, “however unwise his [or her] sense of 
values [in refusing care] may be in the eyes of the medical 
profession.”73  For the Court to substitute its own judgment, 
presumably informed by those of medical experts, for those of Ms. 
Robat or other pregnant women, is to rob them of this bedrock 
constitutional right.  Further, it raises a myriad of practical 
concerns.  As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court noted in 
Commonwealth v. Pugh,74 “[w]hat constitutes reasonable conduct 
during labor and childbirth defies ready articulation. Women give 
birth alone or with others in attendance, with or without 
complications, and they do so in myriad circumstances, each labor 
and childbirth posing its own challenges. There does not appear to 
be any ‘one size fits all’ rule.”75  It seems striking and rather 
implausible that the majority intended to eviscerate such a 
fundamental constitutional right and to so deeply impose its own 
views on the eminently personal choice of how a person should go 
about delivering a child with as little comment as is present in the 
instant case.  One can only hope that such was not the Court’s 
intent, that in future cases the Court will reflect a bit harder 
when issues of such import are at hand, and that such sweeping 
implications are not left lurking in the margins of decisions, 
hanging over the heads of Rhode Islanders with whispered threats 
of long prison sentences.76 
 
 72.  See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (“a 
competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing 
unwanted medical treatment”); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (the 
Constitution protects “the right of the individual, married or single, to be free 
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally 
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”). 
 73.  Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 624 (R.I. 1972). 
 74.  Pugh was decided almost simultaneously with the instant case in 
which, on similar facts, the SJC overturned a conviction for involuntary 
manslaughter and refused to impose such a duty on a woman giving birth at 
home without medical attention. See Pugh, 696 N.E.2d at 694-95. 
 75.  Pugh, 969 N.E.2d at 686. 
 76.  Ms. Robat, pending a sentencing reduction hearing, is facing forty-
five years imprisonment, twenty-five years to serve and twenty years 
suspended with twenty years of probation. Robat, 49 A.3d at 70. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, with one Justice 
dissenting, affirmed the Superior Court’s conviction of Ms. Robat, 
holding that the evidence presented against her – that she did not 
seek medical care before, during, and immediately after delivery, 
that the body of the child was secreted in plastic bags in the 
basement, and that she was thirty years of age – could sustain 
inferences sufficient to find malice aforethought beyond a 
reasonable doubt and thus support her conviction second degree 
murder. 
Michael DaCruz 
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Criminal Law.  State v. Diaz, 46 A.3d 849 (R.I. 2012).  The Rhode Island 
Supreme Court vacated a conviction of second-degree murder after 
concluding that the involuntary manslaughter instruction was inadequate 
because it lacked the concept of criminal negligence.  After considering the 
typical understanding of a lay person with ordinary intelligence, the Court 
concluded that the facts in the case required an instruction which created a 
clear distinction between second degree murder and involuntary 
manslaughter.  Additionally, the Court held, based on the evidence, that a 
jury could find the defendant guilty of second-degree murder beyond a 
reasonable doubt and affirmed the trial court’s denial of motion of judgment 
of acquittal. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
At approximately 9:45 p.m., on June 25, 2008, the defendant, 
Juan Diaz, called the Pawtucket Police Department and stated 
that he had “shot [his] girlfriend in the face by mistake.”1  When 
he was asked to clarify, the defendant responded: “It’s an accident; 
I shot my girlfriend in the face by mistake. . .she had my gun and 
when I took it away from her it hit her right in the face.”2  The 
defendant then told the dispatcher that his girlfriend was not 
breathing and throwing up blood.3  After further inquiry, the 
defendant revealed that the gun was “not around,” that the 
incident occurred “around three in the morning,” and that he 
“tried to help her” by performing CPR.4  The defendant also stated 
that he “didn’t know what to do,” became “nervous,” and “didn’t 
want to report it.”5  The defendant was later found and arrested in 
Albany, New York.6 
At trial, the State presented testimony from eleven 
 
 1.  State v. Diaz, 46 A.3d 849, 851 (R.I. 2012). 
 2.  Id. at 851-52.  
 3.  Id. at 852.  
 4.  Id.  
 5.  Id.  
 6.  Id.  
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witnesses.7  Heather Hill, the defendant’s girlfriend8 and the first 
person whom the defendant contacted after the incident, was 
among those witnesses.9  Hill testified that the defendant called 
her and disclosed that he killed his ex-girlfriend; she stated: 
[T]hey went to a bar to have a couple drinks, and then 
they went back to his house to watch a couple movies, 
and, while they went back to his house to watch movies, 
um, he had a gun, and she had the gun in her hand, and 
he tried to take it away from her, and he said, ‘Give me 
the F*** gun.’  Um, then he took the gun, and he said 
something happened to it, and it went off and it shot her, 
and it shot her, and she started throwing up. . .[h]e told 
me that she died in his arms.10 
Hill also testified that the defendant tried to retrieve the gun 
after the victim put it under a pillow, that while doing so “‘[h]e 
touched something on [the gun]’ and that then ‘[t]he gun went 
off.’”11  The defendant further explained to Hill that the pair were 
arguing and that the victim was trying to “get the smiles” out of 
the defendant and loosen tension from the argument by playing 
with and hiding the gun from the defendant, but that the 
defendant “was scared that something could happen because [the 
victim] had the gun,” and thus tried to retrieve it from her.12  The 
defendant told Hill that he tried to give the victim CPR, after she 
was shot, and stated that he should have called an ambulance, but 
exclaimed that “when somebody dies in front of [you,] you don’t 
even think about a[n]. . .ambulance or anything like that. It’s 
what you can do at that time not to wait for no f*** ambulance 
and s***.”13  The defendant told Hill that he was going to New 
York to “see his kids before he went to jail,” but planned to tell the 
police what happened, pronouncing that the incident “was a f*** 
mistake.”14 
 
 7.  Id.  
 8.  The testimony alludes that the defendant had multiple girlfriends, 
two of which included Ms. Hill and the victim.  See id. at 859. 
 9.  Id. at 855-56.   
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. at 856.  
 12.  Id. at 857.   
 13.  Id. at 856.  
 14.  Id. at 856, 857.  Later in the trial, another acquaintance of the 
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Nail Egan, an inmate at the Adult Correctional Institutions 
(“ACI”) who came into regular contact with the defendant at the 
ACI, testified to a slightly different version of events.15  
Specifically, Egan testified about the story which the defendant 
gave after being asked why he was in the ACI.16 Egan testified 
that, at the ACI, the defendant explained that, when at his 
apartment with the victim, upon realizing his gun was not in the 
dresser drawer, the defendant “flipped out” and began verbally 
and physically fighting with the victim, “slapping” her, and that 
“[t]hey were both beating each other up.”17  Egan further testified 
that the victim hid the gun “under the mattress,” but “ultimately 
gave [the defendant] the gun.”18  Egan testified that when the 
defendant retrieved the gun, “[the victim] started hitting [the 
defendant].  She was hitting him in the face.  He pushed her away, 
push her away.  She hit him in the face again.  He shot her in the 
face.  And he said the gun just went off.”19 Additionally, after the 
victim passed, the defendant “packed his bags and went to his 
sister’s house” and threw the gun in a dumpster on the way.20  
The only witness for the defendant, Castabile Florio, saw the 
defendant with the victim at the bar the night of the incident and 
testified that she was “normal” and that they were “[h]aving a 
good time” and were “affectionate.”21 
David Holden, a police officer, testified that upon arriving at 
the scene, the victim’s body was completely cold and rigid and that 
he observed “what appeared to be a gunshot wound under [the 
victim’s] left eye,” but did not see a gun.22  Furthermore, Dr. 
Alexander Chirkov, the medical examiner, testified that the gun’s 
positioning at the time of the fatal shot could have been from a 
 
defendant, David McDonald, testified that the defendant called him and 
rehashed a very similar account as the one he told Hill.  Id. at 858.  
 15.  Id. at 858-59.  
 16.  Id. at 859. 
 17.  Id.   
 18.  Id.  
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id.  Also, Jacinta Fernandes, the defendant’s landlord, testified that 
while cleaning the defendant’s apartment she found the victim’s wallet, her 
bank statement, and a plastic bag from behind the plywood.  Id. at 855. 
 21.  Id. at 859-60.  
 22.  Id. at 852-53.  On cross examination, Holden admitted that he had 
been informed that the shooting was accidental, but had left this detail out on 
direct examination.  Id. at 853.  
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“few inches up to. . .one, two, possibly three feet” and that it was 
pointed “[s]lightly down.”23  Also, Chirkov testified that effect of 
the gun shot would include vomiting and she would have 
remained alive for fifteen to twenty minutes, but had been dead 
between twelve and twenty-four hours.24  The examiner also 
noticed some bruising on the victim’s arm and foot, but there was 
no evidence of defensive wounds and none of her fingernails were 
damaged.25 
At the conclusion of arguments, the defendant moved for a 
judgment of acquittal26 on the basis that the defendant did not 
commit the acts with malice aforethought, stating on appeal “[i]t 
was abundantly clear from all of the evidence adduced at trial that 
[defendant] did not intend to shoot or kill his girlfriend. . .but that 
the shooting was a tragic accident.”27  The defendant also 
objected28 to the jury instruction29 after the justice gave his 
 
 23.  Id.  
 24.  Id. at 853-54.   
 25.  Id.  
 26.  “The court on motion of a defendant or on its own motion shall order 
the entry of judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the 
indictment, information, or complaint, after the evidence on either side is 
closed, if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or 
offenses.” R.I. SUP. CT. R. CRIM. P. 29(a)(1). 
 27.  Diaz, 46 A.3d at 860-61.   
 28.  “The defendant's written objection filed with respect to the 
involuntary manslaughter charge stated as follows: ‘Defendant objects to the 
court's charge of manslaughter and relies upon that described in State [v.] 
Hockenhull, 525 A.2d 926 [(R.I.1987)] … Defendant maintains that the words 
“criminal negligence” is what is required in a manslaughter charge.’” Id. at 
863-64 & n.13. 
 29.  The trial justice’s jury instruction concerning involuntary 
manslaughter read:  
If, after having reviewed all the evidence, you're not satisfied beyond 
a reasonable doubt as to the existence of any malice on the part of 
the defendant, you cannot find him guilty of second-degree murder. 
And, it is at this point of your deliberations that you should consider 
whether or not the defendant committed the lesser offense of 
manslaughter…Generally speaking, manslaughter is the unlawful 
but unintentional killing of a human being without malice or 
premeditation. A person who recklessly does an act that results in 
the death of another human being is guilty of manslaughter even 
though he did not contemplate such a result. Nothing more is 
required than an intentional doing of an act which, by reason of its 
wanton or reckless character, exposes another person to injury, and 
causes injury or death.  
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proposed instruction and again after he instructed the jury.30  The 
trial justice granted the defendant’s motion of acquittal as to the 
first-degree murder charge, but allowed the second-degree 
murder, involuntary manslaughter, and use of a firearm while 
committing a crime of violence charges to be submitted to the 
jury.31 After trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of second-
degree murder and using a firearm while committing a crime of 
violence. Diaz was sentenced to life imprisonment for each 
conviction.32 
Juan Diaz appealed his convictions of second-degree murder 
and of using a firearm while committing a crime of violence.33  The 
defendant first contends that the trial justice erred in failing to 
grant his motion for judgment of acquittal on the second-degree 
murder charge, asserting that the state failed to provide sufficient 
evidence that the defendant acted with malice during the incident 
which lead to the victim’s death.34  Secondly, the defendant 
contends that the trial justice erred in neglecting to include the 
concept of “criminal negligence”35 in his jury instruction 
concerning involuntary manslaughter; and in instead using 
“confusing language” that blurred the elements of involuntary 
manslaughter and second-degree murder.36 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court applied the same standards 
 
Id. at 863. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. at 860.  
 32.  Id.  
 33.  Id. at 851.  
 34.  Id.  
 35.  Here, the Court recognized the definition of involuntary 
manslaughter as “an unintentional homicide without malice aforethought, 
committed…in the performance of a lawful act with criminal negligence.” Id. 
at 864 (quoting State v. Hockenhull, 525 A.2d 926, 929 (R.I. 1987) (emphasis 
added)).  Moreover, criminal negligence is defined as “conduct which is such a 
departure from what would be that of an ordinarily prudent or careful man 
[or woman] in the same circumstances as to be incompatible with a proper 
regard for human life, or an indifference to consequences.”  Id. (quoting State 
v. Ortiz, 824 A.2d 473, 485 (R.I. 2003)). 
 36.  Diaz, 46 A.3d at 851.  
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as the trial court and “view[ed] the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, giving full credibility to its witnesses, 
and drawing all reasonable inferences consistent with guilt,” and 
ultimately held that there was sufficient evidence to warrant a 
jury finding of malice aforethought and a verdict of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.37  The defendant contends that the shooting 
was accidental and therefore cannot amount to legal malice 
without any attendant circumstances.38  In analyzing these 
claims, the Court defines murder, the degrees of murder, and 
malice aforethought.39  First, it defined murder as the “unlawful 
killing of a human being with malice aforethought.”40  Moreover, 
the Rhode Island Supreme Court has defined malice aforethought 
as “an unjustified disregard for the possibility of death or great 
bodily harm and an extreme indifference to the sanctity of human 
life,” arising from either an express intent to kill or to inflict great 
bodily harm or from “a hardness of the heart, cruelty, wickedness 
of disposition, recklessness of consequence, and a mind 
dispassionate of social duty.”41  Second-degree murder is officially 
defined as any murder not covered under the statute of first-
degree murder.42  However the Court has recognized three distinct 
theories of second degree murder, including: 1) those “killings in 
which the defendant formed a momentary intent to kill 
contemporaneous with the homicide;”43 2) killings involving 
“felony murder for inherently dangerous felonies that are not 
expressly listed within the statutory definition of first-degree 
murder;”44 and 3) “killings in which the defendant killed with 
wanton recklessness or conscious disregard for the possibility of 
death or of great bodily harm.”45 
 
 37.  Id. at 860 (quoting State v. Pitts, 990 A.2d 185, 189 (R.I. 2010)).  
 38. Id. at 861. 
 39.  Id. at 861-62.  
 40. Id. at 861. (quoting State v. Parkhurst, 706 A.2d 412, 421 (R.I. 1998)).  
 41.  Id. at 862 (quoting State v. Texieira, 944 A.3d 132, 142 (R.I. 2008)).  
 42.  Id.  First degree murder is defined by the court as “[e]very murder 
perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of willful, deliberate, 
malicious, and premeditated killing or any murder committed during the 
commission of certain enumerated felonies.  Id. at 861 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).   
 43.  Id. at 862 (quoting State v. Gillespie, 960 A.2d 969, 976 (R.I. 2008)).  
 44.  Id. at 862 (quoting Gillespie, 960 A.2d at 976).  
 45.  Id.  (quoting State v. Delestre, 35 A.3d at 886, 900 (R.I. 2012)).  
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When viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, the Court was left with the theory that the defendant 
pointed a loaded gun at the victim’s and did “something” which set 
a fatal bullet out of the gun.46  The Court concluded that the 
defendant’s conduct could be considered either a conscious 
disregard for human life or wanton recklessness within the logical 
framework of State v. Mattatall.47  The Court recognized that 
malice can be inferred from the circumstances surrounding a 
killing; for example, the evidence that the defendant disposed of 
the weapon.48  Therefore, the Court concluded that the evidence 
could be sufficient to establish a verdict of guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt and affirmed the trial justice’s decision to deny 
the motion for acquittal on second-degree murder.49 
 
The Jury Instruction 
The Court applied a de novo standard in its review of the jury 
instruction, examining the language of the instruction in its 
entirety and in the context that it was rendered.50  In such cases, 
the Supreme Court will uphold the trial justice’s instruction 
unless it does not “adequately cover the law and neither reduce[s] 
nor shift[s] the state’s burden of proof.”51  Furthermore, even if the 
court were to find a jury instruction erroneous, it must only 
reverse the instruction if it could have “misled to the prejudice of 
the complaining party.”52  The Court held that while trial justices 
are “not required to use any specific words or phrases when 
instructing the jury,” the given instructions must still adequately 
cover the law.53  Particularly, the Court held, in the instant case, 
the trial justice committed a reversible error in failing to include 
an “adequate reference” to criminal negligence when instructing 
 
 46.  Id.  
 47.  Id at.862-63. (citing State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098, 1107 (R.I. 
1992)). In Mattatall the Court concluded that the defendant’s act of aiming a 
gun at a person’s face, similar to Diaz’s conduct, constituted the recklessness 
required for malice aforethought. 603 A.2d at 1107.  
 48.  Diaz, 46 A.3d at 863. 
 49.  Id.  
 50.  Id. at 860-61.  
 51.  Id. at 861 (quoting State v. Payette, 38 A.3d 1120, 1124 (R.I. 2012) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 52.  Id.  
 53.  Id. at 865 (citation omitted).   
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on involuntary manslaughter.54 
Here, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred by 
omitting the term “criminal negligence,” and instead using the 
phrase “wanton or reckless,” in the jury instruction for 
involuntary manslaughter.55  The defendant contended that the 
misleading language of the instruction made it impossible for the 
jury to draw a distinction between second-degree murder and 
involuntary manslaughter.56  The State argued that the Court 
should apply the reasoning in State v. Hallenbeck, which affirmed 
an involuntary manslaughter charge in which the instruction 
included the phrase “wanton or reckless.”57  Pursuant to these 
arguments, the Court agreed with the defendant.58  The Court 
considered the rule set in State v. Hockenhull, along with the fact 
that the defendant properly objected to the trial justice’s proposed 
jury instruction59 and concluded that the trial justice should have 
included the concept of criminal negligence in the charge.60 
Moreover, the Court concluded that, based on the specific 
facts of this case, a jury of ordinary intelligence would not have 
understood the distinction between the terms “rash” and 
“unjustified” as the trial justice used to describe malice and 
 
 54.  Id.  
 55.  Id at 863. 
 56.  Id.  
 57.  Id. at 863-64 (arguing that holding in Hallenbeck serves as an 
“explicit approv[al]” of the adequacy of “wanton or reckless” in involuntary 
manslaughter instructions); See also Hallenbeck, 878 A.2d 992, 1009 (R.I. 
2005). 
 58.  Diaz, 46 A.3d at 865.  The Court rejected the State’s argument by 
distinguishing Hallenbeck from the case before them, specifically stating that 
the Hallenbeck ruling controlled only in the circumstances of that case.  Id. at 
864 (stating, “in the instant case, we are presented with an issue that is 
entirely different from that which was presented in Hallenbeck; and, 
therefore, our holding in that case is not controlling with respect to the case 
at bar”). The court further distinguished Hallenback by observing that at no 
time during that case did the Court address the inclusion of “criminal 
negligence” in an involuntary manslaughter instruction.  Id. at 864-65.  
Instead, the Court applied, Hockenhull, the case mentioned by the defendant 
in his written objection to the trial justice’s proposed instruction and found 
that Rhode Island law “has made it very clear that involuntary manslaughter 
includes the concept of criminal negligence.” Id. at 865. 
 59.  Diaz’s counsel specifically objected because the involuntary 
manslaughter instruction lacked the involuntary manslaughter language 
from Hockenhull. Id. at 865.  
 60.  Id.  
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“wanton or reckless character” which he used to explain 
involuntary manslaughter.61  In doing so, the Court reinforced 
previous warnings that when giving criminal negligence 
instructions, trial justices “should avoid the use of such terms as 
‘wanton recklessness’ and ‘willful disregard’ of the harmful 
consequences because such a state of mind goes beyond 
negligence,” and satisfies the element of which is necessary for a 
murder conviction.62  Specifically, the Court noted that even if 
there is a legal distinction between specific language of an 
instruction, this distinction must also be understandable for a lay 
person of ordinary intelligence.63  Thus, the Court concluded that, 
in this case, the trial justice should have included the concept of 
criminal negligence in the involuntary manslaughter instruction 
in order to create a distinct and separate instruction from the 
instruction given for second-degree murder.64 
 
COMMENTARY 
It is still unclear to what extent this holding creates a 
precedent which trial justices must follow when giving 
involuntary murder instructions.  While the Court reaffirmed its 
own rule in Hockenhull, which established that an involuntary 
manslaughter charge includes in the concept of criminal 
negligence,65 it also recognized that trial justices are not required 
to use specific words or phrases in their instructions (so long as 
the law is adequately covered).66  Additionally, the Court avoided 
application and review of Hallenbeck, which affirmed a 
manslaughter instruction that did not include the concept of 
criminal negligence, but instead used language such as “wantonly 
or recklessly.”67  Furthermore, the language of this case suggests 
that the Court did not plan to create an overreaching rule for 
involuntary manslaughter instructions.68 
 
 61.  Id. at 865-66. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. at 866 (quoting State v. Robbio, 526 A.2d 509, 514 & n.2 (R.I. 
1987)).  
 64.  Id.  
 65.  Hockenhull, 525 A.2d at 929.   
 66.  Diaz, 46 A.3d at 865.  
 67.  Diaz, 46 A.3d at 864; Hallenbeck, 878 A.2d. at 1005, 1009.  
 68.  See id. (holding, “in light of the facts of the instant case, the trial 
justice… committed a reversible error in failing to include an adequate 
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While the impact that this ruling may have on trial justices 
remains uncertain, it is distinctively clear how defense attorneys 
should respond to the holding and analysis of this case.  First, 
defense attorneys should ask for involuntary manslaughter 
instructions which include the concept of “criminal negligence.”  
Second, it is imperative that defense attorneys object when trial 
justices give involuntary manslaughter instructions which lack 
the concept. In this case, the Court made it clear that criminal 
negligence should have been included in the defendant’s 
involuntary manslaughter charge not only because of the rule in 
Hockenhull, but also because the defendant requested the 
language from Hockenhull (specifically, the concept of criminal 
negligence) in his objections after the proposed and actual 
instructions to the jury.69 
This theory is reaffirmed when analyzing the recent Rhode 
Island Supreme Court case, Hallenbeck.70  Here, the State was not 
misguided in attempting to use Hallenbeck to support its 
argument in Diaz.  Hallenbeck is very similar to Diaz in many 
aspects,71 yet the court still ruled that Hallenbeck was not 
controlling in the instant case.72 The Court’s reasoning lay 
entirely in the divergent questions at issue in the Hallenbeck.73 In 
fact, Hallenbeck does differ from Diaz in one major aspect: the 
 
reference to the concept of criminal negligence.”) (emphasis added). This 
language suggests the Rhode Island Supreme Court still plans to decide this 
issue on a case-by-case basis.   
 69. Id. at 865.  
 70.  In Hallenbeck, the Court upheld an involuntary manslaughter 
instruction which included “wanton” and “reckless.” 878 A.2d at 998.  
 71.  Like in Diaz, in Hallenbeck the trial justice also gave a jury 
instruction on involuntary manslaughter which did not include the concept of 
criminal negligence but read, “[a] person who wantonly or recklessly does an 
act which results in the death of another human being is guilty of 
manslaughter.” See Diaz, 46 A.3d at 863-64; Hallenbeck, 878 A.2d at 1005. 
Furthermore, when examining the trial justice’s instruction, in Hallenbeck, 
the Rhode Island Supreme Court quoted Hockenhull’s definition of 
involuntary manslaughter, including the concept of criminal negligence, just 
as it did in Diaz. Diaz, 46 A.3d at 864; Hallenbeck, 878 A.2d. at 1008.  
 72.  Diaz, 46 A.3d at 864.  
 73.  Id. Additionally, the Court in Hallenbeck likely would have applied 
the Hockenhull rule if a criminal negligence objection had been made since, 
when examining the instruction in Hallenbeck, the Court quoted 
Hockenhull’s definition of involuntary manslaughter. Hallenbeck, 878 A.2d. 
at 1008. 
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defense attorney’s use of objections to the jury instruction.  Unlike 
defense counsel in this case, the defendant in Hallenbeck made 
two main mistakes.  First, he waived his objections to the jury 
instruction by stating that he had no objection to the trial justice’s 
supplemental instruction, and thus, the Court could not consider 
the issues.74  Second, the defendant never raised the issue of 
criminal negligence, but merely asked the trial justice to define 
“wanton” and “reckless.”75  The defendant in Diaz, on the other 
hand, requested the concept of criminal negligence and objected 
before and after the instruction went to the jury.  Therefore, even 
if this case does not serve as a mandatory guideline for 
involuntary manslaughter charges, it certainly carries procedural 
importance for defense attorneys. If the concept of criminal 
negligence is not brought up through a request or an objection, the 
Court will not address the question of whether it needs to exist in 
an involuntary manslaughter instruction to be proper. Thus, for 
the purposes of appellate review, a defense attorney, at trial, 
should always request that the concept of criminal negligence be 
included in involuntary manslaughter instructions and object 
when it is not.76 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the trial justice’s 
denial of the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, but 
vacated the judgment of conviction against the defendant based on 
the inadequate involuntary manslaughter instruction and 
remanded for a new trial.77  The Court reasoned that there was 
sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that the defendant acted 
with malice, but that the jury instruction, which lacked the 
concept of “criminal negligence,” failed to adequately distinguish a 
second-degree murder charge from an involuntary murder charge. 
 
 
 74.  Hallenbeck, 878 A.2d at 1009. 
 75.  Id.  
 76.  However, even if the Court concludes that an instruction was 
erroneous, the Court must still undergo analysis as to whether the 
instruction was prejudicial on a case-by-case basis.  
 77.  Diaz, 46 A.3d at 866. 
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Criminal Law.  State v. Quattrucci, 39 A.3d 1036 (R.I. 2012).  The Rhode 
Island Supreme Court holds that an arrestee is entitled to a confidential 
phone call when charged with the civil violation of refusing to submit to a 
chemical test.  However, the defendant’s rights in this case were not violated 
because the purpose of the confidential call must be to call an attorney or to 
obtain bail and if an arrestee makes a call for any other purpose, as the 
defendant here did, he or she is not entitled to confidentiality. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
According to the record, defendant, Lewis Quattrucci, was 
pulled over by Warren police for driving at a high rate of speed 
and crossing over the yellow line twice.1  Upon detecting an odor 
of alcohol and other signs that he was impaired, the officer 
administered two sobriety tests, both of which Mr. Quattrucci 
failed.2  On the scene, Mr. Quattrucci refused to submit to a 
preliminary breathalyzer test and was placed under arrest for a 
DUI.3  Officer Bryant testified that he read Mr. Quattrucci his 
rights at the scene.4 
Subsequently, at the police station, Officer Bryant read Mr. 
Quatrucci his rights again and the officers offered Mr. Quattrucci 
an opportunity to use the telephone in accordance with R.I. Gen. 
Laws §12-7-20 which provides any arrested person the 
opportunity to make a telephone call for the purpose of securing 
an attorney or arranging bail.5  In pertinent part, the statute 
 
 1.  State v. Quattrucci, 39 A. 3d 1036, 1042 (R.I. 2012).   
 2.  Id.    
 3.  Id.   
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id.   R.I. Gen. Laws §12-7-20 reads: 
Any person arrested under the provisions of this chapter shall be 
afforded, as soon after being detained as practicable, not to exceed 
one hour from the time of detention, the opportunity to make use of a 
telephone for the purpose of securing an attorney or arranging for 
bail; provided, that whenever a person who has been detained for an 
alleged violation of the law relating to drunk driving must be 
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reads, “[t]he telephone calls afforded by this section shall be 
carried out in such a manner as to provide confidentiality between 
the arrestee and the recipient of the call.”6 
According to the testimony of Officer Bryant, Mr. Quattrucci 
stated that he wanted to make a call but when asked if he wanted 
the call to be confidential, Mr. Quattrucci “stated that he didn’t 
care.”7  Mr. Quattrucci went on to make several calls while both 
officers remained in the room and well within earshot.8  According 
to the testimony of Officer Bryant, Mr. Quattrucci called his friend 
to pick him up and tried to reach his girlfriend but was 
unsuccessful.9  After making these calls, Officer Bryant asked Mr. 
Quattrucci if he wanted to take a chemical test and Mr. 
Quattrucci refused and signed the “Rights For Use At Station” 
form under the line stating: “I acknowledge that the above rights 
have been read to me. I REFUSE to take a chemical test at the 
officer’s request.”10  At this point, Mr. Quattrucci became subject 
to an additional civil charge for the refusal.11 
At the close of his Traffic Tribunal hearing, Mr. Quattrucci 
asked that his case be dismissed on the grounds that he was 
denied a confidential phone call in violation of §12-7-20.12  The 
Magistrate dismissed the refusal charge, concluding that when an 
arrestee elects to make a phone call, it must be confidential.13  
The appeals panel affirmed dismissal.14  The state then filed an 
administrative appeal in district court and the district court 
affirmed the appeals panel’s decision.15  On March 12, 2012, the 
 
immediately transported to a medical facility for treatment, he or 
she shall be afforded the use of a telephone as soon as practicable, 
which may exceed one hour from the time of detention. The 
telephone calls afforded by this section shall be carried out in such a 
manner as to provide confidentiality between the arrestee and the 
recipient of the call. 
R.I. GEN. LAWS §12-7-20 
 6.  Id. at 1041 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS §12-7-20).   
 7.  Id. at 1038. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. at 1038. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. at 1042.   
 12.  Id. 1039. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. at 1039. 
 15.  Id. at 1040. 
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state filed a petition for writ of certiorari which was granted by 
the Rhode Island Supreme Court.16 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Supreme Court’s review on writ of certiorari is limited “to 
examining the record to determine if an error of law has been 
committed.”17 
The court first examines whether the right to confidential 
telephone call under §12-7-20 applies in the context of a civil 
violation proceeding.18  The court concludes that Mr. Quattrucci 
was entitled to a call under §12-7-20 regardless of whether the 
statute applies to civil charges because he had also been arrested 
for a DUI, a criminal charge.19  His subsequent civil charge did 
not take away that right.  “The fact that he subsequently refused 
to submit to a chemical test, thereby becoming subject to an 
additional civil charge, did not vitiate his right to make a 
telephone call in the first instance.”20 
However, the court goes on to state that if Mr. Quattrucci had 
been charged only with the civil charge of refusal, he would still 
have the right to a confidential call.21  In doing so, the Court 
reaffirms its holding in State v. Carcieri22 and extends the rational 
to the context of a civil refusal to take a breathalyzer charge.23 “It 
is clear that the Legislature in enacting §12-7-20 intended that a 
DUI suspect must be afforded an opportunity to exercise the 
rights contained therein.  Accordingly, we find that §12-7-20 
mandates that a police officer not only provide notice of a suspect’s 
right to a confidential telephone call, but also a reasonable 
opportunity to speak privately with the recipient of the call, if the 
call was made for the purpose of securing an attorney”.24 
 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. (citing State v. Santiago, 799 A.2d 285, 287 (R.I. 2002)). 
 18.  Id. at 1040.   
 19.  Id. at 1042 
 20.  Id. at 1042.   
 21.  Id. at 1040-42. 
 22.  730 A.2d 11 (R.I. 1999). 
 23.  Id. (“[T]his court previously has addressed §12-7-20 as it relates to 
an arrestee who subsequently is charged with the criminal offense of a DUI 
… Although the case under review arises in the context of a civil violation, we 
find the reasoning in Carcieri to be persuasive.”) 
 24.  Id. at 1043 (quoting Carcieri, 730 A.2d at 16). 
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Establishing that Mr. Quattrucci had a right to a confidential 
call, the court next considers whether the Warren police violated 
that right.  The Court concludes that the right to confidentiality 
only attaches when the call is to an attorney or for the purposes of 
securing bail.25  Since Officer Bryant testified that the defendant 
called a friend and his girlfriend and Mr. Quattrucci offered no 
evidence that he called an attorney or made a call for the purposes 
of securing bail, the Traffic Tribunal committed an error of law in 
ruling that defendant’s rights were violated under §12-7-20.26  The 
Court remanded the case to district court for further proceedings. 
 
COMMENTARY 
The Supreme Court ultimately decided this case based on the 
fact that the arrestee was not entitled to confidentiality because 
the purpose of his call was not to speak with his attorney or to 
secure bond.  However, this case is important from a public policy 
standpoint because it established that an arrestee charged with 
the civil charge of refusal to take a chemical test does have the 
right to a confidential phone call for the purposes of speaking with 
his attorney or securing bail.27  It is notable that the Supreme 
Court chose to consider that issue when it seems they could have 
avoided that question and relied on the fact that Mr. Quattrucci 
was entitled to a call because he was also charged with the 
criminal charge of DUI.28  I think the Court’s holding was correct 
especially in light of the fact that the civil charge of refusal carries 
a substantial penalty which includes the loss of a citizen’s driver’s 
license.29  When the state institutes penalties that have a 
 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  See id. 
 28.  Id. at 1036. 
 29.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-27-2 (b) provides in part: 
If a person having been placed under arrest refuses upon the request 
of a law enforcement officer to submit to the test, as provided in § 31-
27-2, none shall be given, but a judge of the traffic tribunal or 
district court judge … shall promptly order that the person's 
operator's license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle in this state 
be immediately suspended and that the person's license be 
surrendered within five (5) days of notice of suspension. A traffic 
tribunal judge or a district court judge pursuant to the terms of 
subsection (c) of this section shall order as follows: (1) Impose for the 
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significant impact on a citizen’s ability to live and work, the state 
should err towards providing greater legal protections. 
The court relies on the language of §12-7-20 which makes 
reference to a “DUI suspect” which suggest that this ruling does 
not mean all people charged with a civil charge are entitled to a 
confidential phone calls.  Rather, it applies only to those charges 
related to drunk driving. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The court finds that the Traffic Tribunal made an error of law 
by dismissing Mr. Quattrucci’s charge because §12-7-20 provides a 
confidential phone call for the purpose of contacting an attorney or 
securing bail and Mr. Quattrucci did not present any evidence 
that he sought to do either of those things.30  However, the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court held that when a citizen is arrested on a 
civil charge of refusal to submit to a chemical test, he or she is 
entitled to a confidential phone call for the purposes of contacting 
an attorney or securing bail. 31 
Katie Nee 
 
 
first violation a fine in the amount of two hundred dollars ($200) to 
five hundred dollars ($500) and shall order the person to perform ten 
(10) to sixty (60) hours of public community restitution. The person's 
driving license in this state shall be suspended for a period of six (6) 
months to one year. The traffic tribunal judge shall require 
attendance at a special course on driving while intoxicated or under 
the influence of a controlled substance and/or alcohol or drug 
treatment for the individual. 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-27-2 (b). 
 30.  Id. at 1041. 
 31.  Id. at 1043. 
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Criminal Law.  State v. Lopez, 45 A.3d 1 (R.I. 2012).  The Rhode Island 
Supreme Court upheld a first-time criminal offender’s conviction of first-
degree murder and sentence to life imprisonment with no possibility of 
parole.  The Court held that the admission of the defendant’s prior violent 
acts against the victim was not improper and that the instructions to the jury 
on its entitlement to give whatever weight to witness testimony it so chose 
was adequate.  Further, the Court held that although the admission of a DNA 
allele table was “testimonial” for Confrontation Clause purposes, the 
defendant’s confrontation rights were not violated because of the 
opportunity to cross-examine the expert who certified the underlying DNA 
testing and whose independent analysis produced the allele table. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On August 29, 2007, the defendant, Hamlet M. Lopez, was 
indicted by a grand jury for the murder of his former girlfriend 
Miledis Hilario (“Hilario”), and the state subsequently sought a 
sentence of life without parole pursuant to section 11-23-2(4) of 
the Rhode Island General Laws.1  Prior to trial, the defendant 
made a motion in limine to exclude evidence of the defendant’s 
prior acts of violence against Hilario and Ruth Estrella, also a 
former girlfriend of defendant and mother of one of his sons.2  The 
state only sought to introduce evidence of three incidents between 
 
 1.  State v. Lopez, 45 A.3d 1, 4 (R.I. 2012).  Life without the possibility 
of parole is the most extreme sentence in Rhode Island and is to be reserved 
for a “narrow class of the most heinous crimes.”  Id. at 26 (quoting State v. 
Mlyniec, 15 A.3d 983, 1003 (R.I. 2011)).  The statute states in relevant part:   
Every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall be imprisoned 
for life. Every person guilty of murder in the first degree. . . (4) 
committed in a manner involving torture or an aggravated battery to 
the victim. . . shall be imprisoned for life and if ordered by the court 
pursuant to chapter 19.2 of title 12 that  person shall not be eligible 
for parole from imprisonment. Every person guilty of murder in the 
second degree shall be imprisoned for not less than ten (10) years 
and may be imprisoned for life.   
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-2(4). 
 2.  Lopez, 45 A.3d at 4. 
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the defendant and Hilario.3  The Court excluded evidence of a 
November 11, 2006 event, but found that two incidences in May 
2007, the same month as the murder, would be permissible 
pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence.4 
On September 17, 2008, the defendant’s jury trial in Superior 
Court commenced, in which evidence of the relationship and prior 
violent acts between the defendant and Hilario were adduced.5  
The defendant and Hilario began dating in late 2005, and a few 
months later the defendant began living with Hilario and her 
youngest daughter, Miledy Urena (“Miledy”), at 42 Courtland 
Street in Providence.6  Miledy testified about how the couple’s 
deteriorating relationship ended after a physical altercation in 
early May 2007.7  Miledy testified that on May 18, 2007, her 
mother said that the defendant had been over Hilario’s house and 
that he broke Hilario’s bed and harassed her.8  The police were 
called to the scene, interviewed Hilario, Keyla Urena (“Keyla”) 
(Miledy’s older sister), and Miledy, who testified that the 
“mattress was stabbed up.”9 
On May 20, 2007, Miledy was dropped off at work by her 
mother who was also supposed to pick her up after her shift; 
however, since Hilario never arrived to pick up Miledy, she 
received a ride from Keyla.10  Later on, Miledy received an 
 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id.  The trial justice concluded that the acts were “intertwined with 
what ultimately took place on [May 20, 2007].”  Id. at 21. 
 5.  Id. at 5-6. 
 6.  Id. at 4-5. 
 7.  Id. at 5.  Miledy testified to seeing the defendant push Hilario to the 
ground after an argument inside the Courtland Street house after which 
Hilario threw the defendants belongings out the window, locked the 
defendant out of the house, and ended her relationship with the defendant.  
Id.  Jose Marte, a longtime friend of the defendant and boyfriend of Hilario’s 
sister testified that on May 16, 2007, the defendant called him and explained 
that he “was very angry” and “deeply in love” with Hilario and that “if she 
wasn’t going to be his, she was not going to be anybody’s.”  Id. at 6. 
 8.  Id.  
 9.  Id.  Later that evening, Cesar Tineo, Hilario’s son, called the 
defendant to question him about the incident, to which Tineo testified the 
defendant responded: “She’s playing with my emotions and she’s going to die 
in the hands of a man.”  Id. 
 10.  Id.  During her shift, Miledy had received five telephone calls from 
the defendant, which she did not answer.  Id.  The sisters first went to the 
Courtland house, noticed their mother’s van missing, called the defendant 
who informed them that Hilario was at their Aunt Marisol’s house, then 
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“anxious” call from her aunt, Cruz Gonzalez, prompting Miledy to 
hurry to the Courtland house and call the police exclaiming, 
“[t]hey gonna kill her, please.”11  When Miledy arrived at the 
house, she saw her mother lying “‘[f]ace up’ on the floor, bleeding,” 
and the rescue crew that was called pronounced Hilario dead at 
the scene.12  The first officer on the scene indicated that there 
“appeared . . . [to] have been a struggle” inside the house.13  A 
police detective later seized various items near the crime scene at 
the Courtland street house, but was not able to retrieve any 
identifiable finger prints.14  The assistant medical examiner who 
conducted the autopsy of the decedent testified that there were 
forty stab wounds, including multiple defensive wounds to the 
hands and arms, on the decedent’s body which had been inflicted 
with a sharp-bladed instrument.15  The examiner determined that 
“the cause of death [was a] stab wound to the . . . torso, and [the] 
manner of death [was] homicide.”16 
The defendant was discovered later that evening in his garage 
in his home at 39 Bellevue Avenue wearing clothes that appeared 
to have “dried blood” and “other debris” on them.17  The defendant 
was arrested and his clothes were seized.18  In addition to the 
defendant’s clothes, police sent a blood sample from the decedent, 
oral swabs from the defendant, and swabs from two knives seized 
at the crime scene to the Rhode Island Department of Health and 
Biology Laboratory for DNA testing and analysis.19  Testimony 
from various witnesses at trial established that the defendant had 
placed several phone calls on the night the murder took place.20 
 
proceeded to Marisol’s.  Id. 
 11.  Id. at 6-7. 
 12.  Id. at 7. 
 13.  Id.  The officer noted that a table top had been knocked over, papers 
were scattered, and there were blood spatters on the carpet.  Id. 
 14.  Id. at 8.  Some of the evidence seized included:  a large blood-stained 
kitchen knife found near Hilario’s body, a rinsed off serrated steak knife 
found in the bathroom sink, and a knife found in a strainer in the kitchen 
pantry.  Id. 
 15.  Id. at 8-9.  The examiner stated that Hilario would have been 
consciously aware of the pain from these injuries prior to her death.  Id. at 9. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. at 8. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. at 7. Marte and Gonzales had been in the same room during 
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At trial, the state introduced evidence obtained from the 
testing and analyses of the samples seized from the crime scene, 
the decedent, and the defendant.21  A senior forensic scientist at 
the Rhode Island Department of Health Forensic Biology 
Laboratory explained the general procedures for receiving and 
testing DNA evidence, including the contracting of certain testing 
with Orchid Cellmark (“Cellmark”) of Dallas, Texas.22  Later, 
Matthew Quartaro, a supervisor at Cellmark, testified as an 
expert, over defendant’s objections, on the results of the DNA 
testing.23  Although never having personally observed any of the 
analysts, nor having performed any of the preliminary steps, 
Quartaro was allowed to testify about Cellmark’s “team format” 
approach to DNA cutting, extraction, quantification, and 
polymerase chain reaction (“PCR”) testing in order to generate a 
DNA profile.24  Despite never physically touching any of the 
evidence, Quartaro testified that he had been “involved in the 
entire process” through other means, explaining that he had 
analyzed the DNA profiles that had been created and was able to 
prepare a report based on his findings.25  From Quartaro’s report, 
only an allele table, which contained the numerical data matches 
from the tested samples, was introduced into evidence.26  
Quartaro concluded to a “reasonable degree of scientific certainty,” 
that several of the DNA samples extracted from defendant’s 
clothing matched the DNA profile of Hilario.27 
 
conversations over the phone with the defendant.  Id.  Marte testified that 
defendant state three times he had killed Hilario.  Id.  Gonzales testified that 
defendant said “he was going to finish with all [her] family.”  Id.  The 
defendant’s son, Emmanual Lopez Sanchez stated that the defendant said 
over the phone that:  “I killed my girlfriend.  I killed my girlfriend.  I’m going 
to kill myself.”  Id. at 7-8.  
 21.  Id. at 10-11. 
 22.  Id. at 9. 
 23.  Id. at 10. 
 24.  Id. at 10-11.  Extraction is the separating out of the DNA to be used 
for testing.  Id. at 10.  PCR testing produces copies of the extracted DNA 
regions.  Id.  Genetic markers, whose size variances are used for 
identification purposes, found at these regions are amplified and analyzed 
using computers in order to create a DNA profile.  Id. 
 25.  Id. at 10-11. 
 26.  Id. at 11. 
 27.  Id.  Although one of the swabs indicated a profile to have “originated 
from at least one unknown individual,” Quartaro testified that the probability 
of another individual besides Hilario matching the profiles found on the 
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After the close of evidence, the trial justice gave the jury an 
array of instructions, including an instruction on prior 
inconsistent statements.28  On October 1, 2008, the jury returned 
a guilty verdict of murder in the first degree, and later that such 
murder involved torture and aggravated battery.29  On January 
16, 2009, the trial justice conducted a sentencing hearing at which 
various individuals advocated for different degrees of punishment, 
counsel for both parties argued, the defendant made a statement, 
and letters submitted on behalf of the defendant were read.30  The 
trial justice sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment without 
parole, to which the defendant timely filed a notice of appeal.31  
Defendant’s appeal was delayed32 pending the outcome of the 
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Bullcoming v. New 
Mexico.33 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The defendant asserted a variety of errors on appeal, each of 
which was addressed individually by the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court. 
 
Confrontation Clause 
The defendant argued that his rights to confrontation under 
the Sixth Amendment and section 10 of the Rhode Island 
Constitution were violated by the admission of Quartaro’s 
 
swabs from the knife and the defendant’s clothes to be one in 11.42 
quadrillion.  Id. 
 28.  Id. at 22.  The jury instruction concerning the credibility of witnesses 
read as follows: 
You may consider the presence of corroborating or contradictory 
evidence as well as any consistencies or inconsistencies between 
what was testified to by a witness during the trial and what that 
witness may have said at an earlier time.  A witness’[s] prior 
statements may be accorded whatever evidentiary weight you feel 
they deserve.   
Id. 
 29.  Id. at 9. 
 30.  Id. at 24. 
 31.  Id. at 9. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  131 S.Ct. 2705 (2011). 
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testimony regarding the results of the DNA analyses.34  
Specifically, the defendant argued that cross examining Quartaro 
was an “insufficient substitute for his right to confront all the 
intervening analysts who performed the preliminary stages of the 
DNA testing.”35  Incorporating recent analyses by the U.S. 
Supreme Court, specifically Bullcoming, the Court explained that 
the Sixth Amendment permits the admission of “[t]estimonial 
statements of witnesses absent from trial . . . only where the 
declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a 
prior opportunity to cross examine.”36  Additionally, the Court 
stated that a “document created primarily or ‘solely for an 
‘evidentiary purpose,’ . . . made in aid of a police investigation, 
ranks as testimonial.’”37 
 
Quartaro’s Testimony 
Conducting a de novo review of the mixed questions of law 
and fact involving constitutional rights, the Court distinguished 
the testimony of Quartaro from the inadequate witness in 
Bullcoming that had “no connection” to the report that the witness 
testified about.38  The Court held that because Quartaro 
personally reviewed and analyzed the raw data in order to 
articulate his own conclusions (which are the statements at issue) 
that Quartaro was the “very witness that the Supreme Court 
deemed necessary in Bullcoming.39  Further, the Court found that 
because Quartaro could testify about the process employed for 
DNA testing in this case that he could be “meaningfully cross-
examined on the general and specific risks of error in forensic 
testing.”40 
 
 34.  Lopez, 45 A.3d at 11. 
 35.  Id. at 13. 
 36.  Id. at 12 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004)). 
 37.  Id. (quoting Bullcoming, 131 S.Ct. at 2717). 
 38.  Id. at 13. 
 39.  Id. at 13-14. 
 40. Id. at 15.  The Court explained that cross-examination does not have 
to be able to address every possible risk of bias or error in order to be 
sufficient.  Id. at 16.  Further, citing the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court 
affirmed that the “Confrontation Clause does not mandate ‘that anyone 
whose testimony may be relevant in establishing the chain of custody, 
authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing device, must appear in 
person as part of the prosecution’s case.’”  Id. (quoting Melendez-Diaz v. 
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Admission of Allele Table 
Turning to the allele table created by Quartaro, the Court 
discussed how various courts analyzed similar tables’ testimonial 
character.41  Once again, the Court reviewed the mixed questions 
of law and fact involving constitutional rights de novo.42  Finding 
that creating the allele table required the use of Quartaro’s 
scientific expertise and supplemental independent interpretation 
of the results produced by his subordinates’ testing, the Court held 
that the raw data was transformed into testimonial statements 
subject to the Confrontation Clause.43  However, because the table 
was “solely” the product of Quartaro’s analysis, the Court held 
that the defendant’s ability to cross-examine Quartaro satisfied 
the Confrontation Clause’s requirements.44 
 
Prior Acts Evidence 
The defendant contended that the admission of two prior acts 
of domestic violence against Hilario both occurring in the same 
month as the murder was in error because it was either 
“‘insufficiently relevant’ and unnecessary to prove motive or intent 
to kill,” unfairly prejudicial under Rhode Island Rule of Evidence 
403, or even if evidence of some prior wrongs was admissible, that 
the state went too far with the evidence in its case.45  Reviewing 
the admission of evidence under an abuse of discretion standard, 
the Court found that the defendant’s prior conduct was “integrally 
related” and “interwoven” with defendant’s motive to murder 
because the incidences were close in time, involved the same 
parties, the same place, and the last incident (the stabbing of 
Hilario’s bed) involved the “same or similar instrumentality” that 
was used in the murder.46  The Court concluded that the prior 
 
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311 n. 1 (2009)). 
 41.  Id. at 17-19.  Some courts have found that the allele table was 
“nothing more than raw data produced by a machine.”  Id. at 18 (quoting 
United States v. Summers, 666 F.3d 192, 202 (4th Cir. 2011)).  Other courts 
have found that an allele table is not “wholly machine-generated.”  Id. (citing 
Derr v. State, 29 A.3d 533, 541 (Md. 2011)). 
 42.  Id. at 13. 
 43.  Id. at 19. 
 44.  Id. at 20. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. at 21. 
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events had “culminated in the gruesome murder of Hilario” and 
therefore, the “high probative value clearly outweighed any 
potential for unfair prejudice.”47 
 
Jury Instructions on Prior Inconsistent Statements 
The defendant contended that the failure to use the 
defendant’s proffered instruction on inconsistent statements had 
the implication of restricting the jury to decide “‘which version of 
the witnesses’ testimony’ to credit,” rather than entitling the jury 
to reject the testimony altogether.48  Reviewing the jury 
instructions de novo, the Court held that there was no error in the 
instruction because in its entirety the instruction “explicitly 
informed the jury that it was entitled to give a witness’s testimony 
no weight at all, it so chose.”49  The Court noted that the trial 
justice followed the challenged written instruction with an 
adequate verbal directive to the jury regarding its role as the “sole 
arbiter of the credibility of witnesses.”50 
 
Life Sentence Without Parole 
Pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19.2-5 the Supreme Court 
has the authority to review de novo the appropriateness of life 
sentences without parole.51  The trial justice questioned the 
capacity to rehabilitate the defendant finding that he was 
manipulative and out to “con the system.”52  The defendant 
asserted that his standing in the community, past good deeds, and 
the fact that he was a first time offender militate towards a 
 
 47.  Id.  Additionally, the Court noted that the risk of unfair prejudice 
was reduced because of efforts by the trial justice to exclude a more remote 
incident of violence and the use of limiting instruction to the jury.  Id. at 21-
22. 
 48.  Id. at 22.  The defendant had objected to the trial justice’s written 
jury instruction concerning the credibility of the witness.  Id.  The objected to 
instruction is contained in footnote 28. 
 49.  Id. at 22-23.  
 50.  Id. at 23.  The trial justice’s verbal directive stated in relevant part: 
“You are the sole judges of the credibility of witnesses and of the weight 
which you will give the testimony of each witness.  After making your own 
judgment, give the testimony of each witness such weight, if any, as you 
think it deserves.”  Id. 
 51.  Id. at 23-24. 
 52.  Id. at 25. 
LOPEZ.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2013  12:07 PM 
2013] SURVEY SECTION 361 
reduced sentence.53  Notwithstanding the defendant’s pleas, 
noting the brutality of the crime and the defendant’s lack of 
remorse, the trial justice concluded that life without parole was 
justified.54  The Court agreed with the trial justice that the 
defendant’s “essential character is one of violence” and that any 
mitigating factors were insufficient to reduce the sentence for the 
defendant’s “monstrous crime.”55 
Justice Flaherty dissented from the majority solely on the 
imposition of the life sentence without parole.56  Justice Flaherty 
pointed to the lack of any prior criminal convictions, defendant’s 
position in the community, and the large amount of letters sent on 
the defendant’s behalf as strong factors against imposing the most 
severe sentence in the state.57  Additionally, Justice Flaherty 
stated that the parole board would be able to adequately assess 
the defendant’s ability to return to society when the defendant 
would become parole eligible.58 
 
COMMENTARY 
This case determined both a critical legal issue (Confrontation 
Clause) and an issue, though guided by principles of law, which 
more deeply implicates the human dimension of our criminal 
justice system (life without parole). 
 
Confrontation Clause 
In light of the centrality of the Confrontation Clause issue to 
defendant’s case, the defendant’s appeal was delayed59 pending 
the outcome of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Bullcoming.60  In Bullcoming, the Supreme Court held that the 
lack of testimony by the witness who certified an inculpatory 
blood-alcohol analysis violated the Confrontation Clause and that 
 
 53.  Id. at 23. 
 54.  Id. at 26-27. 
 55.  Id. at 27. 
 56.  Id. at 27. (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
 57.  Id. at 28 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
 58.  Id.  The defendant would not become eligible until his mid-seventies, 
and even then, could only be released on parole by a unanimous vote of the 
parole board.  Id. 
 59.  Id. at 9.   
 60.  131 S.Ct. 2705.  
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the report, which was produced after the defendant was in 
custody, was testimonial in nature.61  Incorporating key elements 
of the Bullcoming analysis, the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
likely adequately distinguished Lopez from Bullcoming.62  Unlike 
the non-certifying witness in Bullcoming that was not involved in 
any part of the analysis at issue in the case, Quartaro not only 
had knowledge of how each of the procedures employed were to be 
performed, but directed specific analysts to perform testing, 
reviewed their work to ensure proper protocols were followed, and 
indeed, as supervisor, certified the work.63  Further, the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Williams v. Illinois64 indicates that 
the R.I. Supreme Court likely was correct in finding the testimony 
of Quartaro and the introduction of the allele table were both 
proper. 
Here, Quartaro’s intimate knowledge of the testing 
procedures and independent analysis of the data in question 
bolstered his adequacy as a sufficient witness for Confrontation 
Clause purposes.  The Williams plurality suggests that the 
testimony of the proper certifying witness may be sufficient in 
itself to satisfy the Confrontation Clause because of the defense’s 
ability to surmount its own independent attack on the credibility 
of a particular DNA analysis.65  However, lower courts may 
eschew from adopting a bright-line, certified-uncertified 
distinction and may begin to produce varying tests to determine 
the sufficiency of the certifying witness.  Emphasis may be placed 
on multiple factors including the certifying witness’s particular 
expertise and its relation to the underlying analysis, the 
complexity of the procedures employed, the number of individuals 
who took part in the procedures, and the interconnected nature of 
 
 61.  Id. at 2716-17. 
 62.  See Lopez, 45 A.3d at 14 (quoting Bullcoming, 131 S.Ct. at 2710 
(“The accused’s right is to be confronted with the analyst who made the 
certification. . .”)). 
 63.  Lopez, 45 A.3d at 15; see Bullcoming, 131 S.Ct. at 2715. 
 64.  See 132 S.Ct. 2221, 2227-28 (2012).  This case was decided six 
months after Lopez. 
 65.  See id. at 2228 (holding that introduction of DNA analysis would not 
have Confrontation Clause violation “will not prejudice any defendant who 
really wishes to probe the reliability of DNA testing done in a particular case 
because those who participated in the testing may always be subpoenaed by 
the defense and questioned at trial.”)  
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their work to the overall product. 
Additionally, the Williams plurality implies the adoption of a 
more relaxed attitude towards the introduction of DNA evidence 
produced by reliable laboratories, indicating that the the R.I. 
Supreme Court was likely proper in allowing the introduction of 
Quartaro’s allele table.66  Thus, the Williams plurality highlights 
that the R.I. Supreme Court’s holding in Lopez rested comfortably 
within the newly contoured parameters of the Supreme Court’s 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.67  However, subsequent cases 
will certainly test the bounds of these new contours and what, if 
any, different safeguards may be necessary both within and 
outside of the realm of DNA profiling.68 
Indeed, Justice Kagan’s dissent in Williams pointed out the 
danger of a defendant not being able to confront the particular 
analyst who performed DNA testing.69  Justice Kagan discussed a 
California case in which a DNA analyst had testified on direct 
that a DNA sample from a rape victim was a direct match to the 
defendant.70  However, only after having been cross-examined, the 
analyst realized she had made an error by accidentally testing 
DNA from a piece of evidence against a control sample taken from 
the victim herself.71  Thus, the “match” to the defendant which the 
analyst had testified to on direct was completely erroneous, a fact 
which may never have come to light if the defendant had only 
been able to cross-examine a party who merely certified the 
analyst’s report.72 
 
 66.  See id. at 2244 (“[T]he use at trial of a DNA report prepared by a 
modern, accredited laboratory ‘bears little if any resemblance to the historical 
practices that the Confrontation Clause aimed to eliminate.’”) (citation 
omitted);  see Lopez, 45 A.3d at 19.  
 67.  See Williams, 131 S.Ct. at 2227-28; see Lopez, 45 A.3d at 16, 18.  
Although, the Supreme Court’s 4-4 split with Justice Thomas concurring in 
the result in Williams may have had the practical effect of not adding 
anything substantive to the Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.  See 
Williams, 131 S.Ct. at 2221. 
 68.  See Williams, 132 S.Ct. at 2259 (“Today’s holding, however, will 
reach beyond scientific evidence to ordinary out-of-court statements.”) 
(Thomas.J., concurring in the judgment). 
 69.  Id. at 2264 (Kagan, J. dissenting). 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. The magnitude of harm that can be caused by not having the 
opportunity to cross-examine the particular lab analyst can be severe, and 
the difficulty of remedying the harm retroactively can cause even more 
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Life without Parole 
Life without parole is the most severe criminal penalty in 
Rhode Island and is reserved for the “narrow class of the most 
heinous crimes.”73  As of 2012, only thirty-two individuals were 
currently serving life without parole in Rhode Island, comprising 
less than one percent of the entire prison population.74  This case 
undoubtedly presented a difficult sentencing determination.  All 
five of the justices essentially agreed that the murder was an 
aggravated battery and that the defendant had not demonstrated 
a significant amount of remorse.75  Additionally, evidence adduced 
at trial demonstrated that the victim would have been consciously 
aware of the numerous painful wounds inflicted unto her prior to 
her death.76  However, while the majority focused primarily on the 
violent nature of the underlying crime itself to validate the 
imposition of life without parole, the dissent placed more 
substantial emphasis on the presence of external mitigating 
factors.77 
Striking the appropriate balance between the circumstances 
of the underlying crime and the existence of external mitigating 
and aggravating factors is a tremendously difficult analysis for 
both the trial justice and the justices of the Supreme Court.  Lopez 
suggests that the Supreme Court will tend to place primary 
emphasis on the underlying circumstances of the particular crime, 
and that reduction of a sentence of life without parole will require 
 
problems with the entire system.  See e.g.  Elaine Quijano, Massachusetts lab 
tech arrested for alleged improper handling of drug tests, CBSNEWS (Sept. 28, 
2012, 7:40 P.M.), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18563_162-
57522834/massachusetts-lab-tech-arrested-for-alleged-improper-handling-of-
drug-tests/.   
 73.  Lopez, 45 A.3d at 26 (quoting Mlyniec, 898 A.2d at 86; see e.g., State 
v. Carpio, 43 A.3d 1, 16 (R.I. 2012) (Murder of on-duty police officer after 
arrest for stabbing elderly woman, defendant had fifteen prior arrests).  
 74.  Rhode Island Department of Corrections Planning and Research 
Unit, FISCAL YEAR 2012 ANNUAL POPULATION REPORT, at 16, available at 
http://www.doc.ri.gov/administration/planning/docs/FY12%20Annual%20Pop
%20Report.pdf. 
 75.  Lopez, 45 A.3d at 26 (majority opinion); Id. at 28 (“I agree with the 
majority that the murder of Ms. Hilario was an aggravated battery.” 
(Flaherty, J., dissenting in part).  Justice Indeglia was the trial justice who 
initially determined that the murder was an aggravated battery.  Id. at 1. 
 76.  Id. at 9. 
 77.  Id. at 28 (Flaherty, J., dissenting in part).   
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extensive mitigating factors.78  Although likely considered in the 
majority’s overall analysis, the Court did not specifically address 
the dissent’s point on the practical effect of reducing the 
defendant’s sentence to life with parole, reaffirming the primacy of 
the underlying offense in sentencing consideration.79 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded that the 
defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights were not violated because 
the defendant had the opportunity to cross examine the witness 
who not only had knowledge of the DNA analysis that was 
conducted, but reviewed the procedures of those who conducted 
the analyses and developed his own independent conclusions from 
the data.80  Likewise, since the allele table that was introduced 
into evidence was primarily created by expertise and independent 
analysis of the certifying witness, the opportunity to cross the 
witness satisfied the Confrontation Clause requirements.81  
Further, the Court found the introduction of prior violent acts 
against the victim was appropriate and that such evidence was 
not unfairly prejudicial.82  Also, the Court held that there was no 
error in the trial justice’s jury instructions which, in their totality, 
let the jury know it was entitled to give whatever, if any at all, 
weight to witness testimony.83  Lastly, over a pointed dissent, the 
Court found that the existence of external mitigating factors did 
not outweigh the aggravating factors present in the underlying 
crime, thus, the imposition of life imprisonment without parole 
was justified.84 
Thomas Pagliarini 
 
 
 78.  See id.at 27. 
 79.  Id. at 28 (Flaherty, J., dissenting in part).  Justice Flaherty pointed 
out that the defendant would not become parole eligible until his mid-
seventies, and even then could not be released unless the parole board 
unanimously found that he should be able to return to society.  Id. 
 80.  Id. at 16. 
 81.  Id. at 20. 
 82.  Id. at 20-21. 
 83.  Id. at 23. 
 84.  Id. at 27. 
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Criminal Law.  Tassone v. State, 42 A.3d 1277 (R.I. 2012).  A Rhode 
Island hearing justice erred when she did not hold an evidentiary hearing to 
independently evaluate defendant’s application for postconviction relief 
when the trial transcript was unavailable.  In all cases involving defendants 
sentenced to life without the possibility of parole, an evidentiary hearing is 
required in the first application for postconviction relief. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On January 28, 1997, Gary Tassone (“Tassone”) was convicted 
of the murder of Kendra Hutter, whose body was found buried in 
the sand at the beach at Crescent Park in East Providence, Rhode 
Island on June 30, 1994.1  He was sentenced to life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole, and his conviction was affirmed 
in 2000.2 
On August 4, 2000, Tassone filed an application for 
postconviction relief under Rhode Island General Law 1956 § 10-
9.1-1 alleging that his constitutional rights had been violated by 
the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel and by witness 
perjury.3  An attorney was appointed to represent him throughout 
the proceedings for postconviction relief; however, on January 10, 
2008, counsel found that Tassone’s allegations were without merit 
and filed a “no-merit” memorandum and moved to withdraw from 
the case.4  This memorandum listed and described four issues that 
Tassone felt indicated his trial counsel’s ineffective assistance, as 
well as perjury committed by police officers who had acted as 
witnesses at trial.5  Ultimately, counsel concluded that Tassone’s 
claims were “wholly frivolous.”6 
 
 1.  Tassone v. State, 42 A.3d 1277, 1279 (R.I. 2012). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. at 1280. 
 4.  Id.  Tassone also had three previous court-appointed postconviction 
relief attorneys to represent him, however all of them withdrew for various 
reasons.  Id. 
 5.  Id.  
 6.  Id. at 1281. 
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On January 15, 2008, a hearing on counsel’s motion to 
withdraw was held.7  At this hearing, however, when the hearing 
justice gave Tassone an opportunity to address the assertions 
raised in the Shatney no-merit memorandum,8 Tassone stated 
that he wanted to address nine issues that had not been heard.9  
Since these issues were not addressed in the original 
memorandum, the hearing justice directed counsel to draft an 
additional memorandum incorporating the newly raised issues.10  
Furthermore, at this hearing, it was brought to the attention of 
the hearing justice that the trial transcript had been lost and was 
unable to be recovered by the Superior Court clerk’s office, but not 
before counsel had reviewed it and made his motion to 
withdraw.11 
On February 12, 2008, counsel submitted the requested 
supplemental memorandum detailing the additional issues that 
Tassone had raised at the January 15th hearing.12  Again, counsel 
addressed each issue and concluded that none had any merit.13  
On February 28, 2008, a final hearing was held on Tassone’s 
application for postconviction relief, at which Tassone confirmed 
that all the issues he wished to raise were before the court.14 A 
judgment was entered dismissing Tassone’s application on 
January 13, 2010, and an order was entered granting counsel’s 
motion to withdraw on January 20, 2010.15  On January 25, 2010, 
Tassone filed a notice of appeal, pro se.16 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court conducted a de novo review 
of the postconviction relief decision, focusing on Tassone’s three 
 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Shatney v. State, 755 A.2d 130 (R.I. 2000), outlined the procedure 
court-appointed counsel must follow when seeking to withdraw from a 
postconviction-relief proceeding after reaching the conclusion that a 
postconviction-relief application lacks merit. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. at 1282. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
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main arguments regarding the alleged ineffective assistance he 
received from his trial counsel.17  The Supreme Court endorsed 
the hearing justice’s use of the two-part test used in Strickland v. 
Washington18 in order to evaluate Tassone’s claims.19  According 
to this test, the applicant for postconviction relief must show that 
“counsel’s performance was deficient in that it fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness,” and “that such deficient 
performance was so prejudicial to the defense and the errors were 
so serious as to amount to a deprivation of the applicant’s right to 
a fair trial.”20  In evaluating the hearing justice’s application of 
this test, however, the Court concluded that the Superior Court’s 
failure to hold an evidentiary hearing and its excessive reliance on 
the Shatney memoranda was error.21 
In first discussing the Superior Court’s lack of an evidentiary 
hearing, the Court considered its previous holdings that stated the 
dismissal of an application for postconviction relief does not 
explicitly require an evidentiary hearing if the applicant has an 
opportunity to respond to the court’s dismissal.22  While Tassone 
did in fact have an opportunity to respond to the Superior Court’s 
decision, the Court clarified that an evidentiary hearing is not 
required only if the court had the “ability to review the trial record 
in the absence of an evidentiary hearing.”23  As was discussed at 
the initial January 15, 2008 hearing, the trial record was lost 
before the hearing justice was ever given an opportunity to review 
it.24  The Court emphasized the importance of trial records in 
determining the performance of counsel, stating, “[N]o evidence is 
more probative than the trial transcript.”25  Without it, the Court 
reasoned that the hearing justice could not make an accurate 
 
 17.  Id.  
 18.  466 U.A. 668 (1984). 
 19.  Id. at 1284. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. at 1286, 1287. 
 22.  Id. at 1285. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. at 1281. 
 25.  Id. at 1286 (quoting State v. D’Alo, 477 A.2d 89, 90 (R.I. 1984)(“In 
determining whether a trial counsel’s performance was effective, no evidence 
is more probative than the trial transcript, for through the transcript a trial 
justice hearing [an application] for postconviction relief can observe, albeit 
second-hand, what actually happened as far as the trial counsel’s actions are 
concerned.”) 
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factual determination as to whether Tassone received adequate 
assistance from his trial counsel.26  Lastly, the Court addressed 
the Superior Court’s reliance on counsel’s Shatney memoranda at 
the exclusion of the trial record.27  The Court cited the post-
conviction relief statute as stating that the “court may dismiss an 
application on the pleadings if, after reviewing the application, the 
answer or motion, and the record, the court determines that it 
lacks merit.”28  The Court reasoned that, without the trial record, 
the hearing justice could not have “independently determine[d] 
that no genuine issues of material fact existed surrounding 
applicant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.”29  This was 
especially troubling to the Court given the severity of Tassone’s 
sentence, and ultimately resulted in the Court holding that an 
evidentiary hearing would thereafter be required in the first 
application for postconviction relief in all cases concerning 
applicants sentenced to life without parole.30 
Justice Indeglia dissented, stating that an evidentiary 
hearing was not required by § 10-9.1-6 “[w]hen a court is satisfied, 
on the basis of the application, the answer or motion, and the 
record, that the applicant is not entitled to post conviction relief 
and no purpose would be served by any further proceedings.”31  He 
stated that, in his opinion, the hearing justice gave Tassone ample 
opportunity to reply to the proposed dismissal of his application 
and that she was scrupulous in following the Shatney mandates.32  
He also dismissed the majority’s concern that the hearing justice 
did not review the trial record, stating that the hearing justice did 
in fact review the available trial record, which included more than 
just the trial transcripts.33  Furthermore, Indeglia also revealed 
that Tassone’s appellate attorney notified the Court on February 
1, 2012 that Tassone had a complete copy of the trial transcripts 
in his cell at the ACI that he could have made available to the 
 
 26.  Id. at 1285. 
 27.  Id. at 1286. 
 28.  Id. (quoting Shatney v. State, 755 A.2d 130, 133 (R.I. 2000); see also 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-9.1-6(b)). 
 29.  Id. at 1287. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. at 1287-88 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-9.1-6). 
 32.  Id. at 1289. 
 33.  Id.  
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trial court, despite his previous claim that they had been lost.34 
 
COMMENTARY 
Given the severity of the defendant’s sentence in this case and 
the peculiar misplacement of the trial record, the Court’s review of 
the Superior Court’s decision was appropriately prudent.  Despite 
the hearing justice’s considerations of additional materials later 
brought to her attention by the applicant and that subsequently 
required applicant’s counsel to draft a supplemental 
memorandum, it makes little sense for the justice to rely solely on 
the memorandum in determining whether the trial counsel was of 
effective assistance to the applicant.35 
As was emphasized by the Court, the importance of the trial 
record in determining whether counsel was of effective assistance 
to the applicant cannot be overstated.36  It is a decision based on 
facts that can only be gleaned from the record itself.37  Allowing a 
decision based almost exclusively on the memoranda effectively 
empowers counsel to decide the motion themselves based 
essentially on the quality and persuasiveness of their writing. 
While Tassone’s appointed counsel is likely capable of forming an 
opinion on whether the trial counsel was effective based on his 
own experience and expertise, the decision must ultimately be 
reached by the hearing justice after she has independently 
reviewed the evidence pertaining directly to the trial.38  Making 
the decision in this manner allows the hearing justice to 
“reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, 
and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the 
time.”39 
Also important is the Court’s decision to require a mandatory 
evidentiary hearing in the first application for postconviction 
relief in all cases involving applicants sentenced to life without 
parole.  Given the severity of this sentence, it seems reasonable to 
have this provision in place in order to avoid the type of pitfall 
that occurred here, even when the applicant is given the 
 
 34.  Id. at 1290. 
 35.  See id. at 1282 & n.8. 
 36.  Id. at 1286. 
 37.  See id. 
 38.  See id. 
 39.  Id. at 1285 (quoting Lynch v. State, 13 A.3d 603, 606 (R.I. 2011)). 
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opportunity to respond to the court’s proposed dismissal. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Court held that it is error for a hearing justice not to hold 
an evidentiary hearing to independently evaluate a defendant’s 
application for postconviction relief when the trial transcript is 
unavailable.  Additionally, the Court found that in the absence of 
the trial record, the Superior Court could not simply rely 
exclusively on counsel’s Shatney memoranda to determine the 
validity of the applicant’s claims.  Furthermore, the Court held 
that in all cases involving defendants sentenced to life without the 
possibility of parole, an evidentiary hearing is required in the first 
application for postconviction relief. 
Jennifer Read 
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Criminal Law.  State v. Isabel Taveras, 39 A.3d 638 (R.I. 2012).  The 
Rhode Island Supreme Court found that a police officer was not prohibited 
by the Fourth Amendment from taking reasonable measures to protect 
himself, nor is an officer required to use the least intrusive method while 
standing along a street, at night, in a high-crime area.  Specifically, the 
officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment when he asked a woman, 
suspected of carrying a weapon, to unzip her jacket to ensure the woman 
was not armed. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On January 10, 2007, at approximately 10:30 p.m., two 
Providence police officers were on patrol on Laban Street in 
Providence and noticed a conversion van without license plates, 
the engine running, lights on, and no visible driver.1  The officers 
drove up to the van, illuminated their cruiser’s take-down lights, 
and saw the defendant, Ms. Isabel Taveras, in the front 
passenger’s seat.2  They saw her bend down towards the floor, pick 
something up and stuff it into the left side of her coat jacket.3  The 
officers then approached Ms. Taveras and questioned her as to 
why she was in the area, what her name was, who owned the 
vehicle, and where the driver was.4  Then, Ms. Taveras was asked 
to exit the van and open her jacket.5  It is disputed as to whether 
when she opened her jacket, a clear plastic bag containing cocaine 
fell to the ground or if the officers saw the bag and pulled it from 
her armpit.6  After seeing the cocaine, Ms. Taveras was placed in 
handcuffs and arrested.7 
On May 8, 2007, Ms. Taveras was charged with one count of 
 
 1.  State v. Taveras, 39 A.3d 638, 640 (R.I. 2012). 
 2.  Id.  
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. at 640-41. 
 5.  Id. at 641. 
 6.  Id. at 641, 643-44. 
 7.  Id. at 641. 
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possession of between one ounce and one kilogram of cocaine and 
one count of possession with intent to deliver a controlled 
substance, cocaine.8  Ms. Taveras then filed a motion to suppress 
tangible evidence on the grounds that the search and seizure was 
“without prior judicial approval, without a warrant, without 
consent, or authority, and without probable cause or articulable 
suspicion.”9 
On November 3, 2008, a Superior Court conducted a 
suppression hearing.10  At the suppression hearing, the officers’ 
version of the night’s events differed slightly from Ms. Taveras’s 
testimony.11  The officers testified that after seeing Ms. Taveras 
stuff something inside the left side of her jacket, when questioned, 
she told them a story that “didn’t seem to add up.”12  She had told 
the officers she was on a first date with a man whose last name 
she did not know, that the van belonged to him, that she did not 
know where he was, and that the she did not know who the “dirty 
and disheveled” man in the backseat was.13  The officers’ testified 
that “the combination of [Ms. Taveras’s] story, her nervous 
demeanor, the fact that it was at night, in a high crime area, and 
the fact that [the officers’ saw Ms. Taveras] stuff something into 
her jacket, prompted [them] to conduct a Terry-type search for 
weapons.”14  Rather than conducting the typical pat-down search, 
which would have required the officer touch Ms. Taveras’s chest 
area, one of the officers had asked Ms. Taveras to unzip her 
jacket, and when she did, cocaine, in a clear plastic bag, fell to the 
ground.15 
Ms. Taveras’s testified that instead of putting the bag of 
cocaine in her jacket pocket she put it in her armpit.16  Ms. 
Taveras testified that an officer did not just ask her to unzip her 
jacket; instead, he first patted her down over her clothing and 
then asked her to unzip her jacket.17  She then testified that when 
 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id.; See R.I. Const. art 1, § 6. 
 10.  Taveras, 39 A.3d at 641. 
 11.  Id. at 641-44. 
 12.  Id. at 641-42. 
 13.  Id. at 642. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. at 643. 
 17.  Id. at 643-44. 
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she unzipped her jacket the officer told her to spread the jacket 
open and then the officer pulled the jacket open wider, and it was 
not until he had pulled the jacket wider that he saw the cocaine, 
asked her what it was, pulled the bag out of her jacket himself, 
and then handcuffed her.18 
At the close of the suppression hearing, the trial judge denied 
Ms. Taveras’s motion to suppress.19  The trial judge found that the 
officers had a reasonable basis for conducting a Terry type search 
for weapons, because based on the facts known to the officers at 
the scene, the officers had a right to protect themselves in a 
manner that went beyond the traditional pat-down search for 
weapons.20 
After the trial judge denied the motion to suppress, a jury-
waived trial commenced.21  The trial justice found Ms. Taveras 
guilty of possession of between one ounce and one kilogram of 
cocaine, and on January 23, 2009, she was sentenced to a 
suspended term of ten years at the Adult Correctional 
Institutions, with ten years probation.22  Ms. Taveras filed a 
timely appeal, appealing the decision to deny the motion to 
suppress and the judgment of conviction.23 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
When reviewing the trial judge’s denial of a motion to 
suppress evidence, the Court must give “deference to a trial 
justice’s findings of historical fact and will overturn such findings 
only if [they] conclude that the trial justice clearly was wrong”; 
however, the Court also independently reviewed, de novo, if Ms. 
 
 18.  Id. at 644. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. at 644-45. 
 21.  Id. at 645. 
 22.  Id. The testimony at the trial was similar to the testimony solicited 
at the suppressions hearing; however, Ms. Taveras did not testify at trial.  Id. 
 23.  Id. While in front of the Rhode Island Supreme Court, the state 
moved to hold the appeal in abeyance and to remand the case for clarification 
from the trail judge in regards to the scope of the search.  The Court granted 
the motion and remanded the case.  On June 1, 2011, the trial justice issued 
a written decision noting that after hearing the testimony at the suppression 
hearing he “firmly believed the police officers’ testimony” and that “certain 
facts [Ms. Taveras] testified to essentially corroborated the police officers’ 
testimony” thereby, increasing the officers’ credibility.  Id. 
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Taveras’s rights had been violated.24 
The Court reasoned, “a police officer may conduct an 
investigatory stop, provided [the officer] has a reasonable 
suspicion based on specific and articulable facts that the person 
detained is engaged in criminal activity.”25  The Court went on to 
note that “when reviewing the constitutionality of an investigative 
stop, [it] must consider the ‘totality of the circumstances.’”26  The 
Court recognized that numerous factors may attribute to the 
reasonableness of an officer’s finding reasonable suspicion of 
criminal conduct, and that these factors must be viewed in their 
entirety to determine if an officer had a reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity to warrant the belief that his safety or other’s 
safety was in danger.27  Here, a van without license plates was 
idling in a high-crime neighborhood at 10:30 p.m.; when the 
officers approached the van Ms. Taveras reached to the floor and 
shoved something into her jacket; officers felt her story did not 
add up and her demeanor appeared nervous.28  Based on all of this 
testimony, looking at the totality of the circumstances, the Court 
found the officers had “sufficient reasonable suspicion for the 
officers to suspect [Ms. Taveras] of possible criminal conduct and 
to perform a Terry-type frisk for weapons to ensure officer 
safety.”29 
Next, the Court analyzed whether the scope of the search 
exceeded the scope permissible in a Terry-style pat down.  Ms. 
Taveras argued that the officer asking her to unzip her jacket was 
invasive and required probable cause.30  The Court noted that 
general, exploratory rummaging through a person’s belongings is 
prohibited under the Fourth Amendment; however, an officer is 
allowed to search a suspect as long as the scope of that search is 
“reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other 
hidden instruments” that could be used for the assault of an 
officer.31  The Court went on to note that the Fourth Amendment 
 
 24.  Id. at 645-46 
 25.  Id. at 647 (citation omitted). 
 26.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 27.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 28.  Id. at 648. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id.  
 31.  Id. at 649. 
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does not require an officer use the least intrusive search 
possible.32  However, here, the Court reasoned that asking Ms. 
Taveras to unzip her jacket was less-intrusive than patting down 
her chest area.33  Also, the Court found that the officer asked Ms. 
Taveras to unzip her jacket to determine if she was armed with a 
weapon or other dangerous instrument.34  Thus, the Court held 
that the Fourth Amendment did not forbid an officer from frisking 
a suspect by asking that suspect to unzip their jacket under the 
circumstances of this case.35 
Justice Flaherty disagreed with the majority’s decision that 
the scope of the officer’s search did not violate Ms. Taveras’s 
Fourth Amendment rights.36  Justice Flaherty believed it was 
debatable whether asking Ms. Taveras to unzip her jacket was 
less-intrusive than patting her down, and he reasoned that 
allowing officers to ask suspects to unzip a jacket “lends an 
elasticity to Terry and to our prior holdings beyond a point that I 
am willing to travel.”37  He went on to note that the purpose of a 
Terry-stop is to discover the presence of offensive weapons that 
pose a risk of harm to the officer, not to discover evidence.38  Here, 
Justice Flaherty was concerned that this case would “give rise to a 
series of flexible and confusing standards for stops and frisks 
under Terry . . . [and] presents a particular danger with respect to 
female defendants because the police may maintain, as they did 
here, that they are reasonably reluctant to frisk women.”39  
Therefore, Justice Flaherty dissented and would have suppressed 
the evidence retrieved.40 
 
 
 32.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 33.  Id. at 650. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id.  
 36.  Id. at 651-52. 
 37.  Id. at 652-53.  
 38.  Id. at 654. 
 39.  Id. at 654-55.  Theoretically, after this case, an officer may be able to 
request a female suspect unzip her jacket and obtain evidence that ordinarily 
may not have been discovered under a typical pat down, because the officer 
could claim he wanted to use a less intrusive frisking method.  However, 
when finding the frisk constitutional, the majority based its decision on a 
multitude of factors that will not be present every time an officer wants to 
frisk a female suspect to ensure she is unarmed.  See id. 
 40.  Id. at 655. 
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COMMENTARY 
Although Justice Flaherty made some reputable points, the 
Court was correct.  The Court stated that the purpose of a Terry-
stop is to discover the presence of suspected offensive weapons 
that could be used to assault an officer.41  Based on the officers’ 
testimony and Ms. Taveras’s statement at the suppression hearing 
about all of the circumstances of the night in question, the 
majority found that asking Ms. Taveras to unzip her jacket to 
ensure she was unarmed and not a threat to their safety was 
within the parameters of a Terry-stop. 
Here, the officers were patrolling in a high-crime 
neighborhood at10:30 at night, a van was idling without any 
license plates, a possible suspect put something into her jacket, 
and the suspect appeared nervous and told them a story that did 
not “add up.”42  All of these factors and the officers’ intention to 
conduct a less intrusive frisk, resulted in one of the officers asking 
Ms. Taveras to unzip her jacket to determine if she was armed. 
Police officers have a difficult and dangerous job, one in which 
on the spot judgment decisions must be made to protect their lives 
and the lives of the public.  Thus, for public policy reasons, police 
officers should be able to frisk a suspect by asking her to unzip an 
outer layer of clothing if, based on the circumstances, an officer 
found that necessary to protect themselves or disarm the suspect. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held, based on the totality 
of the circumstances, that an officer properly frisked and did not 
violate a female suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights when he 
asked Ms. Taveras to unzip her jacket to ensure their safety.43  
Thus, the trial justice’s denial of Ms. Taveras’s motion to suppress 
evidence and the Superior Court’s judgment of conviction was 
affirmed.44 
 
 41.  Id. at 649, 654. 
 42.  Id. at 648. All of these factors contributed to the officers’ conclusion 
that they needed to frisk Ms. Taveras to ensure their safety.  Id. 
 43.  Id. at 650-51. 
 44.  Id. at 651. 
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Employment Law.  McGarry v. Pielech, 47 A.3d 271 (R.I. 2012). A 
plaintiff need not prove a discrimination claim apart from the adverse 
inference arising from the spoliation doctrine, but the inference alone is not 
enough absent existence of other extrinsic evidence supporting the claim. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
Roderick A. McGarry (“Plaintiff” or “McGarry”) applied for 
two open teaching positions in the Cumberland school system 
(“Defendants” or “School Department”), was turned down, and 
brought an age discrimination suit against the school 
department.1  In July of 1998, Plaintiff applied for and was denied 
a full time and part time English teaching position, despite that 
Plaintiff had just received his certificate to teach English earlier 
that month.2  In the spring of 1999, Plaintiff applied for a position 
as an English and social studies teacher, was interviewed, but 
ultimately not chosen.3 
On August 8, 2000, Plaintiff received a right to sue letter from 
the Rhode Island Commission of Human Rights and brought suit 
under the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act and the Rhode Island 
Fair Employment Practices Act alleging he was a victim of age 
discrimination.4  Plaintiff believed himself to be qualified for the 
teaching position because he worked for the school department 
from 1969 to 1970 and was a substitute teacher there in 1997.5  
Plaintiff was interviewed by a three person board, consisting of 
the school principal and two English teachers, for both positions.6  
When Plaintiff learned he was not selected for either job, he 
sought his personnel file, but found the interview sheets were 
 
 1.  McGarry v. Pielech, 47 A.3d 271, 275 (R.I. 2012). 
 2.  Id. at 275. 
 3.  Id. at 276. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
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missing.7 
The principal testified at trial in regards to the hiring process 
for new teachers; in her testimony the principal described the 
process as beginning with a panel interview, which results in the 
submission of one to three names of qualified candidates to the 
superintendent for final selection.8  She further testified that she 
sent the interview sheets to the central office, and that the school 
department has hired teachers who are over forty in the past.9  
The principal testified that at the first round of interviews 
Plaintiff placed forth, and the top three were sent to the 
superintendent for final approval.10  The principal further 
testified that in the second round of interviews Plaintiff ranked 
third, but the interviewing panel decided only to send the top 
choice over to the superintendent for approval.11  Both times she 
felt the other applicants had superior qualifications.12 
The superintendent testified that there is no policy requiring 
the interview sheets to be submitted, but they often are.13  The 
superintendent also admitted that a mistake in the schools 
certification roster caused the school to report to the Rhode Island 
Commission of Human Rights that Plaintiff was not certified to 
teach English when Plaintiff became certified shortly before 
applying for the positions.14 
The trial justice decided that, because the school lost the 
interview sheets before trial, a spoliation jury instruction was 
appropriate because the evidence showed (1) the school regularly 
uses the interview sheets in its hiring process, and (2) the school 
department could not produce these documents for trial.15  After 
 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. at 277. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. at 278. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. at 278.  The spoliation instruction the trial justice gave to the 
jury was:  
[Y]ou may consider the issue of spoliation of evidence, that is, 
destruction of evidence, where a defendant: 
(1) has failed to produce a document which the evidence tends to 
show was routinely generated in its business, and; 
(2) has not been able to provide a satisfactory explanation as to why 
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Plaintiff rested his case, Defendants’ moved for judgment as a 
matter of law alleging that the only evidence existing, which the 
jury could use to make its decision, is the spoliation inference and 
that is not sufficient.16  The trial justice denied Defendants’ Rule 
50 motion, but granted the renewal of the motion at the end of 
trial when Defendants renewed their motion for judgment as a 
matter of law and moved for a new trial.17  The trial justice 
reasoned that his spoliation jury instruction was incorrect because 
Plaintiff did not present any extrinsic evidence to support the 
inference that the interview sheets were advantageous to the 
Plaintiff and that the jury put too much weight on the missing 
interview sheet when making their decision.18 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court began its analysis of the 
trial justice’s ruling on Defendants judgment as a matter of law 
motion by identifying a three part burden shifting test that is 
applied to employment discrimination.19  The plaintiff must 
establish four elements for there to be a presumption that the 
defendant committed unlawful discrimination.20  Once the 
 
the document was not produced with respect to the incident in the 
case before the Court. 
The plaintiff is not required to show that the defendant destroyed or 
lost the documents in bad faith. Spoliation of evidence may be 
innocent or intentional or somewhere [12] in between. You may 
consider the facts and circumstances which were proven at trial 
relating to the 1998-1999 interview notes. You may consider who 
had custody or control of the notes, how they were destroyed or lost, 
the lack of explanation thereof for their destruction, the timing of the 
destruction, as well as any other facts and circumstances bearing on 
this issue. 
If you find that there is an unexplained, and negligent or deliberate 
absence of relevant evidence, you may infer that the missing 
evidence would have been unfavorable to the position of the 
defendant.  
Id. at 279 & n.7. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. at 279. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. at 280. 
 20.  Id. (citing Casey v. Town of Portsmith, 861 A.2d 1032, 1037 (R.I. 
2004)((1) he is a member of a protected class (2) he applied for an open 
position (3) he was not selected (4) the employer filled the position with the 
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presumption is established it is up to the defendant to provide a 
nondiscriminatory explanation.21  After such an explanation is 
provided, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate 
that defendant’s explanation in only a pretext and the true motive 
is discrimination.22  The court found Plaintiff pled a prima facie 
case establishing a presumption Defendants committed unlawful 
discrimination, and Defendants provided a nondiscriminatory 
explanation.  Thus, the critical issue at hand is whether Plaintiff 
was able to demonstrate that Defendants’ explanation was merely 
a pretext and the true motive is discrimination.23 
In considering the propriety of the trial justice’s Rule 50 
ruling, this Court held that “by requiring additional evidence to 
support the inference, exclusive of the evidentiary benefit from the 
adverse inference, the trial justice erroneously increased plaintiff’s 
burden of proof.”24  The Court agreed that there must be some 
other evidence to support the discrimination claim besides the 
negative inference from spoliation evidence, but just how much 
must be decided on a case by case basis.25  In this case, Plaintiff’s 
showing that Defendants misrepresented Plaintiff’s qualifications 
for teaching English, deviated from their hiring process, and 
ranked third in the second interview but was not submitted to the 
superintendent combined with the spoliation negative inference 
was enough to survive judgment as a matter of law.26 
The Court then briefly addressed the trial justice’s decision 
granting Defendants’ motion for a new trial finding that the trial 
justice adequately determined that Plaintiff’s claim was not 
supported by the weight of the evidence.27 
Justice Robinson dissented to the decision concerning the trial 
justice’s granting of the Rule 50 motion on the grounds that 
Plaintiff did not meet his burden of persuasion.28  This is because 
“there is absolutely no sufficient evidence, other than the missing 
 
other individual with similar qualifications)).  
 21.  Id. at 280. 
 22.  Id. at 281. 
 23.  Id. at 282. 
 24.  Id. at 283. 
 25.  Id. at 284. 
 26.  Id. at 282, 284, 285. 
 27.  Id. at 286. 
 28.  Id. 
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documents, to support a finding of discrimination.”29  Justice 
Robinson bases his holding on the facts that Plaintiff obtained his 
certifications the very same month he applied to the teaching 
positions and that the teachers chosen for the position had 
superior credentials and significantly more teaching experience.30 
 
COMMENTARY 
The primary law derived from this case is that to survive 
summary judgment, a Plaintiff in an employment discrimination 
case must provide some amount of facts in addition to any 
negative inference derived from a spoliation jury instruction. This 
makes sense because if a fact finder were able to rely solely on a 
missing document without knowing the contents thereof a fact 
finder could easily be misled into drawing a negative inference 
that is not warranted by the evidence. How much extrinsic 
evidence is needed to support the inference must be decided on a 
case by case basis. Leaving the door open is a smart decision 
because doing so will preserve trial justices’ discretion to insure 
justice will be served. 
This decision is pretty straight forward and the Supreme 
Court was meticulous in its reasoning and rule of law. The biggest 
implications of this decision will be the effect it has on attorneys 
protecting their business clients from costly employment 
discrimination lawsuits. The opinion does not specifically mention 
it, but it appears to me that the Cumberland school system is 
utilizing a behavior based interview technique. This technique 
involves a panel to write down the applicant’s answers so they can 
each give a score and come to an agreement on a single score 
amongst the panel. So after this decision, what do we tell our 
clients to do with the notes?  The Cumberland school department 
had no official policy that says turn them in, but the interviewers 
turned them in as a matter of course. 
We really only have two choices, and either choice has to be 
followed strictly without waiver.  We can have a policy of turning 
the sheets in or destroying them after a selection has been made.  
The upside of requiring the notes be saved is that our clients can 
 
 29.  Id. at 287. 
 30.  Id. at 289. 
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have evidence they based their employment decision on legally 
appropriate criteria.  The downside is that people will be 
negligent, papers go missing in mounds of other documents and it 
will always look pretty suspicious to a jury that the one that got 
misplaced happens to be the one that is being challenged in a 
discrimination case. 
Based solely on the decision in the case at hand my 
recommendation would be to have a policy to destroy all of the 
notes upon the selection of a candidate.  As in any policy this 
would be followed strictly without waiver.  I base this decision on 
a risk reward analysis between the two options. The reward for 
saving them is that the defendant will have evidence as to the 
propriety of their decision. As previously mentioned the risk is 
certain negligence resulting in some of these papers getting lost. 
Conversely, the risk of destroying them is the defendant will 
destroy good evidence in their favor, but the reward is not having 
a jury’s imagination run wild as to what devious information was 
on the lost documents and what conspiracy was being covered up 
at the organization. 
The policy of destroying the interview notes will not prove to 
be an injustice to the victims of employment discrimination 
because all of the traditional evidence towards such a showing 
would still be available. For instance, a plaintiff could show that 
an organization of fifty employees has not hired a single person 
over the age of forty or a younger inexperienced person got the job 
where the plaintiff has superior education and practical 
experience. For example, in the case at hand, Plaintiff would still 
have evidence that his qualifications were misrepresented and 
that he ranked third and his name was not provided to the 
superintendent as is customary. 
Further, a strict policy of destroying such documents is not a 
practice in bad faith. This is because you will be destroying 
evidence that is both favorable to the company and potentially 
unfavorable.  Also, there are other reasons for destroying these 
documents besides avoiding a spoliation jury instruction: (1) doing 
so provides permanence to the organizations hiring and protects 
its business judgment decisions; (2) such a practice will enable the 
interviewers to write down accurate judgments on the candidate’s 
answers to questions without fear that every note will be 
overanalyzed and misconstrued. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that to survive 
summary judgment on employment discrimination the fact finder 
cannot rely solely on a negative inference from a spoliation jury 
instruction; there must be some other evidence provided to 
support the inference. While the sufficiency of this extrinsic 
evidence must be judged on a case by case basis, disbelief in 
defendant’s proffered explanation combined with the negative 
spoliation instruction can be sufficient. 
Geoffrey Aptt 
 
ESPOSITO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2013 12:14 PM 
 
 
386 
 
Family Law.  Esposito v. Esposito, 38 A.3d 1 (R.I. 2012).  When a wife 
learns that her husband’s interest in a company is worth double its appraised 
value after the terminal date for equitable distribution, agreed to in the 
property settlement agreement, the Court cannot grant a relief from 
judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Family Court Rules of Procedure for 
Domestic Relations. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On February 21, 2005, Joseph Esposito (“Husband”) initiated 
a divorce action against his wife, Sharon Esposito (“Wife”), citing 
irreconcilable differences that led to an irremediable breakdown of 
the marriage.1  During discovery the Family Court selected 
Piccerelli, Gilstein, and Company, LLP to appraise Husband’s 
twenty-five percent ownership interest in Prime Time.2  Piccerelli 
submitted a final appraisal on June 23, 2006.3  The court 
instructed the parties that they each could obtain an independent 
appraisal of Prime Time, if they wished.4  In January 2007, after 
Wife indicated that she wished to do an independent appraisal, 
the court ordered Piccerelli to give Wife’s attorney all the records 
it had used in its appraisal.5  Wife’s accountants’ appraisal was 
lower than that of the Piccerelli firm so the parties agreed to use 
the Piccerelli evaluation which indicated the share in Prime Time 
was worth $2.9 million.6 
The parties entered into a property settlement agreement 
(“Agreement”) in order to equitably divide their marital estate on 
March 22, 2007.7  The Prime Time minority interest was included 
 
 1.  Esposito v. Esposito, 38 A.3d 1, 3 (R.I. 2012). In this survey, I refer to 
the parties as “Husband” and “Wife” for clarity only, and intend no disrespect 
by doing so. 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
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in Husband’s share.8  That same day, the Family Court approved 
the Agreement, “ordered that [it] be incorporated, but not merged, 
into the judgment” and entered a decision pending entry of final 
judgment.9 
In August 2007, before the final judgment was entered in the 
divorce, the primary stockholder of Prime Time engaged in 
negotiations to sell the company and Husband discovered that the 
value of his share of Prime Time was worth more than the 
appraised value of $2.9 million.10  On October 31, 2007, the final 
judgment of divorce was entered.11  Then Prime Time was sold on 
November 13, 2007 and Husband received $2.5 million more than 
the appraised value.12  Wife read a press release about the sale of 
Prime Time and thus discovered the increase in Husband’s 
share.13  On June 4, 2008, she filed a motion under Rule 
60(b)(1)(2)(3) and (6) of the Family Court Rules of Procedure for 
Domestic Relations for a relief from judgment.14  The trial justice 
held that there was no concrete evidence that would show that “at 
the time the divorce was granted and the Agreement was 
approved, the value of Prime Time was more than what had been 
provided for in the Piccerelli appraisal.”15  He found that Wife had 
produced no evidence that Husband knew the company would be 
sold at or before the time of the execution of the Agreement.16  
Thus, the Family Court denied Wife’s motion to amend or reform 
the Agreement and Wife appealed to the Supreme Court of Rhode 
 
 8. Id.  
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. at 4. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. at 4 & n.4. 
 14.  Id. at 4.  Rule 60(b) allows for a relief from judgment or order based 
on: 
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly 
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been 
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) 
fraud… misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
… (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of 
judgment. 
    R.I. R. Dom. Rel. P. Rule 60(b)(1)(2)(3) and (6). 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
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Island.17 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Wife claims that the trial justice committed three errors by 
denying her Rule 60(b) motion.18  First, she alleged that she and 
Husband relied on the appraisal by Piccerelli and that report 
failed to accurately account for the marketability of his twenty-
five percent share and thus the parties committed a mutual 
mistake.19  Second, she argued that the accurate date for 
valuation of the marital assets was the date the final judgment 
was entered, not the date of judicial approval of the Agreement.20  
Finally, she contended that the trial justice “did not recognize the 
‘special status of spousal agreements’” when he refused to use the 
court’s equitable powers to amend or withdraw the court’s 
approval of the Agreement.21 
 
Mutual Mistake 
A property settlement agreement that has been incorporated, 
but not merged, into the final judgment maintains the 
characteristics of a contract.22  The court must find a mutual 
mistake before a contract is able to be amended.23  If a mutual 
mistake is committed at the time an agreement is made, it fails, in 
a material manner, to properly reflect the perception of both 
parties.24 
In this case, it is important that, at the time the Agreement 
was made, Prime Time had not begun negotiations for its sale.25  
 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. at 4-5. 
 21.  Id. at 5. 
 22.  Id. (citing Zaino v. Zaino, 818 A.2d 630, 637 (R.I. 2003); Lecours v. 
Lecours, 792 A.2d 730, 731 (R.I. 2002)). 
 23.  Esposito, 38 A.3d at 5 (citing Gorman v. Gorman, 883 A.2d 732, 740 
(R.I. 2005)). A mutual mistake is a mistake that is “common to both parties 
wherein each labors under a misconception respecting the same terms of the 
written agreement sought to be [reformed].” Esposito, 38 A.3d at 5 (quoting 
Merrimack Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Dufault, 958 A.2d 620, 624 (R.I. 
2008)). 
 24.  Esposito, 38 A.3d at 5 (quoting Merrimack, 958 A.2d at 624). 
 25.  Esposito, 38 A.3d at 5. 
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Therefore, since Wife did not provide evidence of the discussion of 
the sale, the trial court concluded that the appraisal was not 
weakened since it did not take into account the later purchase of 
Prime Time.26  Thus, since both parties accepted the terms, the 
Agreement does not fail, in a material way, to show the 
understanding of the parties about the worth of Husband’s 
interest in Prime Time at the time they executed it.27  Wife did not 
show a mutual mistake of material fact by clear and convincing 
evidence.28  The Family Court did not have the power to reform or 
amend the Agreement because there was no mutual mistake 
concerning the value of Husband’s interest in Prime Time when 
the Agreement was entered into, and because Husband “did not 
consent to reformation of the Agreement.”29 
 
The Proper Date for Valuation of Assets 
Parties of a divorce continue to be husband and wife until the 
final judgment is entered.30  The date of the final judgment is the 
“terminal date for equitable distribution,” unless the parties have 
an express agreement stating otherwise.31  “Significantly, ‘[p]arties 
may make an express agreement to change the terminal date for 
equitable distribution.’”32 
Here, the Agreement contained an “express agreement” that 
March 22, 2007, the date the Family Court approved it, would 
serve as the “terminal date for equitable distribution.”33  
Paragraph seventeen of the Agreement explicitly grants each 
party the freedom to move on with his or her separate financial 
life without any claims from the other spouse.34  And paragraph 
 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. at 6. 
 28.  Id.  
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. (citing Janson v. Janson, 773 A.2d 901, 904 (R.I. 2001)). 
 31.  Esposito, 38 A.3d at 6 (citing Ruffel v. Ruffel, 900 A.2d 1178, 1185 
(R.I. 2006)). 
 32.  Esposito, 38 A.3d at 6 (citing Ruffel, 900 A.2d at 1185). 
 33.  Esposito, 38 A.3d at 6 (citing Ruffel, 900 A.2d at 1185). 
 34.  Esposito, 38 A.3d at 6-7. The dispositive section of paragraph 
seventeen states: 
Except as otherwise more specifically provided in this Agreement, all 
of the property of each of the parties hereto, both real and personal, 
now owned by him or her, or to which he or she may hereafter 
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nineteen shows that the parties drafted their agreement knowing 
the principles stated above.35  It is not the purpose of the Supreme 
Court or Family Court to ignore a property settlement agreement 
simply because a party is unhappy with the result or a party does 
not want to be bound by it anymore.36  The Court declined to 
rewrite the Agreement in Wife’s favor because the parties had 
provided a terminal date for equitable distribution in the 
Agreement.37 
 
Should the Family Court have withdrawn its approval? 
Wife contended that since the Agreement resulted in an 
inequitable distribution of the marital assets when Husband’s 
interest in Prime Time increased in value, the Family Court 
should have withdrawn its approval.38  She also argued that 
Husband was required to inform her of the increased value of his 
share prior to entry of the final judgment.39 
Spouses have a duty to reveal changes in their financial 
circumstances until the entry of a final judgment.40  Since 
Husband learned that his minority interest in Prime Time had 
increased in value between the time of the granting of the divorce 
and the entry of the final judgment, he had a duty to inform Wife 
 
become entitled, shall be and remain his or her sole and separate 
property, free from all rights of the other spouse and party hereto, 
with power in the party owning such property to deal with or 
otherwise dispose of the same as if he or she were single. … [E]ach of 
the parties hereto releases and quit-claims unto the other… all other 
rights, statutory or otherwise, in and to any real estate of which such 
other spouse and party hereto is, or may become seized and 
possessed, or to which he or she may otherwise be or become 
entitled. It is the intention of this clause to permit and empower 
each of the parties hereto to deal with his or her own separate 
property now owned or hereafter acquired without any let, 
hindrance, claim, demand or assertion of right of or by the other 
party and in all respects as if each party hereto were single. 
    Id. at 6. 
 35.  Id. at 7. Paragraph 19 states “[e]ach party waives any interest he or 
she may have in and to any assets acquired by the other party subsequent 
hereto and prior to the entry of any Final Judgment of Divorce.” Id. 
 36.  Id.at 7 (citing Vanderheiden v. Marandola, 994 A.2d 74, 78 (R.I. 
2010)). 
 37.  Esposito, 38 A.3d at 7. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Esposito, 38 A.3d at 7 (citing Giha, 609 A.2d at 949). 
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of his change in financial circumstances.41  “However, even despite 
[Husband’s] breach of his duty to disclose, any property rights 
[Wife] had in [Husband’s] share of Prime Time were foreclosed on 
March 22, 2007, when the Agreement was executed and approved 
by the Family Court.”42 
 
Dissent 
In her dissent, Justice Goldberg stated that the Court 
recognizes that spousal contracts are fundamentally different 
from ordinary business contracts and that “the Family Court must 
monitor such agreements ‘with special attention and with concern 
for the equities of the situation.’ . . . The special nature of marital 
property settlement agreements makes judicial approval of the 
fairness of those contracts ‘a sine qua non’ of our Family Court 
jurisprudence.”43  In this case, Husband deliberately withheld 
information involving the increase in the value of the Prime Time 
share and received $5.4 million.44  In her view, the Court should 
“remand this case to the Family Court ‘to review the Property 
Settlement Agreement and to withdraw its approval of the 
Agreement [if] it determine[s] that the Agreement [is] 
inequitable.’”45  Instead, “the majority concluded that an equitable 
evaluation of the fairness of the contract is unavailable to this 
spouse based on the contract itself.”46 
 
COMMENTARY 
However compelling Justice Goldberg’s argument seems, the 
majority made it clear that the Court was “in no way signaling a 
 
 41.  Esposito, 38 A.3d at 7. 
 42.  Esposito, 38 A.3d at 7 (citing Ruffel, 900 A.2d at 1185). “In so 
holding, we are in no way signaling a retreat from the good-faith rule set out 
in Gorman. […] In the absence of the specific terms and judicial approval of 
the Agreement, [Wife] may well have been entitled to share in the increase in 
the value of [Husband’s] interest in Prime Time.” Esposito, 38 A.3d at 7 
(referencing Gorman, 883 A.2d at 737). 
 43.  Esposito, 38 A.3d at 8 (quoting Gorman, 883 A.2d  at 737). 
 44.  Esposito, 38 A.3d at 8. 
 45.  Id. (quoting Gorman, 883 A.2d at 741). 
 46.  Esposito, 38 A.3d at 8-9.  The Court declared that even a “‘completed 
and integrated and signed document is subject to review and approval by the 
Family Court,’” but the majority decided that a review is unnecessary in this 
case. Esposito, 38 A.3d at 9 (quoting Gorman, 883 A.2d at 738). 
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retreat from the good-faith rule set out in Gorman.”47  The 
circumstances in this case and Gorman are completely different. 
In Gorman, the husband failed to inform his wife about the 
existence of substantial shares of stock in his employee stock 
bonus plan before the property settlement agreement was 
executed.48  In contrast, here, both parties were cognizant of the 
existence and value of all assets owned by each party at the date 
the Agreement was executed.49  Therefore, “[t]he Agreement was 
fair and equitable when the parties entered into it.”50 
This decision shows that when a property settlement 
agreement is not merged with the final divorce decree, the Family 
Court has far less discretion to modify contracts/agreements and 
the court must apply traditional contract principles.  Had the 
Agreement been merged with the final judgment of divorce, it 
would have been deemed an unenforceable contract and the 
Family Court would have had the discretion to reevaluate the split 
of marital assets and potentially modify it.51  However, the Family 
Court has no discretion to modify property settlement agreements 
after they have been made.52  This further supports the majority’s 
decision that the Family Court and Supreme Court did not have 
the authority to change the Agreement with “‘concern for the 
equities of the situation.’”53 
The majority is correct in its decision, based on the law. 
However, it would be equitable to have the Family Court 
restructure the property settlement agreement since Husband 
received double the amount of the appraised value.  As the Family 
Court is a court with ample discretion, it should be able to 
restructure property settlement agreements when it sees fit, but 
that is not the law in Rhode Island when an agreement is not 
merged with the divorce decree.  The policy behind this reasoning 
would seem to be that if parties wanted the Family Court to have 
the authority to amend the agreement, they would have merged 
the agreement with the final divorce decree, giving the court the 
 
 47.  Esposito, 38 A.3d at 7 (citing Gorman, 883 A.2d at 737). 
 48.  Gorman, 883 A.2d at 736. 
 49.  Esposito, 38 A.3d at 7. 
 50.  Id. at 8 (emphasis added). 
 51.  See Ronald J. Resmini, The Law of Domestic Relations in Rhode 
Island, 29 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 379, 400-01 (1995). 
 52.  See id. at 401. 
 53.  Esposito, 38 A.3d at 8 (quoting Gorman, 883 A.2d at 737). 
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discretion to make equitable changes.  The policy behind this 
reasoning is the competency of the parties to enter into contracts 
and party autonomy. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Court held that a mutual mistake of material fact was 
not shown here by clear and convincing evidence, the terminal 
date for equitable distribution is not the date the final judgment 
was entered because the parties included a terminal date for 
equitable distribution in the Agreement, and if Husband had 
disclosed to wife the increase in the value of the Prime Time 
interest, it would have changed nothing.54  Accordingly, the Court 
affirmed the Family Court’s order because there was no indication 
that the trial justice had abused his discretion when he denied 
Wife’s motion to vacate.55 
Ashley Brinkmann 
 
 
 54.  Esposito, 38 A.3d at 6-7. 
 55.  Id. at 8. 
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Insurance Law.  Henderson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 35 A.3d 902 (R.I. 
2012).  The Rhode Island Supreme Court addressed whether a “for a fee” 
policy exception under an uninsured-motorist insurance policy violated 
Rhode Island policy.  The Court held that the provision was clear, 
unambiguous and did not violate public policy.  Additionally, the Court 
emphasized that an insurance policy is foremost a contract between an 
insurance company and the insured and that courts should not interfere with 
these contracts so long as they meet the above criteria. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
Mr. Henderson, the plaintiff in the Superior Court and the 
Respondent in this matter, was employed by All Occasion 
Transportation as a professional driver.1  Mr. Henderson’s  
customers paid All Occasion a fee for his services, and in turn All 
Occasion compensated Mr. Henderson by salary.2  On or about 
June 5, 2003,3 Mr. Henderson, was directed by his employer to 
transport a number of customers from Newport, Rhode Island, to 
Logan Airport in Boston, Massachusetts.4  After driving them to 
the airport, and while he was unloading his customer’s luggage, 
another vehicle hit Mr. Henderson, severely injuring him. After 
the accident, Mr. Henderson settled claims against the tortfeasor 
as well as All Occasion’s insurance carrier, but he contended that 
his injuries exceeded the amounts he received.5  Mr. Henderson 
then filed an “under-insured” motorist claim with Nationwide, his 
personal automobile insurance carrier.6  Nationwide denied Mr. 
Henderson’s claim, naming two exclusions contained in his 
uninsured motorist coverage policy: the “for a fee exclusion” and 
 
 1.  Henderson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 35 A.3d 902, 903 (R.I. 2012). 
 2.  Id. at 903.  
 3.  The exact date is in dispute due to conflicting testimony by the 
respondent, Mr. Henderson, but it did not impact the decision in this case. 
See id. at 904 & n. 1.  
 4.  Id. at 904.  
 5.  Id.  
 6.  Id.   
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the “regular use exclusion.”7 
After Nationwide denied his claim, Mr. Henderson filed suit 
in the Superior Court asserting that his insurer had “unlawfully 
and unjustifiably” denied him coverage.8  Nationwide moved for 
summary judgment, which was denied by the motion justice.9  The 
motion justice found that the policy exclusions were “convoluted,” 
“difficult to understand,” and that they were “a plain attempt to 
vary or qualify the clear and unambiguous statutory definition of 
uninsured motor vehicle and the requirement that all insurance 
carriers offer personal protection to their insured.”10 
One year later, Nationwide renewed its motion for summary 
judgment arguing that Mr. Henderson’s testimony, from a 
deposition after the denials of the initial summary judgment, 
showed that the accident occurred while he was using All 
Occasion’s limousine to carry passengers “for a fee” and did so 
regularly.11  The motion justice, who presided over the first 
summary judgment hearing, stated that she accepted the facts 
both as true and weighing in favor of Nationwide, but still denied 
Nationwide’s motion because she found that the exclusions were 
overbroad and violated public policy.12  After the justice’s ruling, 
the parties acknowledged that Mr. Henderson’s remaining 
damages exceeded the policy limits, and subsequently Mr. 
Henderson filed a motion for entry of judgment in his favor.13  On 
October 1, 2010, a judgment was entered on behalf of Mr. 
Henderson for the policy limit of $25,000.14  Nationwide appealed 
that judgment to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island.15 
 
 
 
 7.  The relevant portions of his policy provide: “coverage does not apply 
to: 1. Use of any motor vehicle by an insured to carry persons or property for 
a fee and 4. bodily injury suffered while occupying a motor vehicle: a) owned 
by; or b) furnished for the regular use of; you or a relative, but not insured for 
Auto Liability coverage under this policy.” Id.    
 8.  Id.  
 9.  Id. at 904-05.  
 10.  Id. at 904.  
 11.  Id. at 905.  
 12.  Id.  
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. Additionally, Mr. Henderson received interest and costs. Id.  
 15.  Id. 
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island began its analysis by 
stating the general rule for the interpretation of insurance policies 
in Rhode Island.16  The Court states “it is well settled that when 
the terms of an insurance policy are found to be clear and 
unambiguous judicial construction is an end.”17  The Court 
elaborates that policy terms must be given their plain, ordinary 
meaning and that the contract terms must be applied as stated.18  
Further, “[c]ontracts for uninsured-motorist coverage must be 
[considered] in light of the public policy mandated by the 
Legislature.”19 
In the case at hand, the Court reviewed the policy language 
and its precedent and held that the “for a fee” exclusion is 
consistent with the fundamental purpose of Rhode Island’s 
uninsured-motorist statute.20  It opined that the language of 
Nationwide’s “for a fee” exclusion was clear, unambiguous, and 
the words in the exclusion provision were “all of common usage 
and not susceptible to multiple meanings,” and because of this, the 
Court applied the “clear” and “unambiguous” policy language to 
the facts of the case at hand.21  The Court focused on the 
undisputed facts that at the time of the accident Mr. Henderson 
was employed by All Occasion as a professional driver, that his 
passengers paid a fee for his services, which All Occasion paid him 
a salary for, and that Mr. Henderson was injured in the course of 
his employment.22 
Further, the Court has held, in previous uninsured motorist 
 
 16.  See id. at 906.  
 17.  Id. (quoting Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Viti, 850 A.2d 104, 
106-07 (R.I. 2004) (citation omitted)). 
 18.  Henderson, 35 A.3d at 906.  
 19.  Id. (quoting DiTata v. Aetna Causality and Surety Co., 542 A.2d 245, 
247 (R.I. 1988) (citation omitted)). The Court states that the public policy 
behind Rhode Island’s uninsured-motorist statute is to protect the insured 
against loss resulting from injuries sustained by negligence of uninsured 
vehicles. See Henderson, 35 A.3d at 906.   
 20.  Id. at 906. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. at 907. The Court focused on the fact that Mr. Henderson was 
injured in the course his employment because he was asserting a claim 
against his personal automobile insurance policy. Id. at 908.    
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policy exclusions, that although public policy favors 
indemnification it does not require insurance companies to provide 
policyholders with coverage that protects them in every 
circumstance.23  The Court believes that this case is one of those 
circumstances where an insurer is not required to indemnify an 
insured.24  In the Court’s opinion, Nationwide was not required to 
indemnify Mr. Henderson because “the purchaser of a personal 
automobile insurance policy cannot reasonably anticipate coverage 
of his employment as a professional [] driver; neither could an 
insurance company reasonably anticipate insuring that risk in a 
personal automobile insurance policy.”25  Elaborating, the Court 
explains that the “for a fee” exception comes from the fact that 
insurers base their policy premium rates on the risk that the 
policyholder will be injured by an uninsured motorist, and not an 
individual using his vehicle in a commercial context.26  Concluding 
that the “for a fee” exception was not ambiguous and did not 
violate public policy, the Court did not analyze the parties’ 
arguments with respect to the “regular use” exception.27  The 
Supreme Court of Rhode Island vacated the judgment of the 
Superior Court and remanded the record to the Superior Court for 
entry of judgment in favor of the Nationwide Insurance 
Company.28 
 
COMMENTARY 
It is important to emphasize that this decision is narrowly 
focused to the present facts.29  The Court, itself, admits that the 
“for a fee” exclusion’s language is vast, and that the broad terms 
can, at times, lend themselves to wrongful interpretation that may 
be inconsistent with the public policy that the Court articulated.30  
Further, the Court mentions that though the vastness of the 
exclusion was the primary concern of the motion justice, the Court 
stated that it had to channel itself to the facts of the case before 
 
 23.  Id. at 906-07.  
 24.  See id. at 907-08.  
 25.  Id. at 908. 
 26.  Id.   
 27.  Id. & n. 12. 
 28.  Id. at 909. 
 29.  See id. at 908-09. 
 30.  Id. at 908. 
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Additionally, it seems that “for a fee” is not as “unambiguous” 
and “clear” as the Court seems to make it.32  The exclusion 
provision explicitly states that coverage does not apply when “use 
of any motor vehicle by an insured to carry persons or property for 
a fee,”33 yet Mr. Henderson, the insured who was operating the 
motor vehicle, was not paid a fee, but a salary.34  It seems that the 
“for a fee” exclusion would be clearly more applicable for one who 
drives a taxi. For example, if Mr. Henderson were a taxi driver, 
who was directly paid a fee for his services, and was injured, he 
would be the insured using a motor vehicle for a fee and excluded 
under the exclusions plain meaning. Here, All Occasion, who was 
not insured under the policy, was paid a fee and in turn Mr. 
Henderson was paid a salary from that fee. Based on the 
difference explained above it is surprising that the language of the 
exclusion provision was not found to be ambiguous.35 
 
CONCLUSION 
After reviewing Nationwide’s policy language and Rhode 
Island precedent the Court held that the “for a fee” clause was 
clear, unambiguous, and did not violate Rhode Island public policy 
or the purpose behind Rhode Island’s uninsured-motorist coverage 
statute. 
Maxine Kutner 
 
 
 31.  Id. at 909. 
 32.  See id. at 906.  
 33.  Id. at 904 (emphasis added).  
 34.  See id. at 903. 
 35.  See id. at 906. 
KOZIOL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2013 12:19 PM 
 
 
399 
 
Insurance Law.  Koziol v. Peerless Ins. Co., 41 A.3d 647 (R.I. 2012).  The 
Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the terms of a homeowner’s insurance 
policy coverage “summary page” will be considered terms of the actual 
policy.  If the court finds ambiguity and/or contradictions between a 
“summary page” and the policy, it will interpret the policy against the 
insurer. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
Ronald Koziol et al (“Plaintiffs”), as a general contractor for 
the construction of new homes, subcontracted framing work to be 
done to their property.1  The framing work done by the 
subcontractor was faulty “to such an extent that the building 
official of the Town of Cumberland refused to approve the work.”2  
Therefore, Plaintiffs had to incur additional expenses to bring 
their property into compliance with the building code.3 Plaintiffs 
filed a claim with their homeowner’s insurance company, Peerless 
Insurance Company (“Peerless”).4  Peerless denied the Plaintiffs’ 
claim because it deemed their contract unambiguously excluded 
coverage for both “faulty workmanship” and for enforcement of 
“any ordinance . . . regulating the construction . . . of a building,” 
and Plaintiffs filed this declaratory-judgment action.5 
In addition to the base coverage provided by the homeowner’s 
policy, Plaintiffs also purchased a “Homeowners Special Ultra 
Plus Coverage” (“Ultra Plus Coverage”) at an extra premium.6  In 
the insurance summary page under the “Ultra Plus Coverage” 
section, a chart listed coverages and provided that “Ordinance or 
Law Compliance for Buildings (required after a loss) [is] 
 
 1.  Koziol v. Peerless Ins. Co., 41 A.3d 647, 648 (R.I. 2012). 
 2.  Id. at 648-49.  
 3.  Id. at 649. 
 4.  Id.  
 5.  Id. at 649-50.  
 6.  Id. at 649. 
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[i]ncluded.”7  Although the term “loss” was never defined, the 
summary page did include a disclaimer that the chart did not 
constitute an insurance contract, and that the insured should look 
at their policy terms for their specific coverage.8 
The other relevant terms in the policy are exclusions that 
Peerless referred to in denying the Plaintiffs’ claim.9  The policy 
included an exclusion of coverage for “faulty workmanship,” 
disjointly found from pages thirty-one to thirty-three of the policy,  
and an “Ordinance or Law” coverage exclusion for work needed for 
“enforcement of any ordinance. . .unless specifically provided 
under this policy.”10  The Providence County Superior Court found 
that the terms of the policy created ambiguity.11  Because the 
summary page caused ambiguity and the policy could be 
reasonably construed to provide coverage, the trial court 
interpreted the policy against the insured.12  The trial court 
denied Peerless’ motion for summary judgment, and entered a 
declaratory judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor upon a request by both 
parties for a final judgment.13  Peerless appealed.14 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
A policy’s terms are found to be ambiguous if they are 
“reasonably susceptible of different constructions”15 and are 
strictly construed in favor of the insured if ambiguity is found.16  
The Plaintiffs’ arguments of ambiguity were based on content 
found in the summary page.17  The Rhode Island Supreme Court 
 
 7.  Id. “Ordinance or Law Compliance for Building” is herein referred to 
as “ordinance compliance coverage.” 
 8.  Id.  
 9.  Id. at 650.  
 10.  Id.  
 11.  Id. at 649.  
 12.  Id.  
 13.  Id. A bench decision in the lower court was proper because whether a 
contract is ambiguous is a question of law and not of fact. Id. (citing Bliss 
Mine Road Condominium Association v. Nationwide Property and Casualty 
Insurance Co., 11 A.3d 1078, 1083 (R.I. 2010)). 
 14.  Id. at 649.  
 15.  Id. at 650 (quoting Bliss Mine Road Condominium Association, 11 
A.3d at 1085). 
 16.  Id. at 651 (citing Bliss Mine Road Condominium Association, 11 A.3d 
at 1085). 
 17.  See id. at 650. 
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held that the summary page was also part of the homeowner’s 
insurance policy and that it should be considered with the other 
policy terms.18  Therefore, the issue in this case is whether the 
policy’s other coverage terms “when read in concert with the 
information on the summary page, are sufficiently clear so that an 
ordinary reader would understand the nature of the 
coverage. . .”19 
The Court held that the policy was ambiguous in two different 
ways.20  First, although the summary page did provide ordinance 
compliance coverage after a loss, it never limited the term loss to 
“covered losses” anywhere in the policy.21  Peerless contends that 
when viewing the policy as a whole, the ordinance compliance 
coverage did not reach to work needed due to “faulty 
workmanship.”22  The court reasoned that even if the insured 
“could have been expected to weave their way through the policy” 
to find such “faulty workmanship” exception, the exception was 
ambiguous.23  It provided that the policy would cover “any ensuing 
loss . . . not excluded or excepted in this policy as covered.”24  The 
Court found that an ordinary insured could reasonably conclude 
that the “Ultra Plus Coverage” covers the ensuing loss “resulting 
from having to comply with the building code, even if the initial 
loss due to faulty workmanship was not covered.”25 
Secondly, the Court held that the policy was ambiguous 
because it excluded ordinance compliance coverage “unless 
 
 18. Id. at 651; Similar to Sentry Insurance Co. v. Grena, 556 A.2d 998, 
1000 (R.I. 1989) (separate and distinct document that explained the parties’ 
insurance coverage was permitted to consider the policy’s reach); Unlike 
Amica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Streicker, 583 A.2d 550, 552 (R.I. 1990) 
(where an “information digest” that had been sent separately to the Plaintiff’s 
home was not considered part of the policy terms). Id.  
 19.  Id. at 651-653 (citing Mallane v. Holyoke Mutual Insurance Co. in 
Salem, 658 A.2d 18, 21 (R.I. 1995)) (Declaration page of the automotive 
insurance policy designated plaintiff as “named driver” but insurance 
company claimed the plaintiff was not insured. Declaration page along with 
entire policy created ambiguity, and therefore the policy was construed 
against the insurer). 
 20.  See id. at 652-53. 
 21.  Id. at 651. 
 22.  Id.  
 23.  Id. at 652.  
 24.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 25.  Id. at 653.   
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specifically provided under [the] policy.”26  When reading the 
summary page which extended ordinance compliance coverage 
“required after a loss,” an insured could reasonably conclude that 
the summary page specifically provided ordinance compliance 
coverage under the policy.27  “Reasonable expectations of coverage 
raised by the [coverage summary] cannot be contradicted by the 
policy’s boilerplate unless the [summary] page itself clearly so 
warns the insured.”28 Because the Court held that the policy was 
ambiguous, it construed its terms against Peerless and affirmed 
the declaratory judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs.29 
 
COMMENTARY 
The Court was correct when it reemphasized the established 
doctrine that ambiguous contracts will be interpreted against the 
drafter.30  The Court’s policy rationale is that “summaries written 
by an insurance company are necessarily relied upon by 
consumers as reasonably clear statements about what they have 
purchased.”31  The Court determined that it must consider the 
terms of a summary page to be part of the policy’s terms, 
especially when the summary page is with the insurance policy, 
because “‘it is a common knowledge that the detailed provisions of 
insurance contracts are seldom read by the consumers.’”32  Justice 
Flaherty, writing for the majority, recognized that it would take 
an “adventurous” reader to look beyond a policy’s summary page, 
and that even if one were to do so, they would “soon [be] tangled in 
a bewildering thicket of verbiage False”33  Although finding 
certain provisions in the policy would require a “scavenger hunt” 
and for an insured to “bounc[e] like a pinball from section to 
section,” ultimately the Court properly concluded that it was the 
ambiguity of the actual terms that allowed Plaintiffs to prevail, 
 
 26.  Id.  
 27.  Id.  
 28.  Id. at 653 (citing Mallane, 658 A.2d at 21).  
 29.  Id.  
 30.  Id. at 651 (citing Bliss Mine Road Condominium Association, 11 A.3d 
at 1085). 
 31.  Id. at 654. 
 32.  Id. at 653-54 (citing Sentry Ins. Co. v. Grenga, 556 A.2d 998, 1000 
(R.I. 1989)).  
 33.  Id. at 652. 
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not the mere disorderly structure of the policy.34 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Court held that because the terms of an insurance policy 
coverage “summary page” will be considered terms of the actual 
policy when such summary is embedded within the policy, no 
ambiguity or contradictions may exist between the summary page 
and the actual policy terms. If there is any ambiguity or 
contradictions, the Court will interpret the policy against the 
insurer. 
Leticia Cunha Tavares 
 
 
 34.  Id.  
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Insurance Law.  Henderson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 35 A.3d 902 (R.I. 
2012).  The Rhode Island Supreme Court addressed whether a “for a fee” 
policy exception under an uninsured-motorist insurance policy violated 
Rhode Island policy.  The Court held that the provision was clear, 
unambiguous and did not violate public policy.  Additionally, the Court 
emphasized that an insurance policy is foremost a contract between an 
insurance company and the insured and that courts should not interfere with 
these contracts so long as they meet the above criteria. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
Mr. Henderson, the plaintiff in the Superior Court and the 
Respondent in this matter, was employed by All Occasion 
Transportation as a professional driver.1  Mr. Henderson’s  
customers paid All Occasion a fee for his services, and in turn All 
Occasion compensated Mr. Henderson by salary.2  On or about 
June 5, 2003,3 Mr. Henderson, was directed by his employer to 
transport a number of customers from Newport, Rhode Island, to 
Logan Airport in Boston, Massachusetts.4  After driving them to 
the airport, and while he was unloading his customer’s luggage, 
another vehicle hit Mr. Henderson, severely injuring him. After 
the accident, Mr. Henderson settled claims against the tortfeasor 
as well as All Occasion’s insurance carrier, but he contended that 
his injuries exceeded the amounts he received.5  Mr. Henderson 
then filed an “under-insured” motorist claim with Nationwide, his 
personal automobile insurance carrier.6  Nationwide denied Mr. 
Henderson’s claim, naming two exclusions contained in his 
uninsured motorist coverage policy: the “for a fee exclusion” and 
 
 1.  Henderson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 35 A.3d 902, 903 (R.I. 2012). 
 2.  Id. at 903.  
 3.  The exact date is in dispute due to conflicting testimony by the 
respondent, Mr. Henderson, but it did not impact the decision in this case. 
See id. at 904 & n. 1.  
 4.  Id. at 904.  
 5.  Id.  
 6.  Id.   
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the “regular use exclusion.”7 
After Nationwide denied his claim, Mr. Henderson filed suit 
in the Superior Court asserting that his insurer had “unlawfully 
and unjustifiably” denied him coverage.8  Nationwide moved for 
summary judgment, which was denied by the motion justice.9  The 
motion justice found that the policy exclusions were “convoluted,” 
“difficult to understand,” and that they were “a plain attempt to 
vary or qualify the clear and unambiguous statutory definition of 
uninsured motor vehicle and the requirement that all insurance 
carriers offer personal protection to their insured.”10 
One year later, Nationwide renewed its motion for summary 
judgment arguing that Mr. Henderson’s testimony, from a 
deposition after the denials of the initial summary judgment, 
showed that the accident occurred while he was using All 
Occasion’s limousine to carry passengers “for a fee” and did so 
regularly.11  The motion justice, who presided over the first 
summary judgment hearing, stated that she accepted the facts 
both as true and weighing in favor of Nationwide, but still denied 
Nationwide’s motion because she found that the exclusions were 
overbroad and violated public policy.12  After the justice’s ruling, 
the parties acknowledged that Mr. Henderson’s remaining 
damages exceeded the policy limits, and subsequently Mr. 
Henderson filed a motion for entry of judgment in his favor.13  On 
October 1, 2010, a judgment was entered on behalf of Mr. 
Henderson for the policy limit of $25,000.14  Nationwide appealed 
that judgment to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island.15 
 
 
 
 7.  The relevant portions of his policy provide: “coverage does not apply 
to: 1. Use of any motor vehicle by an insured to carry persons or property for 
a fee and 4. bodily injury suffered while occupying a motor vehicle: a) owned 
by; or b) furnished for the regular use of; you or a relative, but not insured for 
Auto Liability coverage under this policy.” Id.    
 8.  Id.  
 9.  Id. at 904-05.  
 10.  Id. at 904.  
 11.  Id. at 905.  
 12.  Id.  
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. Additionally, Mr. Henderson received interest and costs. Id.  
 15.  Id. 
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island began its analysis by 
stating the general rule for the interpretation of insurance policies 
in Rhode Island.16  The Court states “it is well settled that when 
the terms of an insurance policy are found to be clear and 
unambiguous judicial construction is an end.”17  The Court 
elaborates that policy terms must be given their plain, ordinary 
meaning and that the contract terms must be applied as stated.18  
Further, “[c]ontracts for uninsured-motorist coverage must be 
[considered] in light of the public policy mandated by the 
Legislature.”19 
In the case at hand, the Court reviewed the policy language 
and its precedent and held that the “for a fee” exclusion is 
consistent with the fundamental purpose of Rhode Island’s 
uninsured-motorist statute.20  It opined that the language of 
Nationwide’s “for a fee” exclusion was clear, unambiguous, and 
the words in the exclusion provision were “all of common usage 
and not susceptible to multiple meanings,” and because of this, the 
Court applied the “clear” and “unambiguous” policy language to 
the facts of the case at hand.21  The Court focused on the 
undisputed facts that at the time of the accident Mr. Henderson 
was employed by All Occasion as a professional driver, that his 
passengers paid a fee for his services, which All Occasion paid him 
a salary for, and that Mr. Henderson was injured in the course of 
his employment.22 
Further, the Court has held, in previous uninsured motorist 
 
 16.  See id. at 906.  
 17.  Id. (quoting Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Viti, 850 A.2d 104, 
106-07 (R.I. 2004) (citation omitted)). 
 18.  Henderson, 35 A.3d at 906.  
 19.  Id. (quoting DiTata v. Aetna Causality and Surety Co., 542 A.2d 245, 
247 (R.I. 1988) (citation omitted)). The Court states that the public policy 
behind Rhode Island’s uninsured-motorist statute is to protect the insured 
against loss resulting from injuries sustained by negligence of uninsured 
vehicles. See Henderson, 35 A.3d at 906.   
 20.  Id. at 906. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. at 907. The Court focused on the fact that Mr. Henderson was 
injured in the course his employment because he was asserting a claim 
against his personal automobile insurance policy. Id. at 908.    
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policy exclusions, that although public policy favors 
indemnification it does not require insurance companies to provide 
policyholders with coverage that protects them in every 
circumstance.23  The Court believes that this case is one of those 
circumstances where an insurer is not required to indemnify an 
insured.24  In the Court’s opinion, Nationwide was not required to 
indemnify Mr. Henderson because “the purchaser of a personal 
automobile insurance policy cannot reasonably anticipate coverage 
of his employment as a professional [] driver; neither could an 
insurance company reasonably anticipate insuring that risk in a 
personal automobile insurance policy.”25  Elaborating, the Court 
explains that the “for a fee” exception comes from the fact that 
insurers base their policy premium rates on the risk that the 
policyholder will be injured by an uninsured motorist, and not an 
individual using his vehicle in a commercial context.26  Concluding 
that the “for a fee” exception was not ambiguous and did not 
violate public policy, the Court did not analyze the parties’ 
arguments with respect to the “regular use” exception.27  The 
Supreme Court of Rhode Island vacated the judgment of the 
Superior Court and remanded the record to the Superior Court for 
entry of judgment in favor of the Nationwide Insurance 
Company.28 
 
COMMENTARY 
It is important to emphasize that this decision is narrowly 
focused to the present facts.29  The Court, itself, admits that the 
“for a fee” exclusion’s language is vast, and that the broad terms 
can, at times, lend themselves to wrongful interpretation that may 
be inconsistent with the public policy that the Court articulated.30  
Further, the Court mentions that though the vastness of the 
exclusion was the primary concern of the motion justice, the Court 
stated that it had to channel itself to the facts of the case before 
 
 23.  Id. at 906-07.  
 24.  See id. at 907-08.  
 25.  Id. at 908. 
 26.  Id.   
 27.  Id. & n. 12. 
 28.  Id. at 909. 
 29.  See id. at 908-09. 
 30.  Id. at 908. 
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Additionally, it seems that “for a fee” is not as “unambiguous” 
and “clear” as the Court seems to make it.32  The exclusion 
provision explicitly states that coverage does not apply when “use 
of any motor vehicle by an insured to carry persons or property for 
a fee,”33 yet Mr. Henderson, the insured who was operating the 
motor vehicle, was not paid a fee, but a salary.34  It seems that the 
“for a fee” exclusion would be clearly more applicable for one who 
drives a taxi. For example, if Mr. Henderson were a taxi driver, 
who was directly paid a fee for his services, and was injured, he 
would be the insured using a motor vehicle for a fee and excluded 
under the exclusions plain meaning. Here, All Occasion, who was 
not insured under the policy, was paid a fee and in turn Mr. 
Henderson was paid a salary from that fee. Based on the 
difference explained above it is surprising that the language of the 
exclusion provision was not found to be ambiguous.35 
 
CONCLUSION 
After reviewing Nationwide’s policy language and Rhode 
Island precedent the Court held that the “for a fee” clause was 
clear, unambiguous, and did not violate Rhode Island public policy 
or the purpose behind Rhode Island’s uninsured-motorist coverage 
statute. 
Maxine Kutner 
 
 
 31.  Id. at 909. 
 32.  See id. at 906.  
 33.  Id. at 904 (emphasis added).  
 34.  See id. at 903. 
 35.  See id. at 906. 
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Tort Law.  Higgins v. Rhode Island Hospital, 35 A.3d 919 (R.I. 2012). 
David Higgins, an injured on the job Providence firefighter, sued Rhode 
Island Hospital for negligence.  The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed 
the judgment below that the “firefighter’s rule” barred a negligence action 
for a firefighter’s injury that occurred within the course of an emergency 
where the risk created could be reasonably anticipated because Higgins’ 
injury arose out of the circumstances that brought him to the scene, it was 
reasonably foreseeable, and defendants were the alleged tortfeasors who 
caused Higgins to go to the location where he was injured. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
Plaintiff David Higgins (“Higgins”), an on duty Providence 
EMT/firefighter, was injured when he responded to a call to 
deliver a patient to defendant Rhode Island Hospital.1  Higgins 
injury occurred when a nurse asked Higgins to assist with a 
different patient that was unruly and “shouting and spitting” at 
her.2  Because the patient struggled, was only under soft 
restraints and allegedly not properly medicated, Higgins was 
injured when the patient “violently moved his head and torso,” 
breaking Higgins’ jaw and knocking him unconscious.3 
Higgins sustained major injuries that caused him to retire as 
a firefighter on a disability pension.4  He then filed suit against 
Rhode Island Hospital and their security company alleging 
negligence for “fail[ing] to restrain the patient and that failure 
had caused his injuries.”5  Defendants motion for summary 
judgment was granted by Superior Court Justice Stern as 
plaintiff’s claim was barred by the firefighter’s/public-safety 
officer’s rule in Rhode Island.6  Plaintiff timely appealed. 
 
 1.  Higgins v. Rhode Island Hospital, 35 A.3d 919, 921-22 (R.I. 2012). 
 2.  Id. at 922, 925. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. at 922-23. 
 5.  Id. at 922. 
 6.  Id. 
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Rhode Island firefighter’s rule “bar[s] an injured public-
safety official from maintaining a negligence action against a 
tortfeasor whose alleged malfeasance is responsible for bringing 
the officer to the scene of a fire, crime, or other emergency where 
the officer is injured.”7  If a defendant can meet the three-pronged 
test to trigger the rule’s application, a plaintiff will be barred from 
recovery.8  For the firefighter rule to apply, the defendant must 
prove “(1) that the tortfeasor injured the police officer or 
firefighter in the course of his or her employment, (2) that the risk 
the tortfeasor created was the type of risk that one could 
reasonably anticipate would arise in the dangerous situation 
which their employment requires them to encounter, and (3) that 
the tortfeasor is the individual who created the dangerous 
situation which brought the police officer or firefighter to the 
crime scene, accident scene, or fire.”9 
The Court held that the event was in the course of Higgins’ 
employment and that there was a nexus between the original 
emergency and the alleged tort by Rhode Island Hospital.10  Here, 
Higgins’ argument that helping the nurse restrain the patient was 
an intervening act was rejected.11  As such, all three prongs of the 
firefighter rule have been met.  Higgins was responding to an 
emergency, the risk could be reasonably anticipated, and the 
alleged tortfeasor was the same individual creating the risk.  
Thus, Higgins was properly barred from recovery and the 
 
 7.  Id. at 922-23. (quoting Labrie v. Pace Membership Warehouse, Inc., 
678 A2d 867, 868 (R.I. 1996)). 
 8.  Higgins, 35 A.3d at 923. 
 9.  Id. (quoting Rinn v. Razzee, 912 A.2d 939, 940 (R.I. 2006) (citation 
omitted)). 
 10.  Id. at 923-24. The Court has recognized cases where an intervening 
cause does break the chain of causation. See Aenta Casualty & Surety Co. v. 
Vierra, 619 A.2d 436, 439 (R.I. 2012) (finding a break in causation where a 
car not involved in the original accident scene struck a police officer) and 
Labrie v. Pace Membership Warehouse, Inc., 678 A.2d 867, 868 (R.I. 1996) 
(holding a break in the causal chain where during a fire alarm certification a 
fire superintendent was injured by an unexpected pipe bursting). But see 
Walker v. Prignano, 850 A.2d 954, 955 (R.I. 2004) (holding that a plaintiff 
could not recover when injured on stone steps at a call for a security alarm 
going off because it was incidental to the emergency). The way the injury was 
sustained in Higgins is comparable to the one in Walker. 
 11.  Higgins, 35 A.3d at 923-24. 
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judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed.12 
 
COMMENTARY 
This case further strengthens the notion that when a public 
officer’s injury is proximately related and reasonably anticipated 
from his service as a public safety officer in the scope of an 
emergency call, that he is barred from recovery against an alleged 
tortfeasor that caused the emergency.  Higgins stands for the 
principle that the firefighter rule is not a “literal requirement” 
that the tortfeasor called the firefighter to the scene but that there 
is a “nexus or connection” between the injury and the reason the 
firefighter was called to the scene of the accident, clarifying what 
is an intervening event that will break the chain of causation.13  
This case properly applied the firefighter rule and is consistent 
with precedent in Rhode Island. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island firefighter’s rule bars a negligence action 
for a plaintiff firefighter’s injury in the course of his employment 
where the injury could be reasonably anticipated because it rose 
out of the circumstances that brought him to the scene.14 
Nicholas Denice 
 
 
 12.  Higgins, 35 A.3d at 923, 925. 
 13.  See id. at 924-25. 
 14.  Id. at 925. 
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Tort Law.  Gushlaw v. Milner, 42 A.3d 1245 (R.I. 2012).  A defendant who 
drives his intoxicated friend to his car does not owe a duty of care to other 
motorists when the intoxicated friend proceeds to get into his vehicle and 
drive.  Creation of such a duty would impose a high liability on public 
transport operators as well as interfere with policies designed to combat 
drunk driving, with particular concern for designated drivers.  It is not for 
the Court, but rather, the General Assembly, to determine whether such a 
duty should be imposed on this class of individual. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On August 12, 2005, Joseph M. Clukey (“Mr. Clukey”), then 
nineteen years old, invited Matthew J. Milner (“Mr. Milner”), then 
age twenty, to a party in Warwick, Rhode Island.1  Prior to the 
party, both men met at a local convenience store not far from 
where they lived in Smithfield, Rhode Island, where it was 
decided that Mr. Clukey would drive to the party and Mr. Milner 
would leave his car at the convenience store.2  En-route to the 
party, Mr. Clukey and Mr. Milner stopped at a liquor store where 
they purchased an “eighteen-pack” of beer and proceeded to the 
party.3  At the party, it was observed that each man consumed 
between seven and eight beers, with Mr. Milner becoming “louder 
and more obnoxious” as the evening proceeded.4  Following the 
first party, Mr. Clukey and Mr. Milner returned to Smithfield 
where they went to a friend’s house for another party.5  After 
being asked to leave from the second party for being too loud, Mr. 
Clukey drove Mr. Milner back to his car at the convenience store 
and subsequently returned to the house party.6 
 
 1.  Gushlaw v. Milner, 42 A.3d 1245, 1247 (R.I. 2012). 
 2.  Id. at 1247-48.  
 3.  Id. at 1248. 
 4.  Id. A comment was made by the hostess of the party that she hoped 
Mr. Milner was not driving, to which Mr. Clukey responded that he would be 
driving when they left the party. Id.  
 5.  Id. No alcohol was consumed at this party at the hostess’ request. Id. 
 6.  Id. 
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At approximately 1:30 a.m., Mr. Milner, driving at a “high-
rate of speed,” crossed the center line along Plainfield Pike in the 
Town of Scituate, Rhode Island, and collided with Eldrick L. 
Johnson (“Mr. Johnson”), the decedent in this case.7  Mr. Milner 
was pronounced dead at the scene of the collision and an autopsy 
indicated his blood alcohol concentration was 0.162, which is twice 
the legal limit for operating a motor vehicle in Rhode Island.8  Mr. 
Johnson, although alive at the scene when the police arrived, was 
pronounced dead when he arrived at the hospital.9 
On August 26, 2005, the plaintiff10 filed a wrongful death suit 
against Mr. Milner’s father, William J. Milner, John Doe, and 
Allstate Insurance, with amended complaints adding Mr. Clukey 
and his parents to the suit.11  While most of the claims with 
respect to the other defendants were settled, the plaintiff alleged 
that Mr. Clukey was negligent in the sense that he knew that Mr. 
Milner was drunk when he [Mr. Milner] got behind the wheel and 
Mr. Clukey had a duty to other motorists on the road to prevent 
Mr. Milner from operating his vehicle.12  On June 3, 2009, Mr. 
Clukey filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the 
plaintiff failed to allege a recognized duty under Rhode Island 
law.13  Mr. Clukey argued that he owed no duty to other motorists 
on the road because there is no duty to prevent third party’s from 
operating their vehicle.14  The plaintiff argued that while there 
was no social host liability attached to Mr. Clukey, there was a 
voluntary assumption of a duty when Mr. Clukey transported Mr. 
Milner back to his car.15 
During oral arguments, the hearing justice expressed 
reservations on the mechanics of the proposed duty, the scope of 
the duty, and how an individual in the position of Mr. Clukey 
 
 7.  Id. at 1249. 
 8.  Id. at 1249 & n.7.  
 9.  Id. 
 10.  There are multiple plaintiffs in this case: Rebecca L. Gushlaw, 
individually and on behalf of her four minor children and Judith Gushlaw, in 
her capacity as co-administrator of Mr. Johnson’s estate. See n.1. 
 11. Id.  
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. at 1249-50. 
 14.  Id. at 1250.  
 15.  Id.  
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would perform this duty.16  Likewise, the hearing justice raised 
concerns that the Legislature had not yet debated whether the 
imposition of such a duty on designated drivers, public transport 
operators, and other individuals was appropriate.17  After hearing 
oral arguments, the hearing justice granted the defendant’s 
motion for summary judgment, noting that the potential policy 
implications were too great for a court to rule on; rather, the court 
deferred its judgment to any future discussions on the matter in 
the General Assembly.18 Final judgment was granted for Mr. 
Clukey on September 3, 2009, with the plaintiff filing a timely 
appeal on September 17, 2009.19 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
On appeal, the plaintiff advanced four theories to support her 
claim that Mr. Clukey did owe a duty to Mr. Milner.20  The 
theories were: 
(1) liability resulting from a cognizable duty ascertained 
from a consideration of the factors set forth in Banks, (2) 
establishing a “special relationship” between Mr. Clukey 
and Mr. Milner as set forth in Restatement (Second) 
Torts § 315 (1965), (3) voluntary assumption of a duty by 
Mr. Clukey, and (4) the fact that Mr. Clukey 
“substantially assisted” Mr. Milner in transporting him 
back to his car at the convenience store while he was 
intoxicated.21 
In reviewing orders for summary judgment from the hearing 
justice, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reviews the order de 
novo.22  The Court will affirm the “grant of summary judgment 
only ‘[i]f we [the Court] conclude, after viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact to be decided and that the moving 
 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id.  
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. at 1251. 
 21.  Id; see Banks v. Bowen’s Landing Corp., 522 A.2d 1222, 1225 (R.I. 
1987). 
 22.  Id. at 1251 (citing Henderson v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 35 A.3d 
902, 905 (R.I. 2012)). 
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party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”23  The party 
opposing the motion for summary judgment bears the burden of 
proving there is a fact in dispute.24 
 
Special Relationship: Social Host Liability 
Initially, the Court began its analysis by eliminating the 
social host liability argument by determining that Mr. Clukey was 
not hosting Mr. Milner in any social capacity and therefore, such a 
classification is not applicable.25  In previous cases, the Court has 
held that social hosts could not be held liable for injuries of third 
parties as a result of an intoxicated person coming from the social 
host’s party.26  Through prior case law, the Court concluded that 
to determine if a social host liability existed, “an intricate 
scrutiny” of the facts was required to determine if a special 
relationship and in the facts at bar, no special relationship existed 
between Mr. Clukey and Mr. Milner to require Mr. Clukey to 
exercise a duty of care over Mr. Milner.27 
 
Duty Analysis 
In addition to examining if a special relationship existed 
between Mr. Clukey and Mr. Milner, the Court also examined 
whether a general duty existed between the two men.28  In their 
analysis, the Court recognized that there is “no clear-cut formula 
for the creation of a duty that can be mechanically applied to each 
 
 23.  Id. at 1251 (citing Empire Acquisition Group, LLC v. Atlantic 
Mortgage Co., 35 A.3d 878, 882 (R.I. 2012) (citation omitted)). 
 24.  Id. at 1251 (citing Lynch v. Spirit Rent A Car, Inc., 965 A.2d 417, 424 
(R.I. 2009) (citation omitted)). 
 25.  Id. at 1252. 
 26.  Id at 1252; see Ferreira v. Strack, 652 A.2d 965, 967 (R.I. 1995) 
(cautioning that to impose such a duty would raise “serious implications” 
which should be resolved in the General Assembly, not the courts); contra 
Martin v. Marciano, 871 A.2d 911, 917 (R.I. 2005) (concluding that because 
parents were serving minors alcohol, a special relationship existed between 
parents-children and therefore, the social hosts could be held liable for the 
actions of the intoxicated minors);  see also Volpe v. Gallagher, 821 A.2d 699, 
705 (R.I. 2003) (holding that a mother owed a duty to prevent her mentally ill 
son from storing guns and ammunition on the property because a special 
relationship existed between the parent-child).  
 27.  Id. at 1256.  
 28.  Id.  
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and every negligence case.”29  To determine if a duty was owed by 
Milner to third party motorists, the Court carried out an ad hoc 
analysis.30  Citing previous cases, the Court has previously 
examined several factors which included: 
(1) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (2) the 
degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered an injury, 
(3) the closeness of connection between the defendant’s 
conduct, (4) the policy of preventing future harm, and (5) 
the extent of the burden to the defendant and the 
consequences to the community for imposing a duty to 
exercise care with resulting liability for the breach.31 
For the case at bar, the Court began by examining the nature 
of the relationship between Mr. Clukey and Mr. Milner and 
determined that there was not a property based relationship and 
that the Restatement (Second) Torts § 31832 did not apply to Mr. 
Clukey and Mr. Milner’s friendship.33  The Court concluded that 
Mr. Clukey did not have the ability to control Mr. Milner’s 
drinking habits and that while Mr. Clukey agreed to take Mr. 
Milner back to his car, such an act was not enough of an 
affirmative act signaling the level of control necessary for a duty 
to be owed.34  Likewise, the Court looked to Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 314A35 to eliminate Mr. Clukey’s relationship to Mr. 
Milner from the special relationships delineated in the section, 
concluding that Mr. Clukey owed no special responsibility to Mr. 
 
 29.  Id. (quoting Santana v. Rainbow Cleaners Inc., 969 A.2d 653, 664 
(R.I. 2009) (citation omitted)). 
 30.  Id. (quoting Ouch v. Khea, 963 A.2d 630, 633 (R.I. 2009) (citation 
omitted)). 
 31.  Id. at 1256-57 (quoting Ferreira, 652 A.2d at 967-68 (quoting Banks, 
522 A.2d at 1225)).  
 32.  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 318 (1965) (A special relationship 
may arise between the possessor of land and those allowed on the land 
because of the possessor’s power of control over those allowed to enter.)  
 33.  Id. at 1257. 
 34.  Id. at 1258.  
 35.  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A (1965) (“[S]pecial relations 
giving rise to a duty to aid or protect: (1) common carrier/passenger, (2) 
innkeeper/guests, (3) possessor of land that holds the land open to the public, 
and (4) legal or voluntary custodian/ward.”)   As explained in comment c. of 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 (1965), “the relationship between the 
actor and the other which require the actor to control the conduct of third 
persons are started in §§314A and 320.” Id. at 1258. 
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Milner.36 
Rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that a special relationship 
and a relationship existed between Mr. Clukey and Mr. Milner, 
the Court continued their ad hoc analysis to focus on the 
argument that because Mr. Clukey negligently undertook to 
assisting Mr. Milner back to his vehicle, he should be held liable 
for Mr. Milner’s subsequent actions.37  In its opinion, the Court 
recognized that other jurisdictions, in addition to the Restatement 
(Second) Torts has a “relaxed” standard, meaning that an 
individual who gratuitously undertakes services for another is 
subject to the liability resulting from the acts of third party.38  The 
Court has not accepted the relaxed approach and declined 
applying such an analysis to the case at bar.39  While the Court 
has assigned responsibility to third parties in instances where a 
contractual obligation was in place, Mr. Clukey and Mr. Milner 
were not contractually related, rather they were just friends and 
no such obligation existed at the time of the incident.40 
The Court also examined other factors including foreseeability 
of harm to Mr. Johnson as a result of Mr. Clukey’s conduct, 
determining that while it was conceivable that Mr. Clukey would 
recognize Mr. Milner could harm people if he was to drive while 
intoxicated, “foreseeability alone does not create a duty.”41  In 
addition to the foreseeability aspect, the closeness of connection 
between Mr. Clukey’s alleged conduct and the death of Mr. 
Johnson was deemed to be too attenuated seeing as much time 
 
 36.  Id. at 1258.  
 37.  Id. at 1259. The Court concluded that Mr. Clukey completed his duty 
to Mr. Milner when he returned Mr. Milner to his car after the party and that 
even though Mr. Clukey could have driven Mr. Milner home rather than his 
car, Mr. Clukey was under no obligation to do this because this course of 
action was not agreed to by Mr. Clukey and Mr. Milner. Id. at 1260. 
 38.  Id. at 1259; compare McGee ex rel McGee v. Chalfant, 806 P.2d 981, 
983 (Kan. 1991) (holding that a third party may be held liable when the 
individual gratuitously undertakes his services to assist another, resulting in 
the injury of a plaintiff); see also Restatement (Seconds) Torts §§323 & 324A 
(1965). 
 39.  Id. at 1259-60 (quoting Contois v. Town of West Warwick, 865 A.2d 
1019, 1024 n. 7 (R.I. 2004)). 
 40.  Id. at 1260; see Buszta v. Souther, 232 A.2d 396, 397 (R.I. 1967).  
 41.  Id. at 1261 (quoting Ferreira, 636 A.2d at 688 n.4 (citation omitted) 
(concluding that the true question is not whether the “event is foreseeable, 
but whether a duty exists to take measures to guard against it”). 
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elapsed between Mr. Clukey dropping Mr. Milner off at his car 
and the time of the accident.42  From the factors analyzed so far, 
the Court could not conclude that Mr. Clukey owed a duty to Mr. 
Johnson.43 
 
Public Policy Concerns 
From its analysis, the Court concluded that Mr. Clukey did 
not owe a duty to third party motorists on the road and could not 
be held accountable for the actions of Mr. Milner because no 
relationship existed between Mr. Clukey and Mr. Milner, the 
foreseeability of injury to Mr. Johnson was too attenuated and Mr. 
Clukey did not voluntarily assume responsibility for Mr. Milner 
when he drove Mr. Milner back to his car.44  As part of the ad hoc 
analysis, the Court examined the public policy concerns of 
assigning a duty to individuals to protect other motorists from 
third party drivers.45  The Court was concerned that the General 
Assembly has tried to be pro-active against drunk driving, 
through policy initiatives and laws and believed that assigning a 
duty to “designated drivers” would deter sober individuals from 
taking drunk drivers from behind the wheel.46  The extent of the 
burden placed on individuals, taxi drivers, or public transport 
operators would be too great and the scope would be too vast.47  
The Court concluded that to create such a duty was too great of a 
responsibility for the Court, but was vested in the Legislature if it 
wanted to take this step because if the Court created a 
“designated driver duty,” it would run counter to Legislative 
action and the desire for sober individuals to be designated drivers 
and remove intoxicated individuals from the motorway.48 
Taking all the factors into account: (1) the lack of control Mr. 
Clukey had over Mr. Milner, (2) the attenuated foreseeability of 
harm to Mr. Johnson, (3) the fact that Mr. Clukey drove Mr. 
Milner back to his car was not a voluntary assumption of 
responsibility for Mr. Milner’s actions, and (4) the concern by the 
 
 42.  Id. at 1261-62.  
 43.  Id. at 1260. 
 44.  Id. at 1262. 
 45.  Id. at 1263. 
 46.  Id. & n. 22. 
 47.  Id. at 1262. 
 48.  Id. at 1263.  
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Court that assigning such a duty to individuals to protect the 
general population against third party motorists would run 
contrary to policies implemented by the General Assembly, the 
Court determined that Mr. Clukey did not owe a duty to Mr. 
Johnson or other motorists on the road, and affirmed the hearing 
court’s grant of summary judgment for Mr. Clukey, remanding the 
case to the Superior Court for further action.49 
 
COMMENTARY 
Through the opinion in this case, it seems that the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court is signaling that assignment of a duty, such 
as the one desired by the plaintiff cannot be done lightly, or in the 
words of the Court “mechanically,” but rather is applied based on 
the intricate details and circumstances of the case at bar.50  The 
Court seemed to take care to parse the different approaches to 
duty analysis, developing its own approach to the special 
relationship sections in the Restatement and the concerns it has 
with accepting the “relaxed” approach taken by other jurisdictions 
as well as the Restatements with respect to individuals who 
“undertakes gratuitously.”51  In its view, a “relaxed” approach to 
duty analysis creates the potential for unintended policy knock-on 
effects that are in the purview of the General Assembly to debate, 
not the Court to assign.52 
Likewise, the ad hoc analysis the Court adheres to in this 
case enable the Court to be versatile in analyzing duty, and 
negligence cases in general, because it enables the Court to take 
the facts as given and apply the different approaches as they 
potentially fit.53  The malleability of the ad hoc analysis does not 
peg the Court down to one standard, but allows the negligence 
cause of action to adapt to the situation that is presented to the 
court and not be pigeon-holed to one set standard.  Given the 
versatility of the ad hoc analysis and the ability to interchange 
factors as necessary for a particular case, the ad hoc analysis 
 
 49.  Id. at 1264. 
 50.  Id. at 1256. 
 51.  Id. at 1256-57 (quoting Ferreira, 652 A.2d at 967-68 (citation 
omitted)); see Restatement (Seconds) Torts §§323 & 324A (1965). 
 52.  Id. at 1259-60. 
 53.  Id. at 1256-57 (quoting Ferreira, 652 A.2d at 967-68 (citation 
omitted)) 
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seems to have worked in this case, taking the facts and 
determining which factors were needed for the analysis and 
whether such a duty should be assigned to a particular individual, 
in this case, whether Mr. Clukey owed a duty to other motorists 
on the road given Mr. Milner’s intoxication. 
Although the Court was correct in its analysis that Mr. 
Clukey did not assume a duty for Mr. Milner when he drove Mr. 
Milner back to his car, the Court does not explain why it does not 
accept the Restatement’s “relaxed” position with respect to 
assigning duty to individuals who gratuitously undertake 
assisting another individual.54  Along this line, it would seem that 
the Legislature has voiced its perspective with the passage of the 
Rhode Island Good Samaritan Law, which states that individuals 
who assist others cannot in certain instances, be held liable for 
any negligent actions that may follow.55 
While the majority of the Court’s opinion focused on the duty 
analysis and the ad hoc analysis that has been formulated via 
previous precedent, the Court in this case seemed to be equally 
concerned with the policy implications of creation of such a duty 
on drivers and the extent that such a duty can be assigned.  In 
particular, the Court was concerned that by creation of such a 
duty, it would run counter to the objectives of the Rhode Island 
General Assembly in trying to remove intoxicated drivers from the 
road.  The Court was equally concerned that creation of such a 
duty would impact public transport operators; specifically, taxi 
drivers and other common carriers that might be held liable if 
such a duty was imposed.56 
Given the policy implications of assignment of this type of 
duty to individuals like Mr. Clukey, the Court was correct in 
balancing its legal analysis with the policy considerations 
discussed in the opinion and its temperance in not creating a duty 
 
 54.  Id. at 1259-60; see Gray v. Derderian, 448 F. Supp. 2d 351, 360 
(D.R.I. 2005) (noting that the Federal District Court cannot apply the 
“relaxed” approach because the Rhode Island Supreme Court has yet to adopt 
the Restatement’s “relaxed” standard). 
 55.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS §9-1-27.1 (2012); see Boccasile v. Cajun Music 
Ltd, 694 A.2d 686, 687 (R.I. 1997) (concluding that health care professionals 
are covered by the Good Samaritan Statute when they attempt to assist an 
individual requiring emergency assistance and their conduct was not willful, 
wonton, or grossly negligent).  
 56.  Id. at 1264. 
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that might run counter to the General Assembly’s attempt to deal 
with the tragic nature of drunk driving shows a respect for the 
process of debate and policy development and articulation in the 
legislature. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a duty cannot be 
imposed on an individual who transports an intoxicated individual 
to his car because to impose such a duty would run counter to the 
General Assembly’s attempt to combat drunk driving.  While the 
Court determined based on the ad hoc test that no duty existed, 
they acknowledged that it was for the General Assembly to decide 
whether such a duty should be assigned to such a class of 
individuals who transport intoxicated drivers. 
Marc R. Fialkoff 
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Tort Law.  McCain v. Town of N. Providence, 41 A.3d 239 (R.I. 2012).  
The Rhode Island Supreme Court was petitioned by the Town of North 
Providence to decide whether an employee was employed as a “member” of 
the fire department at the time he was injured for purposes of Rhode Island’s 
injured-on-duty statute. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On July 20, 2001, the Town of North Providence hired the 
plaintiff, Everett McCain as a “Firefighter 3rd Class,” to work as a 
lineman with the Communications Department of the North 
Providence Fire Department.1  As a lineman, McCain was 
responsible for “insuring the proper operation of the bucket truck, 
maintaining the Municipal Fire Alarm system cabling, and 
installing and maintaining cabling to town buildings to support 
radio, telephone and networking equipment.”2 
He was issued an identification card that certified him as a 
“TECHNICIAN” and a “member of the North Providence Fire 
Department” and was a member of Local 2334, International 
Association of Firefighters, and AFL-CIO (“the union”).3  McCain 
was not obligated to attend the fire department sponsored 
training academy, nor was he required to obtain an Emergency 
Medical Technician certification or issued “protective gear.”4  He 
did not participate in fighting any fires or making rescue runs.5  
He responded to incident scenes after a fire or other emergency 
was “under control” and when the incident damaged exterior 
communications.6  McCain was subject to the collective bargaining 
agreement (“CBA”) in effect between the town and the union.7  
 
 1.  McCain v. Town of North Providence, 41 A.3d 239, 240 (R.I. 2012). 
 2.  Id. at 241.  
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id.  
 7.  Id. 
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McCain was designated by the CBA as holding an “administrative 
position” and was considered ineligible to “work callback or 
overtime as a firefighter.”8  The CBA also dictated that workers in 
the Communications Division were unable to work as firefighters, 
and could not be counted as part of the minimum firefighter 
manpower requirement.9 
On June 23, 2006, McCain struck his head on the “underside 
of a bucket apparatus on a bucket truck” while getting into the 
truck.10  Because his injury occurred during the performance of 
his duties, McCain fell within the provisions of Article XI of the 
CBA, which provides benefits to employees who are injured or 
contract illness in the line of duty.11 
The Town of North Providence began making injured-on-duty 
(“IOD”) payments to McCain pursuant to Rhode Island General 
Law § 45-19-112 on June 23, 2006, and continued to make 
payments until July 24, 2009.13  The town then decided that 
because McCain was not a “sworn firefighter,” he was ineligible to 
collect IOD payments under § 45-19-1.14 The town accordingly 
removed McCain from its payroll.15 
McCain filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the 
Superior Court on August 25, 2009, requesting that the Court 
order the town to resume his IOD benefits based on §45-19-1 and 
the CBA and asking the court to issue a declaratory judgment that 
he was a firefighter within the meaning of §45-19-1.16  The town 
 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. The relevant parts of the CBA are:  
Section 1: Injuries and Illness: Employees who are injured or who 
contract illness in the line of duty shall receive such benefits as are 
provided by the General Laws of the State of Rhode Island…. 
Section 3: Injuries and Illness: Any employee who shall become 
wholly or partially incapacitated by reason of injuries received or 
sickness contracted in the performance of their duty, shall, during 
the incapacity receive full salary or wages and medical expenses 
from the Town. 
Id. 
 12.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-19-1 (1956). 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  McCain, 21 A.3d at 242. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
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filed an objection to his petition, along with an answer on 
September 23, 2009, challenging his eligibility to collect benefits 
under the IOD statute and seeking a declaration that McCain was 
not a firefighter for purposes of collecting benefits under §45-19-
1.17  The town further requested that the Court require McCain to 
repay the IOD payments he received between 2006 and 2009.18 
The trial justice issued a written decision on March 11, 2010, 
finding that McCain fell within the “broad” definition of 
“firefighter” as set forth in the IOD statute, but failed to issue a 
writ of mandamus as requested by McCain.19 Judgment was 
entered on March 25, 2010, granting declaratory relief in favor of 
McCain, and denying the town declaratory relief as sought in its 
counterclaim.20 The town filed a notice of appeal on April 6, 
2010.21 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Court applied de novo review to interpret the legislative 
intent of the IOD statute.22 By enacting the IOD statute, the 
Legislature intended to “provide greater work related injury 
benefits to certain public employees whose jobs require them to 
serve the state or its municipalities, often in dangerous 
situations.”23  Here, the Court was required to determine whether 
McCain, a civilian lineman with the fire company was a 
“firefighter” at the time of his injury for purposes of collecting 
benefits under the IOD statute.24  The court held that, based on 
the clear and unambiguous language set forth in §45-19-1, McCain 
met the definition of a “firefighter” at the time of his injury for the 
purposes of collecting the IOD benefits under the statute.25 
As defined by §45-19-1, “firefighter means and includes any 
chief or other member of the fire department or rescue personnel 
of any city, town, or fire district, and any person employed as a 
 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. at 243. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. at 244 (quoting Hargreaves v. Jack, 750 A.2d 430, 433 (R.I. 2000).  
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id.  
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member of the fire department in any city or town.”26  Therefore, if 
McCain was employed as a member of the fire department, he was 
a firefighter for purposes of the statute. McCain was hired by the 
town as a “Firefighter 3rd Class” with the fire department; his 
identification card certified him as a “member” of the fire 
department, and although his training, duties and responsibilities 
did not fall within the definition of a “first responder,” he was 
employed as a “member” of the fire department for purposes of the 
IOD statute.27  As a result, the Court concluded that the meaning 
expressed in the statute was the meaning intended, and that 
because McCain’s job title and identification declared him to be a 
member of the fire department, he was entitled to collect under 
the IOD statute.28 
Justice Goldberg wrote in dissent, joined by Chief Justice 
Suttell, and agreed with the town that McCain was never a 
firefighter or a first responder, and therefore did not fall within 
the purview of §45-19-1.29  The dissent argued that the 
Legislature never intended to provide IOD benefits for 
maintenance personnel, nor was the definition of firefighter under 
§45-19-1 so broad as to encompass employees of the fire 
department who are not firefighters in the traditional sense.30 The 
Court has declared in the past that the IOD statute was “intended 
to provide greater work-related-injury benefits to certain public 
employees, whose jobs require them to serve the state or its 
municipalities, often in dangerous situations.”31 According to the 
dissent, that definition has never been expanded to include a class 
of employees who were not specifically enumerated in the IOD 
statute.32 Therefore, the dissent refused to accord a literal 
application to a statutory definition when such adhesion “would 
produce an unintended result and [was] contrary to the policy and 
purpose underlying the act.”33 
 
 
 26.  R.I. Gen. Laws §45-19-1 (1956). 
 27.  McCain, 41 A.3d at 244-245. 
 28.  Id. at 246. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. at 247. 
 31.  Id. at 247 (quoting Labbadia v. State, 513 A.2d 18, 21 (R.I. 1986)).   
 32.  Id. at 247. 
 33.  Id. at 248. 
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Here, the Court made a fair decision by protecting the 
interests of McCain where he fit into the statutory definition of a 
“fireman” and was injured while working as such. While the 
dissent raises valid points, and it would be reasonable to interpret 
the statute to include only first-responders34 had the Legislature 
intended that narrow an application of the statute, they easily 
could have included it in the language of the statute. The fact that 
the statute does not limit recovery to these classes indicates that 
the Legislature was aware of the possibility that even those not 
literally fighting fires are at times placed in potentially dangerous 
positions as a part of their duties, and wanted to provide 
protection for those employees. 
Also, the town paid McCain according to the IOD statute for 
several years before deciding that he was ineligible to receive 
payments; his position as a lineman was well known both at the 
time of the incident, as well as throughout the years the town paid 
him. It can be inferred from these facts that for two years the 
town believed that McCain was a firefighter and qualified for 
recovery under the IOD statute. The Court reached an equitable 
decision by declaring McCain a firefighter under the IOD statute 
at the time of injury, and allowing him his deserved recovery. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the statutory 
language in §45-19-1 which defined “firefighter” to mean and 
include “any person employed as a member of the fire 
department,” to be clear and unambiguous and to include people 
working in administrative positions, such as members of the 
Communications Department. 
Caitlyn Kelly 
 
 
 34.  McCain was employed as a “Firefighter 3rd Class” as a part of the 
Communications Department and as such was not a first responder to 
emergencies. Id. at 241. 
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Tort Law.  Burke v. Gregg, 55 A.3d 212 (R.I. 2012).  Even if an allegedly 
defamatory communication is inaccurate, a plaintiff cannot recover in a 
defamation cause of action unless the recipient of the communication could 
have reasonably understood the communication as intending to injuriously 
affect the plaintiff’s reputation, degrade him in society, or bring him into 
public hatred and contempt.  Further, under the republication rule, opinions 
can be actionable as defamatory if they are based on non-disclosed, 
defamatory facts. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
From 2006 to 2008, William Murphy (“Murphy”), then-
Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Rhode Island 
General Assembly, hosted an annual St. Patrick’s Day event at 
the Federal Reserve Restaurant, operated by plaintiff Robert 
Burke (“Burke”).1  Murphy invited Rhode Island politicians, 
businesspeople, and media representatives to the event, entitled 
“Murphy’s Law Luncheon,” where fellow politicians would “roast” 
one another by subjecting each other to jokes and playful ridicule.2  
Unlike in previous years, for the 2009 luncheon Murphy 
announced to members of the press that “the jokes, gags, [and] 
punch lines would be ‘off the record.’”3 
The day before the lunch, defendant Katherine Gregg 
(“Gregg”) called Burke to protest the “off the record” rule.4  Burke 
told her that Murphy, and not he, was responsible for the new 
rule.5  In a separate conversation with Murphy’s spokesperson, 
Gregg asked that Murphy reconsider the rule and allow the press 
 
 1.  Burke v. Gregg, 55 A.3d 212, 216 (R.I. 2012).  Also joined as 
plaintiffs are BOEA, Inc. (“BOEA”), which operates the Federal Reserve 
Restaurant, and its parent corporation the Food and Beverage Corporation 
(“Food and Beverage”). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Reporters were prohibited from publishing things said during the 
roast.   Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
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to publish comments made during the roast.6  Gregg continued to 
attribute the new policy to Burke, even after he expressed to her 
that he considered her accusations to be “repugnant and false.”7 
Three days later, in a co-authored article published in print 
and online by defendant Providence Journal Company (“Journal”), 
Gregg compared the Murphy’s Law Lunch to a similar event in 
Boston.8  However, she emphasized that Murphy’s event applied a 
“press ban” that the Boston event did not, again attributing the 
censorship to Burke.9  On the day that the Providence Journal 
published Gregg’s story, defendant Dan Yorke (“Yorke”), a radio 
talk show host employed by defendant Citadel Broadcasting 
Company (“Citadel”), discussed the article on-air10 and started 
ranting against Burke and the “off the record rule.”11  After being 
advised of the article and broadcast, Burke called into Yorke’s 
program to address his comments.12 
Burke eventually filed a complaint alleging multiple counts of 
libel and slander against Gregg, the Journal, Yorke, and Citadel.13  
The two other plaintiffs, Food and Beverage and BOEA, also 
alleged libel and slander, as well as two contractual claims, 
against Yorke and Citadel.14  All the defendants moved to dismiss 
 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. at 216-17.  A relevant portion of the article read, “‘One of the 
hoped-for side effects of the event is to lessen the polarization that has 
become rife in our politics,’ Burke said in a recent exchange of e-mails.  He 
said he imposed the off-the-record rule because he felt a former Journal 
columnist took a Murphy quip about homosexuals, at an earlier St. Patrick’s 
Day lunch, out of context…creating an impression of an event that is mean-
spirited.”  Id. 
 10.  It is unclear whether Yorke read the article on air or just referenced 
it. 
 11.  Id. at 217.  His comments were also streamed across the internet 
and posted on a website maintained by Citadel.  Among Yorke’s comments 
were: “That Bob Burke thinks he can control the First Amendment.” “You can 
kiss my Irish ass. You manipulative piece of garbage.” “What an absolute 
disgrace that guy is.” “And stupid Bob Burke. He’s too stupid. He’s a stupid 
person. He’s too stupid to understand that I don’t have, have a problem with 
the event. I have a problem with the gag order.” Id.  
 12.  Id. The exact contents of their on-air exchange were not detailed in 
the record. Id. at n.5. 
 13.  Id. at 215. 
 14.  Id. Plaintiffs alleged that during the time of Yorke’s broadcast, Food 
and Beverage and BOEA had advertising contracts with Citadel to advertise 
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all claims pursuant to Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 12(b)(6),15 and a Superior Court justice granted them all.16  
The plaintiffs timely appealed.17 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
In reviewing a motion justice’s decision on a 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss, the Court assumes the plaintiff’s allegations to be true.18  
Viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, 
the Court will affirm a ruling that grants a 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss “when it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
plaintiff would not be entitled to relief from the defendant under 
any set of facts that could be proven in support of the plaintiff’s 
claim.”19 
 
Defamation Claims Against Gregg and the Journal 
Because Burke’s claims against Yorke and Citadel rest in part 
on the claims against Gregg and the Journal, the Court addressed 
the latter claims first, which “sound in defamation.”20  To sustain 
a defamation claim, a plaintiff must prove “(a) a false and 
defamatory statement concerning another; (b) an unprivileged 
publication to a third party; (c) fault amounting at least to 
negligence on the part of the publisher; and (d) damages, unless 
the statement is actionable irrespective of special harm.”21  In 
determining whether a communication is defamatory or not, the 
Court must construe the statement in its “plain and ordinary 
 
their businesses on two of its radio stations. Id.  Thus, Food and Beverage 
alleged interference with contractual relations against Yorke and Citadel.  
BOEA alleged breach of contract against Citadel, but it is unclear whether 
that allegation was also with respect to Yorke. See id. at 215, 221. 
 15.  Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which plaintiffs 
could recover.  Id.at 220 
 16.  Id. at 215. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. at 218. 
 19.  Id. (quoting Palazzo v. Alves, 944 A.2d 144, 149-50 (R.I. 2008)). 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. The plaintiff must show that the statement is “false and 
malicious, imputing conduct which injuriously affects a man’s reputation, or 
which tends to degrade him in society or bring him into public hatred and 
contempt.”  Id. (quoting Marcil v. Kells, 936 A.2d 208, 212 (R.I. 2007)). 
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sense” within the context of the publication in which it appears.22  
The crucial inquiry is what the recipient of the communication 
“reasonably understood as the meaning intended to be expressed” 
by the communication.23 
The Court agreed with the motion justice that even if Gregg’s 
attribution of the “off the record” rule to Burke was inaccurate, it 
was not defamatory.24  The Court reasoned that after considering 
all the circumstances, the article, though critical, communicated 
that Burke, in cooperation with Murphy, “had a prudent, 
thoughtful, and logical reason for imposing [the] rule.”25  Thus, 
even if Gregg’s assertions were slightly inaccurate, they could not 
reasonably be interpreted to have “injuriously affected Burke’s 
reputation, degraded him in society, or brought him into public 
hatred and contempt.”26  The Court was not persuaded that the 
plaintiffs stated a claim upon which they could recover and thus it 
affirmed the motion justice’s dismissal of these claims.27 
 
Defamation Claims Against Yorke and Citadel 
The Court begins its analysis of this claim with the 
republication rule, which provides that “one who republishes 
libelous or slanderous material is subject to liability just as if he 
had published it originally.”28  Although opinions are afforded 
greater protection under the law, an opinion can be actionable 
under the republication rule if it is based on undisclosed, 
defamatory facts.29  Conversely, if the statement is based on 
disclosed or assumed facts, it is not actionable because the 
recipients would understand it is the author’s interpretation of the 
 
 22.  Id.  
 23.  Id. (quoting Marcil, 936 A.2d at 213). 
 24.  Id. at 218-19.  
 25.  Id. at 219.  The article suggested that the rule was imposed due to 
the concern that “politically-incorrect” jokes made at the lunch could be taken 
out of context and create the impression that the event is “mean-spirited.”  
Id.  Plaintiffs did not argue that Gregg’s explanation of the rule’s underlying 
rationale was incorrect.  Id. 
 26.  Id. The Court also rejected the plaintiffs’ suggestion that an opinion 
drawn from a contested statement is proof that the statement itself is 
defamatory.   Id.  
 27.  Id. at 220. 
 28.  Id. (quoting Trainor v. The Standard Times, 924 A.2d 766, 770 (R.I. 
2007)). 
 29.  Id. at 220. 
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facts presented.30 
Thus, when reviewing Yorke’s opinions, the Court considered 
(1) whether Yorke disclosed the basis of his opinions and (2) 
whether the basis for his opinions was itself defamatory.31  The 
Court found that Yorke’s ramblings may have been distasteful and 
insulting but they were based on disclosed, non-defamatory 
facts.32  Yorke clearly disclosed the fact that his opinions were 
based on Gregg’s article by referring to it on-air, and the Court 
had already determined that Gregg’s article was not defamatory 
as a matter of law.33  Thus, the claims against Yorke and Citadel 
were not actionable and properly dismissed by the motion 
justice.34 
 
Contractual Claims Against Yorke and Citadel 
The Court held that the motion justice did not err in 
dismissing the interference with prospective contractual relations 
claim because the plaintiffs failed to allege any intentionally 
disruptive conduct by either defendant that was aimed at 
interfering with a potential client relationship.35  In fact, none of 
the plaintiffs’ allegations suggested the effect of Yorke’s comments 
was more than incidental.36 
Because the motion justice did not address the breach of 
contract claim—after dismissing the defamation counts and the 
interference with prospective contractual relations claim—the 
Court remanded the matter to the Superior Court for a hearing on 
that claim.37 
 
 30.  Id. at 220-21. 
 31.  Id. at 221. 
 32.  Id.  
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. at 222.  To make a successful claim for interference with 
prospective contractual relations a plaintiff must prove, among other things, 
that but for an intentional act of interference “there would have been a 
relationship or that it is reasonably probable that but for the interference the 
relationship would have been established.”  Id. (quoting L.A. Ray Realty v. 
Town Council of Cumberland, 698 A.2d 202, 207 (R.I. 1997)).  The plaintiffs 
failed to allege any causal connection between Yorke’s rants and interference 
with any specific prospective business client.  Id. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
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The Court dismissed the defamation claims against Yorke and 
Citadel because it first found that Gregg’s article was not 
defamatory as a matter of law.  Instead of making this two-step 
determination, the Court should have taken Yorke’s statements as 
evidence of the article’s injurious effect on Burke’s reputation 
when analyzing the claim against Gregg and the Journal.  If the 
decisive question truly is what the reader reasonably understood 
as the intended meaning of the article, Yorke’s comments show 
that he understood it to communicate that Burke was a bully, 
curtailing journalists’ First Amendment rights by censoring them.  
The Court acknowledges that the article was “inescapably 
critical”38 but does not dwell on this fact because the article also 
suggested a legitimate rationale for the rule.  The Court uses this 
same reasoning to gloss over the fact that Gregg published the 
article with this inaccurate attribution after Burke told her on two 
separate occasions that he was not responsible for the rule.  Under 
the totality of the circumstances inquiry, the fact that the article 
was critical and it fueled an on-air tirade should have weighed 
heavily against the mere fact that it put forth an explanation for 
the rule’s implementation. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that an article 
attributing a censorship rule to the plaintiff, even if inaccurate, is 
not defamatory where the article provided logical reasons for the 
rule’s implementation, and where it did not injuriously affect the 
plaintiff’s reputation, degrade him in society, or bring him into 
public hatred and contempt.  Thus, a radio talk show host’s 
opinions that are clearly based on that article are not defamatory.  
Further, where such opinions only incidentally, rather than 
intentionally, affect a plaintiff’s prospective business relations, the 
plaintiff cannot sustain a claim for interference with prospective 
contractual relations. 
Asia-Sierra Millette 
 
 
 38.  Id. at 219. 
YI GU.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2013 12:31 PM 
 
 
435 
 
Tort Law.   Yi Gu v. R.I. Pub. Transit Auth., 38 A.3d 1093 (R.I. 2012).  The 
Rhode Island Supreme Court addressed whether the trial justice should have 
let the jurors go to the accident site to help them understand the bus accident 
and whether the trial justice erroneously admitted the viewing of the site as 
evidence for the defendant’s case.  The Court held that the trial justice erred 
by not giving instructions to exclude the view as evidence before taking the 
jurors to the site of the accident and by failing to instruct them before the 
viewing not to discuss the case during the view. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
Plaintiff Yi Gu, an international student from China studying 
at Brown University, was crossing the street at an intersection at 
the entrance of a bus tunnel in Providence, RI.1  She testified that 
she waited until the walk signal came on and then crossed on the 
crosswalk.2  She did not see the bus until it pushed her from 
behind and knocked her down.3  The bus then rolled over her 
ankle, causing injuries that forced her to undergo numerous 
surgeries and physical therapy and delayed her graduation.4  The 
plaintiff sued Rhode Island Public Transit Authority (“RIPTA”), 
the owner of the bus, and Hathaway, the driver, for injuries 
arising from Hathaway’s alleged negligence and Hathaway for 
gross negligence for delaying moving the wheel off her leg.5 
As witnesses for the defendant, Hathaway and Bannister, a 
RIPTA employee who was driving a vehicle out of the tunnel 
behind the bus, both testified that the light was green when they 
 
 1.  Yi Gu v. R.I. Pub. Transit Auth. 38 A.3d 1093, 1095 (R.I. 2012).  The 
incident occurred at the intersection of Waterman Street and North Main 
Street, at the entrance to what is commonly referred to as the “East Side bus 
tunnel” in Providence.  Id. 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. The delay caused her to lose one year’s salary as a professor at 
University of Toronto. Id.n.3 
 5.  Id. at 1093. 
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exited the tunnel.6  Hathaway also testified that the walk signal 
could not have been on when the light for the tunnel was green.7  
According to Hathaway, the bus would trigger the trip bar when it 
comes to the opening of the tunnel, which would then trigger the 
green traffic light and turn on the “don’t walk” signal for the 
pedestrians.8 
During the trial, at least one juror informed the judge that it 
was very important for him “to see the bus coming out of the 
tunnel to see the angle at which it turned.”9  There was no 
evidence that the judge spoke to either counsel about this trip 
from the courthouse.10  Additionally, although she told the jurors 
that the trip to the accident scene, which the courts referred to as 
“the viewing” was to “give [them] context”, the justice only 
instructed the jurors that the viewing was not to be considered 
evidence two days after the viewing, once the trial had resumed.11  
During the viewing, a RIPTA van was brought to the tunnel to 
demonstrate the function of the trip bar to trigger the green light, 
which the trial court characterized as a demonstration.12 
After the viewing, the jury returned a verdict for 
defendants.13  The trial judge subsequently denied plaintiff’s 
motion for a new trial, even though she admitted that plaintiff’s 
testimony was more credible than Hathaway’s testimony because 
it was impossible for Hathaway to not have seen the plaintiff 
while she was crossing.14  The trial justice, after seeing the 
demonstration at the scene of the accident, believed that the light 
could have changed fast enough when the bus came to the trip 
bar, to catch the plaintiff off guard while she was in the middle of 
crossing the road.15  The trial justice also admitted that her 
instructions to the jury two days later, telling them that the 
viewing was not evidence probably confused the jury and that she 
should have explained more specifically that only the facts from 
 
 6.  Id. at 1096. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id.  
 9.  Id.  
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. at 1096-97. 
 12.  Id. at 1097. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
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the demonstration of the trip bars, and not the entire viewing 
event, could be considered as evidence.16  However, the justice 
concluded that giving the jury more specific instruction would not 
have changed the jury’s decision even though it would have 
presented evidence of Hathaway’s negligence.17 
Plaintiff filed motion to reconsider her motion for new trial, 
alleging that she was unfairly prejudiced because the viewing 
gave RIPTA an opportunity to interact with the jurors and 
provided the jurors the opportunity for ex parte communication.18  
The trial justice stated that she denied plaintiff’s motion for new 
trial for two reasons.19  First, plaintiff’s counsel failed to object 
when he should have known about the demonstration.20  Second, 
jurors had been instructed not to consider the evidence of the 
viewing.21 
Plaintiff appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court the 
trial justice’s denial of her motion for a new trial.22 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Following the motion for a new trial, the trial justice would 
assume the role of a “superjuror” weighing “the evidence and 
assess[ing] the credibility of the witnesses”.23  “‘If the trial justice 
determines that the evidence is evenly balanced or is such that 
reasonable minds in considering the same evidence could come to 
different conclusions, the trial justice must allow the verdict to 
stand.’”24  When reviewing a trial justice’s decision to deny a 
motion for new trial, the decision cannot stand if she “‘overlooked 
or misconceived material and relevant evidence or was otherwise 
clearly wrong.’”25 
 
 16.  Id. at 1098. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. at 1099. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. (citing Botelho v. Caster’s Inc., 970 A.2d 541, 545 (R.I. 2009)). 
 25.  Id. (citing Izen v. Winoker, 589 A.2d 824, 829 (R.I. 1991)).  The R.I. 
Supreme Court briefly motioned that the trial justice’s denial of the motion to 
reconsider will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Id.  (citing Sch. 
Comm. Of Cranston v. Bergin-Andrews, 984 A.2d at 629, 649 (R.I. 2009)) 
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Plaintiff raised several issues regarding the trial justice’s 
ruling on appeal.26  The Court first addressed the timeliness of the 
plaintiff’s objections.27  Although an objection during trial had to 
be raised “contemporaneously” by the party or it may be deemed 
to be waived,28 if a party had no opportunity to object, the “failure 
to object will not be held against the party.”29  Here, counsel’s 
failure to object during trial does not waive his objection because 
plaintiff’s counsel may have been “unaware of the events that took 
place during the view” and may not have realized that a 
significant evidentiary event, the demonstration of the trip bar, 
occurred during the view of the accident scene.30 
The Court held that the trial justice erroneously considered 
the demonstration as evidence.31  Despite instructing the jury that 
the view was not evidence two days after the viewing, she said 
herself that the view was “very instructive.”32  The trial justice’s 
consideration of the viewing caused concern for the Court because 
without considering the information gathered at the viewing, the 
trial justice believed that Hathaway was not credible and that 
there was evidence of his negligence due to his failure to see 
plaintiff on crosswalk.33  Additionally, the trial justice 
characterized a part of the view as a demonstration, justifying 
acceptance as evidence into the trial, which the Court held was 
another erroneous action on the part of the trial justice.34  The 
Court explained that questions regarding the “walk” signal should 
 
(quoting Keystone Elevator Co. v. Johnson & Wales university, 850 A.2d 912, 
916 (R.I. 2004)). 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. at 1100. 
 28.  According to Rule 46 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which “encapsulates the contemporaneous objection requirement when it 
states in pertinent part that: ‘[I]t is sufficient that a party, at the time the 
ruling or order of the court is made or sought, makes known to the court the 
action which the party desires the court to take or the party’s objection to the 
action of the court and the party’s grounds therefor is requested; and if party 
has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order at the time it is made, the 
absence of an objection does not thereafter prejudice the party.’”  Id. at n.13 
(citing R.I. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 46). 
 29.  Id. at 1100 (citing R.I. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 46). 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. at 1101. 
 34.  Id. at 1100. 
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have been determined based on evidence admissible in the 
courtroom.35 The evidence of the viewing would have been 
admissible if the trial justice had first consulted the parties before 
responding to the jury’s request for the viewing, took reasonable 
measure to assure that both party’s attorneys and all the jurors 
were present, employed some method of accurately recording the 
event, and adequately instructed the jury before they “embarked 
on the view.”36 
Because the purpose of a view was only to understand the 
evidence already admitted, not to obtain evidence, the Court held 
that the admission of the view as new evidence constituted 
reversible error.37  The Court came to this conclusion after 
considering several factors, including (1) this view was an off-
record event, (2) there was no assurance as to whether both 
party’s attorneys were present or if even all the jurors were 
present, or if the jurors that were present were fully aware of 
what transpired,38 and (3) this was an unorganized viewing where 
the trial justice neglected to instruct jury before the viewing that 
it could not be considered as evidence and that they could not 
discuss the case with each other.39  The Court held that the trial 
justice’s later instruction that “the view itself is not evidence” was 
not enough.40  The Court ordered the trial court to grant the new 
trial in order to take proper steps to safeguard the trial and the 
rights of the plaintiff.41 
The Court required that at the very minimum, the proper 
safeguards be put in place to protect the trial process and that 
counsel for both parties be represented at the view of the accident 
scene.42  If a demonstration must happen to better understand a 
case, the demonstration must be in a more controlled situation 
 
 35.  Id. at 1101. 
 36.  See id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. at 1101-02. The trial justice recollected that “the jurors ‘split up 
and moved about the intersection’ and were ‘wandering around the area of 
the intersection’…several jurors coordinated their efforts in an attempt to 
activate the trip bar by jumping on it.” Id. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  See id. 1102. 
 42.  See Id. 
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than what had occurred.43  Additionally, the Court required that 
the trial court provide the limiting instructions before the viewing 
of the accident scene in regards to the use of the facts obtained at 
the scene, such as they are only to use the viewing to clarify the 
evidence that had been admitted in court and not consider the 
entire viewing as new evidence.44 
 
COMMENTARY 
This case presents an example of how some applicable laws 
may deal with the severe injuries of a helpless plaintiff in the 
most unsympathetic way.  The plaintiff brought in three 
witnesses, an art student at the Rhode Island School of Design 
(“RISD”), an employee at the same school, and a professor at RISD 
(“Professor Drew”).45  All three had seemingly altruistic intentions 
to help the plaintiff.  They testified to the way the bus hit the 
plaintiff, but none gave definite answers about whether the signal 
was on “walk” or “don’t walk”.46 
Thus, whether the plaintiff saw the sign as “walk” was 
speculative at best.  Professor Drew’s testimony provided 
confusion over whether the plaintiff thought the light was green 
for the bus when she started walking or whether she was referring 
to her “walk” signal.  He testified that she told him at the scene 
that the light was green, although other evidence produced at trial 
indicated that plaintiff was actually referring to the white walk 
signal.47  The plaintiff later explained that because of the shock 
she suffered during the accident, she had confused the walk signal 
in the U.S. with the walk signals in China, which are green.48 
The trial justice and the jury apparently gave more weight to 
the inconsistent information from the plaintiff than the non-
 
 43.  See id. 
 44.  Id. at 1101. 
 45.  Id. at 1092-1093. Witness Hamilton, an artist at RISD, saw the bus 
“clip” the plaintiff when the plaintiff was about a third of the way across the 
street.  Id. at 1096.  Witness Silva, an employee, also saw the “front 
passenger side of the bus strike the left side of plaintiff’s body.”  Id.  Witness 
Drew, a professor, banged on the side of the bus and shouted for it to stop, 
then cradled the plaintiff’s head to comfort her until the ambulance arrived.  
Id. at 1095-96. 
 46.  Id. at 1095-1096. 
 47.  Id. at 1095. 
 48.  Id.  n.4.  
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credible evidence given by the bus driver.49  The jury wanted to 
see the functionality of the traffic lights because they needed to 
clarify the plaintiff’s explanation.  If they had believed 
Hathaway’s testimony, they would not have needed to go see the 
functionality of the traffic light and the “walk” signal. 
Though there was some discrepancy in the facts about 
whether the plaintiff was walking on the crosswalk and whether 
she looked left and right when crossing the street,50 none of the 
plaintiff’s actions should matter if the bus driver, Hathaway, upon 
approaching the intersection had looked in front of him while 
driving that enormous vehicle.  Thus, the material fact was not 
whether the plaintiff was exercising reasonable precautions while 
crossing the street nor was it whether the “walk” signal was on 
and traffic light was green for the traffic exiting the tunnel.  
Rather, it was whether the bus driver was exercising reasonable 
precautions normally exercised by someone driving a bus, which 
even the trial justice admitted that he was not.51  Thus, no matter 
how the law was applied, it is still the negligence of the bus driver, 
which caused the plaintiff’s injuries. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Court here addressed whether the trial justice should let 
the jurors go to the site of the accident in question to help the 
jurors understand the accident and if they must go to better 
understand the case, what safeguards should be put into place to 
help facilitate a fair trial for the plaintiff.52 The Court held that 
proper instructions regarding what can and cannot be considered 
as evidence should be given before taking the jurors to the 
accident scene, the decision should be discussed with of both 
party’s attorneys, and the jurors should be provided with proper 
warning to avoid discussing the case with each other during the 
viewing.53 
 
 49.  See id. at 1097.  
 50.  Id. at 1096. 
 51.  Id. at 1101. 
 52.  Id. at 1102. 
 53.  Id. 
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Workers’ Compensation. Gallagher v. Nat’l Grid USA, 44 A.3d 743 (R.I. 
2012). A mesothelioma-stricken employee asserted workers’ compensation 
claims against his three former employers, pursuant to a statute entitling him 
to compensation from his “last employer.”  The Court ultimately affirmed 
the decision of the Appellate Division of the Workers’ Compensation Court 
declaring his penultimate employer his “last employer,” because of 
insufficient evidence of asbestos exposure while he was subsequently 
employed by his ultimate employer. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
From 1965 to 1971, Dennis Gallagher (“Mr. Gallagher”) was 
employed as a welder at Electric Boat where, he testified he was 
consistently exposed to asbestos.1  In 1984 Mr. Gallagher took up 
employment as welder at a National Grid USA/Narragansett 
Electric (“National Grid”) plant.2  Mr. Gallagher testified that he 
was exposed to asbestos “insulation in the boilers” at the plant 
when the insulation was annually stripped and replaced.3  In 
1995, the National Grid Plant was “repowered,” and an outside 
company encapsulated or removed the asbestos from the plant.4  
In 1998, USGEN New England Inc. (“USGEN”) acquired the 
plant, and Mr. Gallagher continued working there as a welder 
under USGEN management.5  As to the possibility of his exposure 
to asbestos at the USGEN-managed plant, he testified with 
language like “I bet you still find some [asbestos]” and “I wouldn’t 
doubt there’s still some [asbestos in some areas].”6 
Shortly after his last day of work at USGEN, Mr. Gallagher 
was diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma likely caused by his 
 
 1.  Gallagher v. Nat’l Grid USA, 44 A.3d 743, 745 (R.I. 2012).   
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. at 745-746. 
 4.  Id. at 746. 
 5.  Id.  
 6.  Id. 
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asbestos exposure at Electric Boat.7  Mr. Gallagher filed petitions 
against Electric Boat, National Grid, and USGEN, for worker’s 
compensation benefits for this “occupational disease,” pursuant to 
R.I.G.L. 1956 §28-34-8.8  The Rhode Island Worker’s 
Compensation Court found USGEN liable as his “last employer” 
because “his employment at [USGEN], the final employer, was the 
same exact job he did while at [National Grid].  The only 
difference was the name of the employer.”9  Recovery against 
Electric Boat and National Grid was denied.10 
On appeal, the Worker’s Compensation Court Appellate 
Division (“Appellate Division”) vacated the trial judge’s decree 
holding USGEN liable.11  Instead, it assessed liability against 
National Grid, because the testimony as to asbestos exposure after 
the USGEN takeover was “mere speculation” and not probative of 
asbestos exposure at USGEN.12  Both Gallagher and National 
Grid appealed, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court issued 
certiorari, consolidating the cases.13 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Supreme Court was satisfied that Mr. Gallagher’s 
malignant mesothelioma was an “occupational disease,” entitling 
him to recover from his “last employer” under the relevant 
statute.14  The real issue for the Court was determining which 
employer was in fact his “last employer.”15  Both Gallagher and 
National Grid contended that exposure to asbestos at USGEN is 
not “a condition precedent” to finding USGEN to be the last 
 
 7.  Id. at 747.  Mesothelioma is a rare form of cancer, which an expert 
witness testified has a “very strong association with asbestos dust exposure.” 
Id.  Mr. Gallagher eventually succumbed to his disease, and his wife 
prosecuted his case after he died, pursuant to R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-35-56 
(1956). Id. n.8. 
 8.  Id. The statute states in the relevant part that an employee suffering 
from an occupational disease may recover from “the employer who last 
employed the employee in the employment to the nature of which the disease 
was due and in which it was contracted.”  R.I. GEN. LAWS §28-34-8 (1956).  
 9.  Gallagher, 44 A.3d at 747. 
 10.  Id. at 748. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. at 748, 751.  
 13. Id. at 748. 
 14.  Id. at 749.  
 15.  Id. 
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employer, if the type of job performed at USGEN was exactly the 
same as was preformed at National Grid.16  Additionally, National 
Grid argued that the Appellate Division should not have 
disregarded Gallagher’s testimony regarding the possibility of 
asbestos exposure at USGEN because no Rule of Evidence 
“requires the witness to be positive or absolutely certain about his 
testimony.”17 
The Court, employing a “clearly erroneous” standard, affirmed 
the Appellate Division’s assessing damages against National 
Grid.18  The Court explained that it attached liability to the “last 
employer” for the purposes of §28-34-8 if “the last employment (no 
matter how brief) was of the same nature and type in which the 
disease was first contracted, regardless of whether the last 
employment aggravated the prior condition.”19  Additionally, the 
Court noted that the employee must show “evidence of the nature 
and conditions of his employment and that these conditions be of a 
nature that is likely to cause the disease.”20  The Court affirmed 
that USGEN was not the “last employer,” due to the Appellate 
Division’s findings that Gallagher’s testimony as to asbestos 
exposure was “mere speculation.”21  In doing so, the Court pointed 
out that the relevant analysis is not of “an employee’s job title; 
rather, it is whether the employee was exposed to conditions that 
were ‘likely to cause the disease,’” and that the evidence presented 
here did not demonstrate such conditions.22 
Regarding National Grid’s objection to the evidentiary 
argument, the Court explained that the Appellate Division did not 
deem the testimony inadmissible because Gallagher was not 
“absolutely certain about his testimony.”23  Rather, the Appellate 
Division found that the testimony was speculative and insufficient 
to prove the similar disease causing conditions required for 
 
 16.  Id. at 751. 
 17.  Id.  
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. at 749. (quoting Tavares v. A.C. & S. Inc., 462 A.2d 977, 979 (R.I. 
1983)). In circumstances not relevant here, the statute can also attach 
liability “if the employee’s work with the last employer caused an aggravation 
of the prior condition.” R.I. GEN. LAWS §28-34-8 (1956). 
 20.  Gallagher, 44 A.3d at 749 (quoting Tavares, 462 A.2d at 980). 
 21.  Id. at 751. 
 22.  Id. (quoting Tavares, 462 A.2d at 980). 
 23.  Id. at 751. 
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recovery, and the Court found that determination to be within the 
Appellate Division’s discretion.24 
 
COMMENTARY 
The court here clarifies its holding in Tavares, and correctly 
underscores that recovery from the “last employer” for an 
“occupational disease” under the statute is based not on the 
similarity of the work performed for a subsequent employer, but 
on the similarity of the exposure to conditions giving rise to the 
disease.25  Thus, National Grid is still liable to pay for Mr. 
Gallagher’s asbestos exposure under the statute, despite evidence 
that asbestos exposure at Electric Boat most likely caused his 
disease.26 
A law that holds subsequent employers liable for diseases 
their employees contract at prior employer may not immediately 
seem fair. However, asbestos exposure is unique in that it has a 
long latency period, and without §28-34-8, an employer with an 
unsafe workplace could avoid liability due to the difficulty in 
proving many years later exactly which employers’ workplace 
conditions caused the disease.  Such liability ultimately protects 
workers by incentivizing all employers to minimize disease-
causing conditions in their workplace.  As a result, the statute’s 
function is only served by attaching liability to employers with 
similar disease-causing conditions, rather than to employers 
where similar work performed.  Therefore, under the Court’s 
reasoning, had Gallagher worked in a totally different capacity at 
National Grid, as an electrician for example, it is possible that he 
could still recover from National Grid for the mesothelioma he 
contracted as a welder at Electric Boat, as long as he was still 
exposed to asbestos at both jobs. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Court affirmed the holding of the Appellate Division 
vacating USGEN’s liability and assessing liability against 
National Grid instead.27  In making this decision, the Court found 
 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  See id. 
 26.  See id. at 747. 
 27.  Id. at 751. 
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that Mr. Gallagher’s inability to prove similar disease-causing 
conditions at USGEN was fatal to recovery against USGEN and 
instead rendered National Grid his “last employer.” 
Brendan F. Ryan 
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2012 RHODE ISLAND PUBLIC LAWS 
 
2012 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 088, 118. An Act Relating to Food and 
Drugs – The Edward O. Hawkins and Thomas C. Slater Medical 
Marijuana Act. Amended to state that a registered qualifying 
patient shall not be subjected to arrest or penalty in any manner 
for selling, giving, or distributing marijuana used for medicinal 
purposes that does not exceed twelve marijuana plants and two 
and one half ounces of usable marijuana. Additionally, a person 
who is qualified as the primary caregiver of the registered 
qualifying patient and who has in his or her possession a registry 
identification card shall not be subjected to arrest or penalty if the 
marijuana was cultivated for medicinal purposes and the 
qualifying patient that the caregiver is connected to has been 
provided with an adequate amount of the marijuana to meet their 
medicinal needs. The law was further amended to state that all 
registry identification card applicants must apply to the state 
police for a criminal background check, and, if a felony drug 
offense conviction or a plea of nolo contendere for a felony drug 
offense is discovered, the state police shall inform the applicant 
and the Rhode Island Department of Health in writing that a 
felony drug offense has been found.  Furthermore, no state 
employees who are employed at a “compassion center” shall be 
subjected to arrest or penalty in any way for any and all conduct 
that occurs within the scope of his or her employment at the 
compassion center. 
 
2012 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 114, 133. An Act Relating to State 
Affairs and Government – State Police. Provides that local police 
officers who are assigned to the state police to be on a task force 
will have the same powers of arrest as sworn members of the state 
police when it is within their capacity as members of the task 
force and when they are working under the superintendent of the 
state police. 
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2012 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 159, 172. An Act Relating to Criminal 
Procedure – Search Warrants. Amended to provide that a search 
warrant will issue upon complaint in writing under the oath of a 
sworn law enforcement member of any city or town where that 
member is serving on a statewide task force. 
 
2012 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 187, 199. An Act Relating to Health and 
Safety. The “Rights of the Terminally Ill Act” is amended to 
include a section directing the Department of Health to establish 
the structure and content of Medical Orders for Life Sustaining 
Treatment (“MOLST”) according to certain guidelines. According 
to the parameters set forth in the amendment, a medical order for 
life sustaining treatment may be recorded as such provided that 
the medical orders for life-sustaining treatment and medical 
intervention and procedures have been explained to the patient by 
a MOLST qualified health care provider, and the form 
documenting the declaration has been completed and signed by a 
MOLST qualified health care provider, as well as by the qualified 
patient or his or her recognized health care decision maker. Upon 
evaluation and consultation with the patient or health care 
decision maker, a MOLST qualified health care provider may 
issue a new MOLST consistent with any new information that has 
become available about the patient’s health status and care 
preferences. The patient or his or her health care decision maker 
may revoke a MOLST at any time by informing the MOLST 
qualified health care providers, other health care providers, or any 
member of the medical or nursing staff of the revocation. 
 
2012 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 216, 230. An Act Relating to Criminal 
Offenses-Weapons.  This law amended section 11-47-3.2: Using a 
firearm when committing a crime of violence to state that under 
(b)(4) involuntary manslaughter shall not be considered a “crime 
of violence” for the purpose of subdivision (b)(4).  Section (b)(4) 
states that every person who, while committing an offense 
violating subjection (a), a crime of violence using a firearm shall 
be guilty of a felony and imprisoned for life if the crime of violence 
resulted in death or permanent incapacity of any person, other 
than the person convicted, from the discharge of the firearm.  
After the amendment, if a person uses a firearm while committing 
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involuntary manslaughter and death or permanent incapacitation 
results, the person committing the involuntary manslaughter is 
now not automatically imprisoned for life under (b)(4).  Prior to 
this law, involuntary manslaughter did not qualify as an exception 
to section (b)(4). 
 
2012 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 221, 233.  An Act Relating to Food and 
Drugs – Uniform Controlled Substances Act.  Sets forth scheme to 
decriminalize the possession of one ounce or less of marijuana for 
all individuals who are not already exempted from penalties for 
possession for medical use.  Provides that the sole penalty for the 
possession of one ounce of less of marijuana by individuals over 18 
who are not otherwise exempted from penalties shall be a civil 
penalty of $150 and the forfeiture of the marijuana for any first or 
second offense within the previous eighteen months.  Minors are 
subject to the same $150 civil penalty and forfeiture for any first 
or second offense within the previous eighteen months, provided 
the minor completes a court approved drug awareness and 
community service program.  Additionally, the minor’s 
parents/legal guardian shall be notified of the offense and the 
availability of court approved drug awareness and community 
service programs.  If the minor fails to complete the drug 
awareness and community service program within one year of the 
offense, the civil penalty is increased to $300, but no other 
additional sanctions are rendered.  Any third offense by any 
individual not otherwise exempted within eighteen months of two 
prior adjudications for possession of one ounce or less is subject to 
a misdemeanor punishable for not more than 30 days or a fine 
between $200 and $500 dollars.  With this Act, Rhode Island joins 
15 other states that have enacted some form of state-wide 
decriminalization legislation for the possession non-medical 
marijuana.  NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR THE REFORM OF 
MARIJUANA LAWS.  http://norml.org/states. 
 
2012 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 251, 263.  An Act Relating to Food and 
Drugs – Good Samaritan Overdose Prevention Act.  Provides 
various forms of immunity from civil liability and criminal 
sanctions for individuals seeking to assist another experiencing a 
drug overdose or drug-related medical emergency and individuals 
suffering from a drug overdose or drug-related medical emergency.  
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21-28.8-3 allows an individual to administer an “Opioid 
antagonist,” a drug which is used to fight the effects of an opiate-
based drug (largely pain medication) overdose if the individual 
administering the drug has a good faith belief that another person 
is experiencing a drug overdose and the individual acts with 
reasonable care in administering the drug.  The individual 
administering the Opioid antagonist under this section shall not 
be subject to civil liability or criminal prosecution for 
administering the antagonist.  Further, individuals who seek 
medical assistance for a drug overdose or drug-related medical 
emergency and individuals seeking medical assistance for another 
individual experiencing a drug overdose or drug-related medical 
emergency shall not be charged or prosecuted for drug related 
crimes under R.I. GEN. LAWS § § 21-28 or 21-28.5 except for crimes 
involving the manufacture or possession with the intent to 
manufacture a controlled substance or possession with intent to 
deliver a controlled substance. 
 
2012 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 256, 262.  An Act Relating to Insurance-
Health Insurance-Consumer Protection.  This Act amended Rhode 
Island statutes to be consistent with health insurance consumer 
protections enacted in federal law.  This Act establishes insurance 
rules, standards, and policies pursuant to, and in furtherance of 
the health insurance standards established in the federal Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, as amended by the 
federal Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010. 
 
2012 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 278, 284.  An Act Relating to Criminal 
Offenses-Assaults.  This Act makes domestic assault by 
strangulation a felony punishable for up to ten years in jail. The 
Act defines strangulation as “knowingly and intentionally 
impeding normal breathing or circulation of the blood by applying 
pressure on the throat or neck or by blocking the nose or mouth of 
another person with the intent to cause that person harm.” 
 
2012 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 289, 290.  An Act Relating to Revenue 
Protection.  This Act formally acknowledges the potential 
economic danger posed to the Rhode Island gaming facilities of 
Twin River (Lincoln, R.I.) and Newport Grand (Newport, R.I.) in 
light of neighboring Massachusetts’s approval of casino gambling 
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in several locations.  The Act provides a regulatory framework 
designed to protect the amount of revenue to be received by the 
State and host municipalities if casino gaming is approved by 
voters in the 2012 referenda (casino gaming was approved state-
wide and by the Town of Lincoln, but was not approved by the 
City of Newport).  Under the Act, the State will continue to receive 
approximately 61 percent of the net income from the video lottery 
terminals (VLTs) at Twin River (the same amount the State 
currently receives).  In addition, the State will receive 18 percent 
of the net table game revenue from table games at Twin River.  
However, this amount will decrease to 16 percent the first full 
fiscal year that the net terminal income from VLTs is less than 
the net terminal income from VLTs in the prior fiscal year.  Also, 
with the approval of casino gaming at Twin River, the Act 
provides that the Town of Lincoln shall receive continually 1.45 
percent of the net terminal income from VLTs without having to 
obtain year-to-year approval.  Further, should revenue from VLTs 
at Twin River decline, the Town of Lincoln shall receive 1 percent 
of net table game revenues from the share allocated to the licensed 
operator (the gaming company UTGR, Inc.) for a period of four 
years to ease the transition to table gaming.  Lastly, the Act 
provides that the Lottery Division shall have the authority to 
oversee the regulation of table gaming at Twin River. 
 
2012 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 301, 358. An Act Relating to Animals 
and Animal Husbandry – Dogs. Amended to include a new section 
that describes violations in relation to the treatment of dogs. 
Violations include keeping any dog on a tether that restricts 
movement to an area less than a six foot radius, tethering a dog 
with a choke-type collar, keeping any dog tethered for more than 
10 hours during a 24 hour period, or keeping a dog in a pen or 
cage for longer than 14 hours in a 24 hour period. Tether is 
defined as the practice of fastening a dog to a stationary object or 
stake by a chain, rope or other tethering device as a means of 
keeping the dog under control. 
 
2012 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 309, 354. An Act Relating to Motor and 
Other Vehicles- Accidents and Accident Reports. The Act places a 
duty on individuals involved in a motor vehicle accident which 
results in any physical injury or death to pull over and request 
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police assistance.  None compliance with this new law constitutes 
a felony with an automatic one-year minimum driver’s license 
suspension, a maximum 5 year imprisonment, and $5,000 fine. 
 
2012 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 311, 333.  An Act Relating to 
Commercial Law – General Regulatory Provisions – Unfair Sales 
Practices.  This Act provides specific protections for consumers 
against price gouging of essential commodities during states of 
emergency declared by the Governor or during federal disasters 
declared by the President.  The Act supplements the broad 
protective powers set forth in the Rhode Island Emergency 
Management Act.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 30-15-1 et. seq.  The Act 
declares that it shall be an unfair trade practice to sell or offer to 
sell consumers an unconscionably high price for any essential 
commodity in any area in which there has been declared a state of 
emergency or federal disaster.  Whether a price is unconscionably 
high is determined by comparing the price of the allegedly 
overpriced commodity to the 30 day average price for which the 
commodity was offered for sale in the particular effected area 
(legitimate discounts offered by sellers during the 30 day period 
are not to impact the calculation).  The Act defines essential 
commodities as any goods, services, materials, merchandise, 
supplies, equipment, resources, or other article of commerce, and 
includes, without limitation, home heating fuels, motor fuels, food, 
water, ice, chemicals, petroleum products and lumber necessary 
for consumption or use as a direct result of the market emergency.  
Further, the Act sets forth the penalties to be paid for violation of 
the Act, including up to $1,000 per violation and up to $25,000 per 
twenty-four hour period, the costs of litigating the offense, and the 
disgorgement of profits earned from the violation.  In light of the 
extensive damage and declarations of emergency by both the 
Governor and the President in response to Superstorm Sandy, 
there is the potential that consumers could file actions this coming 
year under this Act. 
 
2012 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 316, 356. An Act Relating to Property- 
Rhode Island Fair Housing Practices Act- Chapter 37.1 Homeless 
Bill of Rights. Rhode Island has passed the country’s first 
Homeless Bill of Rights. The Bill prohibits governments, police, 
healthcare workers, landlords or employers from treating 
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homeless people unfairly because of their housing status. 
Homeless individuals who believe they have faced discrimination 
now have grounds to sue. 
 
2012 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 373, 395.  An Act Relating to Courts 
and Civil Procedure – Procedure Generally – Evidence.  The 
stated goal of this Act is to “relieve physicians and the other 
medical professionals. . .who are associated with hospitals and 
other health care facilities from the hardship and inconvenience of 
attending court as witnesses.”  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-27.  
Accordingly, the Act calls upon trial courts to “liberally construe 
this section to admit what is presumptively reliable medical 
evidence.”  Id.  The Act provides for the admissibility of medical 
record affidavits which are admissible for the fair and reasonable 
charge for the services and/or the necessity of the services or 
treatment, the diagnoses and prognoses, opinions as to causation 
of conditions diagnosed, and opinions as to disability, incapacity or 
permanency, if any, proximately resulting from the condition so 
diagnosed.  The new legislation allows for affidavits to incorporate 
by reference other records or written statements, whether 
contemporaneous with the treatment or not, which are relied upon 
by the affiant in reaching the opinions set forth in the affidavit.  
Additionally, the Act allows an authorized agent of the hospital or 
health care facility to subscribe and swear to the statements in 
the medical records and provides that such records shall not be 
deemed inadmissible simply because a particular physician affiant 
employed by the hospital or health care facility has not subscribed 
to the affidavit.  This addition allows individuals other than those 
who treated a particular individual to provide testimony regarding 
the medical necessity of treatment and the causation of injury.  
However, the Act provides the protection of allowing the adverse 
party, at the expense of the affidavit proponent, to a reasonable 
cross-examination of the affiant at the affiant’s office for up to an 
hour (additional cross-examination time is to be paid by the 
adverse party).  Further, the more relaxed evidentiary rules do not 
apply to medical malpractice cases. R.I. GEN. LAWS §  9-19-27(h).  
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-27.2 essentially maintains the original 
requirements for the use of medical record affidavits in medical 
malpractice cases. 
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2012 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 375, 394. An Act Relating to Businesses 
and Professions- Real Estate Sales Disclosures. The Act requires 
that every contract for the purchase and sale of real estate allow a 
potential purchaser to conduct inspections of the property before 
the purchaser is bound by the contract terms. The inspection shall 
occur within a ten day period, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays 
and holidays. The parties have the right to mutually agree upon a 
different period of time; provided, a potential purchaser may 
waive this right to inspection in writing. This inspection period 
has become an implied term for all real estate purchases, and its 
failure to appear in the agreement is not detrimental to the 
existence of a contract nor does it entitle a party to avoid the 
contract. 
 
2012 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 408, 414. An Act Relating to Health and 
Safety- Food Allergy Awareness in Restaurants. This Act 
mandates that all Rhode Island food-service establishments (1) 
prominently display a poster in the staff area, which must be 
approved by the director of health or his or her duly appointed 
agents (“Director”), providing information about allergies to 
restaurant employees; (2) include on all menus a notice to 
customers of the customer’s obligation to inform the server about 
any food language, which the Director must also approve; and (3) 
that restaurants have a manager who has knowledge about food 
allergies as they relate to food preparation, either through 
mandatory trainings or certification programs. Further, the Act 
established a “Food Allergy Friendly” designations for restaurants 
that meet certain requirements.  Restaurants that receive this 
title will be listed on the department of health’s website. 
 
2012 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 420, 485.  An Act Relating to Public 
Officers and Employers-Merit System.  This Act eliminates the 
definition of a veteran under Section 36-4-19 Placement of names 
on employment lists—Listing of veterans.  In place of the past 
definition, the Act splits up veteran into two categories: “war 
veteran” and “veteran.”  A war veteran is any veteran of any 
conflict of war, undeclared war or contingency operation who has 
earned a campaign ribbon or expeditionary medal for his or her 
service.  The war veteran must have been honorably or generally 
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discharged from the armed forces.  A veteran is a person who 
served on active duty for other than training for a period of more 
than thirty days and was discharged or released from anything 
other than dishonorable discharge; or war discharged or released 
from active duty because of a service-connected disability; or 
served as a member of the national guard of reserve forces and 
served a minimum of twenty years of honorable service in the 
national guard or reserve forces, has received a certificate of 
retirement and has been honorably or generally discharged from 
the national guard or reserve forces. 
 
2012 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 436, 476.  An Act Relating to Elections.  
The Act prohibits the government from creating a polling place 
serving less than five hundred total eligible registered voters, and 
amends the Act to make an exception for when a polling place is 
located in a low income or elderly residential development.  The 
amendment also prohibits the government from eliminating an 
existing polling place presently located in a low-income or elderly 
residential development. 
 
2012 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 448, 454. An Act Relating to Public 
Records- Access to Public Records Act. The Act provides greater 
protection for individuals seeking public records by allowing them 
to remain anonymous. The Act makes more information public, 
and increases fines on non-complying agencies. Agencies must 
now pay the legal fees of citizens and journalists who have to 
bring suit to get access to public records, and who eventually win 
those suits. The most significant change of the new law is the 
“balancing test” between the public and the private information, 
which is designed to counter a broad exemption of the old law that 
concealed all “personally identifiable” records from the public and 
now mirrors the federal Freedom of Information Act.  The Act 
makes personnel records of government officials and employees 
public, except when disclosure would constitute “an unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy” pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552. Further, 
the Act requires that certain details of an arrest, such as name, 
alleged crime and crime scene location, to be released in terms of 
an arrest log within 48 hours on weekdays or 72 hours on 
weekends of an arrest. It also clarifies that contracts with public 
employees and pension data are public information. 
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